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Issued in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (ISSN 0032-3195) is published by the Academy of Political Science, 619 West 114th Street, Suite 500, New York, New York 10025. Subscriptions are obtained through membership in the Academy. Regular membership, $17.50 a year. Three years, $46.00. Students, $13.00 a year. Libraries and institutions, $24.00 a year. Foreign postage, $2.00 additional per year. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y., and additional mailing offices. Volume 95 Number 1 Spring 1980.

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Political Science Quarterly

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Articles that appeared in the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY before 1953 are indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* and since that year in the *Social Sciences Index*. Articles are also listed in *ABC Pol Sci*, the *International Bibliography of Political Science*, and the *Public Affairs Information Services Bulletin* and abstracted in *United States Political Science Documents*, *The International Political Science Abstracts*, *Historical Abstracts*, and *America: History and Life*. Book reviews are listed in the *Book Review Index* to *Social Science Periodicals*, *Book Reviews Index*, and *Book Review Digest*. A title page and an index of articles and book reviews for each volume of the QUARTERLY are included in the Winter issue.

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont.

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Volume 95
Number 1
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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

CORNELIUS P. COTTER and JOHN F. BIBBY analyze the institutionalization of the Democratic and Republican national party organizations. They conclude that during a period when survey research shows that party identification is declining among voters, the national party committees have been growing stronger institutionally.

HENRY BIENEN explores the globalist versus regionalist debate in international affairs and considers the ramifications of this debate for U.S. foreign policy toward Africa.

GLEN D. CAMP argues that a negotiated solution to the Cyprus conflict is possible with a federal central government linking two regions, one Greek Cypriot and the other Turkish Cypriot, into a single polity with sovereign powers. Such a solution would require three prerequisites for success: it must be negotiated, not forced upon either community; it must be aided by active pressure from friendly foreign powers; and the negotiations must take place under the aegis of the U.N. secretary-general.

JOAN HULSE THOMPSON describes the role perceptions she found in 1976 among women members of the House of Representatives and contrasts these with the role conceptions established by other studies for male members of the House.

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., traces the idea of "the just war" through the history of international relations and shows how international organizations have succeeded the medieval church as custodians of that idea.

BARTON J. BERNSTEIN reassesses the relationship between the U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey and the Cuban missile crisis. He concludes that analysts previously missed critical evidence and thus erroneously reported that President Kennedy ordered the removal of the Jupiters from Turkey before the Cuban crisis erupted and that the Kennedy administration considered trading its Jupiters in Turkey only after the Soviets raised the issue.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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Institutional Development of Parties and the Thesis of Party Decline

CORNELIUS P. COTTER
JOHN F. BIBBY

The theories by which social scientists attempt to explain complex social trends are necessarily partial and grounded upon limited expertise and particular experiences. In a disconcerting way, such theories tend to be outstripped by the pace of the change that they are designed to explain, and observation and data collecting continue to be guided by the partially outmoded theories.

The recognition by scholars that events are occurring in combinations that do not conform to theory can be a wrenching experience. Economists and government decision makers are perplexed by the anomaly of recession and rising unemployment accompanied by rising interest rates and increasing inflation. This conjunction does not conform to the expectations derived from accepted economic theory.

Political scientists, pushing the concept of electoral realignment to the limits of its logic and working from the methodological strength of survey and attitudinal research, have formulated and tested a theory of politics that leads them to conclude that American political parties are in steady decline and may verge upon extinction. The electorate's declining commitment to party, the apparent lessened interest of activists in party organization, and the salience of personality and issue over party loyalty are indicators of party decline. This conclusion may have merit when considered in terms of the capacity of party organizations to broker presidential nominations or manage presidential campaigns. This article presents evidence supporting a contrary thesis; that is, while national parties are less involved than in the past in controlling presidential nominations,

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managing presidential campaigns, and dispensing federal patronage, they are more heavily engaged in rule enforcement, campaign and organizational services, and administrative activities. In addition, national parties are exerting greater discipline over their respective state and local organizations and influencing those organizations through the services they provide.

Attention to these trends in party organization is helpful in assessing the condition of our parties and in putting in perspective current findings of a general weakening of the party organizations.[1] In this article we suggest the need to reconcile these findings with another and anomalous finding that emerges from the study of archival sources on the two national party committees; namely, a clear pattern of increasing strength of national party institutions.

Austin Ranney has identified three general types of party change in the United States: establishment of the party system; changes in the party system; and changes internal to a party.[2] This article focuses on internal party change and considers the 1968–78 party reforms as part of a process of continuous change. This process includes at least three dimensions: *institutionalization of the national party; nationalization* and *integration* of the traditionally diffuse, stratarchical parties; and *elite insurgency for control of party organization* as representatives of newly mobilized groups (often designated as "amateurs," or "purists" by political scientists) engage in contests with dominant elites ("professionals" and "regulars") for such control.

Institutionalization of the National Party

Institutionalization, as defined in this article, is a process involving changing roles of party chairmen, national committee members, and staff; the development of staff continuity; the elaboration of programmatic activity and division of labor; the development of regular financing; and rule elaboration. The critical dimension that distinguishes institutionalization from bureaucratization is the development of the national party headquarters as agencies that have sufficient autonomy to enable them to define and pursue their own programs, with assurance that their continued existence does not depend upon the whim of a presidential candidate or party chairman.

The National Party Headquarters

A significant step in the process of institutionalization was the development of the national committee from an ad hoc group to a continuously operating party headquarters.[3] At their inception, national party committees were committees

[1] See, for example, David Broder, *The Party's Over* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); and Ruth K. Scott and Ronald J. Hrebenar, *Parties in Crisis* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1979).

[2] See Austin Ranney, *Curing the Mischiefs of Faction: Party Reform in America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 61.

[3] See Cornelius P. Cotter and Bernard C. Hennessy, *Politics Without Power: The National Party*

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of correspondence composed of representatives from the states and charged with keeping various elements of the party in touch, and the party alive, between presidential election years. The chairman was drawn from the committee membership, and to him was delegated the full discretion of the committee to manage the presidential campaign. Initially, an executive committee was also drawn from the national committee membership, and this was the campaign committee. The committees functioned for a few months in campaign years.

In the post-Civil War era non-committee members became eligible for leadership posts and functional differentiation appeared. Executive committees no longer need be drawn exclusively from the national committee membership, and the national chairman might come from outside the committee. Subcommittees were created with at least nominal charge for various aspects of the campaign: scheduling engagements for speakers, distributing literature, or communicating with the foreign born. Just as national government before the Constitution was conducted with congressional committees serving as executive agencies, the national parties attempted administration by committee. And, of course, vestiges of such party administration, more or less successful, are abundant today.

The period of transition from sketchily differentiated functions performed by notables who came in every four years to a continuous operation performed by professionals extended into the recent past. For example, the Hoover campaign in 1928 was conducted by congressmen, senators, governors, and other notables in Washington, D.C., and New York, with the assistance of short-time professionals borrowed from their regular positions.[4] James A. Farley in *Behind the Ballots* lists the officeholding notables whom he involved in campaign management roles in 1932.[5]

Even with this continuing pattern of ad hoc staffing, the national committees began developing year-round headquarters early in this century. Chairman Will Hays (1918–21) is credited with initiating regular staffing and the conception of a continuous operation at the Republican National Committee (RNC). In an organizational memorandum of 1935, Chairman Henry P. Fletcher (1934–36) confirms this, reporting that for the past seventeen years the RNC had kept the party headquarters open on a continuous basis, "upon the theory that it is cheaper from strictly a dollars and cents standpoint, and far more effective from the standpoint of results in a campaign, to keep the organization alive than it is to wait until after the National Convention and attempt in the short time before the opening of the campaign . . . to set up the machinery and perfect the details."[6]

Committees (New York: Atherton, 1964), chap. 2; Gordon S. P. Kleeberg, *The Formation of the Republican Party* (New York: Moods Publishing Co., 1911); and Jesse Macy, *Party Organization and Machinery* (New York: Century, 1904).

[4] See Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly, *The 1928 Campaign: An Analysis* (New York: Richard R. Smith, 1931); and idem., *The 1932 Campaign: An Analysis* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1935).

[5] James A. Farley, *Behind the Ballots* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1938), pp. 161–62.

[6] "Memorandum of Details," p. 1, attached to RNC Chairman Henry P. Fletcher's "Proposed Pro-

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The Democratic National Committee (DNC) headquarters has operated continuously since the 1928 presidential campaign. After his defeat in that campaign, Governor Al Smith called upon the Democratic party to develop a positive educational program "rather than sit by . . . with the hope of profiting solely by the mistakes and failures of the opposition." DNC Chairman John Raskob (1928–32) created a permanent executive committee chaired by Jouett Shouse and recruited as full-time director of publicity Charles Michelson, "who trained his guns on the Hoover Administration and never ceased firing until the Republicans evacuated Washington. Thus, for the first time, the minority party served as a continuous and effective critic of the majority party in the interim between presidential elections."[7]

By 1959 the two party committees had well-established patterns of continuous staffing and activity and as Stephen K. Bailey observed:

> The permanent staffs of the national party committees and the variety of committee functions have grown greatly during the past decade. Until World War II both national committees were served by skeletal staffs, except for the few months before national presidential elections. Today both of them maintain year-round staffs of between seventy-five and a hundred people. In election years this number doubles or triples. The annual budget of each committee amounts to almost a million dollars—a figure which sky-rockets during election years.[8]

Table 1 provides trend data on national committee staffing between 1952 and 1977. Despite the surge-and-decline character of staffing revealed in the table, since 1950 the number of employees never dipped below forty for the DNC and eighty for the RNC. What is probably most impressive about the staffing figures in Table 1 is the regular incidence of off-year staffing at the level of seventy or more persons for both parties. It is also notable that for only two years, 1960 and 1962, did the DNC have more employees than the RNC. This is consistent with the other aspects of party institutionalization that show the Republicans to be stronger in organization than the Democrats—possibly a reflection of strong financial resources, but possibly a cultural distinction also.

Committee operations may be continuous, but the electoral cycle has imposed radical fluctuations in work load. Chairman Work in 1928, Farley in 1932, Hamilton in 1936, Mitchell in 1952, Butler in 1956, and Bailey in 1964 (on

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gram of Activities of Republican National Committee Preliminary to National Convention of 1936," [15 April 1935], RNC Files, Box 95, RNC General folder, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

[7] Peel and Donnelly, *The 1932 Campaign*, pp. 11–12; Thomas S. Barclay, "The Publicity Division of the Democratic Party, 1929–30," *American Political Science Review* 25 (February 1931): 68–72; 73, n. 4. Also see "History of the Democratic National Committee," [ca. 1956], unsigned typescript in Sprecher Papers, Box 1, Subj File, Advisory Cttee—Political Org. (4), John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Mass. [hereafter JFKL].

[8] Stephen K. Bailey, "The Condition of Our National Political Parties," Occasional Paper on the Role of the Political Process in the Free Society, Fund for the Republic, New York, 1959, p. 21.

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TABLE 1

Staffing at the National Committees

Year	Estimated Size of Paid Staff	
	DNC	RNC
1935	na	11
1952	251	386
1953	59	98
1954	77	107
1955	59	108
1956	201	250
1957	74	85
1958	100	80 to 100
1960	375	352
1961	75	89
1962	107	100
1963	70	124
1964	302	618
1965	85	117
1966	92	116
1967	85	138
1968	317	184 (484 including NYC Office)
1969	87	191
1972	50	na
1977	40	220

Sources: The principal sources for these figures are Hugh A. Bone, *American Politics and the Party System* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), table 6-1, p. 170; and Bone's *Party Committees and National Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), table 1, p. 27. The 1935 figure is from "Memorandum of Detail," attached to RNC Chairman Henry P. Fletcher's "Proposed Program of Activities of Republican National Committee Preliminary to the National Convention of 1936," RNC Files, Box 95, RNC General folder, Eisenhower Library. The 1958 estimates are from Philip S. Wilder, Jr., *Meade Alcorn and The 1958 Election* (New York: Holt, 1959), and the 18 March 1959, *Congressional Quarterly*, CQ note to editors, precis of Francis M. Carney's parallel study of the DNC under Butler. The figures for the 1970s are from Charles H. Longley, "Party Nationalization in America," in *Paths to Political Reform*, ed. William J. Crotty (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath & Co., forthcoming).

instruction of Lyndon Johnson who personally supervised and pressed for radical reductions) are examples of party leaders who imposed drastic post-election staff cuts. Farley and Butler, perhaps others, sent termination notices to the entire staff and then hired some back. We are told that Farley's notices went out at the Chicago convention, and staff members had to find their own transportation home.[9] Certainly, then, however bureaucratized the national committees may appear compared with committees of correspondence, they do not provide the most secure employment auspices.

[9] For staff cutting under Work see Memo, RNC Secretary Franklin Fort, attached to RNC finding aid, Herbert C. Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa; for Farley, see Neale Roach Oral

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As the process of institutionalization has proceeded, the role of the chairman has changed. Two principal elements in the evolving role of the chairman are stressed here: The national committee is no longer a mere extension of the chairman's personality. While the chairman will make a difference in the organization, emphases, and effectiveness of the committee, the collegial committee and the headquarters operation have institutional life separate from the chairman's and can impose some role expectations on the chairman. Moreover, the chairmanship is now a full-time, paid position within each party, and so stated in the party rules.

Prior to the 1930s, the national committee of either party was largely an extension of the personality of the chairman. Just as some state committee headquarters still move to the town or city preferred by a newly elected chairman, national committee business in the 1920s could be taken care of in Chicago or New York, depending upon the convenience of the chairman. A wealthy chairman could play angel to the the national committee. John J. Raskob, Al Smith's DNC chairman, for example, ran up a party debt of $1,550,000, much of which he personally financed.[10]

Today, however, the national chairman administers a sizable staff of specialists who carry out ongoing national committee programs. The committees have also regularized their funding operations. In addition, RNC and DNC rules governing the role and powers of the chairman are now highly explicit and preclude chairmen functioning in the freewheeling fashion of a John Raskob.

The role of the committee as a channel of influence with the administration is changing. A few decades ago it was understood that the chairman and his cronies might legitimately benefit from exerting the influence associated with that position. It is still a job that involves personal loyalty to an incumbent president, but within the changing framework of law, there are now some things that a president is unlikely to ask of a chairman, and there are some requests to which a chairman will say no. Witness, for example, the Republican National Committee's rejection of President Ford's request for use of the RNC contributor lists in 1975.[11] The Harvard Institute of Politics Study Group reported to the

History (1969), p. 2, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.; for Butler, see his memo "To All Employees," 25 October 1956, Papers of Lina D. Adams, Truman Library; and for the experience under Johnson, see Clifford Carter Oral History, pt. 5, p. 28, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas [hereafter LBJL].

[10] Charles Michelson, "Dispelling the Fog," 12 January 1936. There are three sources of "Dispelling the Fog" holdings at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y. [hereafter FDRL]: Scrap Books of the Good Neighbor League, Boxes 16 and 17; DNC Records, Release Books, Container 1202; and Official Files, OF 300, Boxes 104, 105, and 106.

[11] "G.O.P. Chiefs Deny Ford Aides Access to Contributor List," by Warren Weaver, Jr., *New York Times*, 8 December 1975, p. 1. Weaver reports that "when Democratic challenges arose to President Truman in 1952 and President Johnson in 1968, the party's National Committee unwaveringly supported the incumbent." He suggests that "during the Administrations of Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953-61 and Richard M. Nixon in 1969-74, it would have been unthinkable for the National Committee to offer any sort of cooperation to a candidate challenging the President."

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House Administration Committee in 1979 that "neither the Republican nor the Democratic National Committees will share their direct mail lists with their candidates running for federal office."[12] The Federal Election Campaign Act, in forcing an early and highly formal acknowledgment of a first-term president's status as candidate for reelection, makes it increasingly difficult for a party chairman to maintain the appearance of neutrality among competitors for the nomination while loyally serving the president. Indeed, Kennedy supporters invoked a supposed standard of neutrality and chided Democratic Chairman John White in the DNC Executive Committee meeting for his open support of President Carter. In the full committee meeting the next day a hastily improvised section of the program was devoted to appeals by supporters of Brown, Kennedy, and Carter.[13]

The party chairmanship has been moving from a highly personalized, part-time, unsalaried position to a full-time, salaried position with a fairly well-defined role prescription. The first full-time, paid chairman was John Hamilton of the RNC (1936–40); Robert E. Hannegan (1944–47) became the DNC's first full-time, paid chairman.[14] After alternating between part-time and full-time chairmen, both parties now have rules that call for a full-time chairman, and both Republican Bill Brock (1977–) and Democrat John White (1978–) serve in that capacity.

The chairmanship has become fully differentiated from federal executive positions. As late as the 1940s, however, DNC Chairman Hannegan was also serving in the patronage rich position of postmaster general. This pattern of dual incumbency included two RNC chairmen (George B. Cortelyou [1904–1907] and Hays) and three DNC chairmen (Farley, Frank C. Walker [1943–44] and Hannegan) in this century. The tradition was apparently ended by President Dwight Eisenhower, who was adamant that neither the party chairman nor any member of the national committee would simultaneously hold a federal executive position.[15] It is unlikely that another national chairman will hold federal office while running the party headquarters. Even the common tendency of senators and congressmen to serve as national chairmen may be passé now that both parties have rules that require a full-time chairman.

[12] U.S., Congress, House, Administration Committee, *An Analysis of the Impact of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 1972–78*, 96th Cong., 1st sess., October 1979, p. 10. Very significantly for our analysis the report continues with this parenthetical observation: "The RNC does, however, share their lists with their State parties, allowing them to make decisions over how the list will be used" (p. 10).

[13] The most complete stories are to be found in the *San Antonio Light*, 9 and 10 November 1979. The committee met in that Texas city, reportedly the first nonelection year meeting outside of Washington, D.C., in twenty-five years.

[14] American Political Science Association, Committee on Political Parties, *Toward A More Responsible Two-Party System* (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1950), p. 49; and "Supplement," *American Political Science Review* 44 (September 1950).

[15] Eisenhower to Arthur E. Summerfield, 21 January 1953; and Eisenhower exchange with Summerfield's son, Arthur E., Jr., 29 May and 13 June 1957, Administration File, Box 40, Summerfield, and Summerfield Jr., folders, Eisenhower Library.

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Elaboration of Functions at the National Committees

In describing the national committees in 1906, James A. Woodburn listed five working subdivisions: executive committee (or "campaign committee"); finance committee; committee in charge of bureau of speakers; committee in charge of literary and press matters; committee in charge of distribution of public documents.[16] These functions have persisted and been added to over the succeeding decades.

The growth in national committee activities during the ensuing half-century was revealed in a report prepared for RNC Chairman Meade Alcorn (1957–59). Alcorn convened a group to propose staff reductions. The executives who composed the group identified eleven divisions that "must exist": executive division (chairman's office), administrative division (lower level management), mail room, public relations, research ("absolutely essential"), finance, speakers bureau, patronage division, federated women, young Republicans, and the new southern division.[17] Six divisions were less essential—to the extent that they had already sustained cuts, or could be cut: women's division, nationalities, minorities, labor, agriculture, and campaign division. Twelve of the divisions that were the subject of Alcorn's 1957 staff report did not exist in 1935.

At the 23–25 May 1979 Democratic National Committee meetings in Washington, D.C., DNC staff reported on programs to support congressional and senatorial candidates, a regional director setup and field staff activities, a direct mail program, and support services for various party officer and public officeholders groups. At the RNC meeting in Minneapolis a month later the emphasis was upon computerized political accounting and donor information systems available to state chairmen and RNC participation in state campaigns down to the county level.

The presidential functions of the national committees persist—issuing the "Call" (which includes delegate apportionment and selection rules), determining convention logistics, and participating in presidential campaigns. In recent decades, however, the presidential campaigns have increasingly been conducted by separate campaign organizations set up by the candidates. The Federal Election Campaign Act permits the candidate to designate the national committee as principal campaign committee, but it seems unlikely that this option will be taken.

While the presidential campaign role of the national committees has been receding, the committees have expanded their nonpresidential activities. For example, both the DNC and the RNC have become increasingly involved in midterm and special congressional elections, and the RNC under Bill Brock has become heavily involved in state and even local election campaigns. Both par-

[16] James A. Woodburn, *Political Parties and Party Problems in the United States* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1906), pp. 202, 296–97.

[17] Memorandum to Chairman Alcorn on RNC Operations from Robert Humphreys et. al., 12 June 1957, Humphreys' Papers, Box 10, 1954–59 RNC Campaign Director, Eisenhower Library.

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ties also increasingly engage in a broad range of party-building activities and have programs for elite constituencies beyond the presidency—state legislators, mayors, and governors.

This brief survey of national committee activities in this century reveals not only an elaboration of functions, but a broadening and diversifying of the national committee constituency away from exclusively presidential concerns. As the national committees move to regionalize their offices, maintain staff in the field, and provide services to state party organizations, it is likely that they will develop a firmer base of grass-roots support.

Financing the National Committees

Continuity of staffing and the operation of a national party headquarters are contingent upon paying salaries, rent, and telephone bills, or at least having a good enough credit rating to defer some of these payments. The institutionalization of the national parties has therefore been heavily dependent upon developing relatively stable funding mechanisms.

The RNC appears to have an edge on the DNC in terms of size and sophistication of national party programs. A large part of the explanation for this is perhaps that the Republicans started businesslike, broad-based finance solicitations in the mid-1930s, some twenty years ahead of the Democrats. Another part of the explanation probably is that the DNC has been obliged to absorb much higher campaign debts on a more continuous basis than the RNC. This has meant that in noncampaign years, when the RNC is collecting money for current programs and future use, the DNC must devote a large part of its income to debt reduction, restricting its staff and program as it pursues solvency. The Federal Election Campaign Act amendments of 1974 and 1976 should, however, relieve the DNC of such campaign debts in the future and to that degree strengthen it.

Data on the costs for continuous operating expenses of the two national committees are scarce. Those that do exist point to a steady increase in the cost of committee operations. DNC and RNC monthly expenditure data which are available from various sources reveal the following patterns.[18]

[18] Sources for DNC expenditures by year: 1923, 1928–30, 1954, and 1955, "History of the Democratic National Committee," Sprecher Papers, Box 1, JFKL; 1935, Fletcher Memorandum, RNC Files, Box 95, Eisenhower Library;1951 and 1952, DNC Budget, Pres. Sec. Files, Box 54, Truman Library; 1959, Butler Finance Memo, 6 Nov. 1959, DNC Rec., Ch. Butler Files, Box 440, Finances, JFKL: 1965, DNC Audit, Office Files of White House Aides, Watson, Container 19, LBJL; 1966, John Criswell to Marvin Watson, memo, 5 December 1966, White House Central Files, Ex Pl, Box 111, LBJL. The 1970 and 1975 estimates are taken from Charles Longley's "Party Nationalization in America," in *Paths to Political Reform*, ed. William J. Crotty (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath & Co., forthcoming). We thank Professor Longley for making this available to us.

Sources for RNC expenditures by year: 1954, see Bacher memo, 7 December 1954, RNC Office of Chairman, Box 101, Leonard Hall 1954 [1] folder, Eisenhower Library; for the 1965 figure, see *Washington Post*, 1 April 1965.

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DNC Monthly expenditure data:

1923:	$ 13,882	1954:	$ 83,333 (estimate)
1928–29:	15,875	1955:	83,333 (estimate)
1929–30:	15,875	1959:	85,058
1935:	16,000 (estimate)	1965:	169,986
1951:	109,718	1966:	61,500
1952:	53,545 (projected)	1970:	150,000 (estimate)
		1975:	200,000 (estimate)

RNC Monthly expenditure data:

1935:	$ 35,000 (estimate of Chairman Fletcher)
1954:	77,295
1965:	125,000

Thus, the two national committees have moved from a monthly operating cost range of $5,000 to $20,000 in the 1920s and early 1930s (perhaps more than $100,000 per year) to a level fluctuating between $50,000 and $200,000 per month (or about $600,000 to $1 million a year) from 1950 on. Generating a reliable flow of income to sustain these spending needs is a measure of the survival capabilities of these two party organizations.

Given the technological advances that have been made since the mid-thirties, it is surprising how much of the contemporary national committee financing technique goes back to the effort under Chairman John Hamilton and Carlton G. Ketchum, long-time adviser to the Republican party, to set up a modern financing operation for a continuously operating national party headquarters. A National Republican Finance Committee was set up, and for the first time the "money collecting for the National Committee and the two Congressional campaign committees was to be centralized in a single agency."[19]

Ketchum set up a sustaining membership program—precursor of contemporary sustaining mass mail solicitation programs. He signed up 4,738 sustaining members in 1937, who pledged specific amounts for 1938, 1939, and 1940. A very high ratio (95.6 percent) of the pledges was collected totaling $202,343 in 1938. The state quota system also originated in this era. Under this system, each state is assigned a quota that represents its share of national committee quota income for the coming year. In 1962 the RNC under William Miller (1961–64) went back to direct mail solicitation of sustaining members conducted by professional fund raisers. In its third year, in 1965, the revived direct mail sustaining membership program "contributed 40.1% of the Republican National Committee's total receipts" for the year.[20] In 1978, the Republican National Finance Committee made $9,730,000 available to the RNC, 81 percent of which was ob-

[19] Karl A. Lamb, "John Hamilton and the Revitalization of the Republican Party, 1936–40," Papers of the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts, and Letters 45, 1960 (1959 Meeting), p. 238; also see Cotter and Hennessy, *Politics Without Power*, chap. 9.

[20] *Report by the Chairman, to the Republican National Committee*, 1 July 1965–21 January 1966, p. 2.

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tained from direct mail solicitations which averaged $37.34 each. Direct mail was not, however, the only arrow in the GOP financial quiver: it also received $2,110,000 from 211 individual contributors to the Republican Eagle Program; 1067 persons contributed between $1,000 and $10,000 each to join the National Republican Associates Club, and political action committees accounted for $250,000.[21]

Efforts by Democrats to institute regularized funding operations were begun much later than for the Republicans and generally have yielded less revenue. Under pressure of a heavy campaign deficit, Chairman Stephen Mitchell (1952–55) adopted the state quota system at the DNC, and in 1958, Paul Butler (1955–60) appointed a full-time finance promotion director, Kenneth Birkhead, whose job it was to meet the $700,000 annual cost of Butler's national committee operation.[22]

A committee on fund-raising techniques recommended that the DNC establish a permanent Democratic finance committee, "supplemented by adequate staff." The national committee approved the recommendation, and by June 1960 finance committee Chairman Roger L. Stevens was soliciting contributions on behalf of the new committee.[23] This was the first modern effort at joint fund raising by the DNC and the Democratic campaign committees in Congress. It lasted until the DNC, without the approval of the congressional Democrats, took $860,000 that had been raised at a congressional dinner and used it to pay off the 1964 presidential campaign debt.[24]

According to Herbert Alexander, "no Democratic program was more successful or raised more questions, than the President's Club, begun in 1961." It was patterned after the 750 Club which, between 1957 and 1960, enlisted 750 givers of $1,000 each to pay off the 1956 Stevenson campaign debt and the "One Thousand Club" of FDR's last months in office. By 1964 the President's Club had 4,000 members and for 1965–67, 2,000 members. Between 1961 and 1966 the President's Club accounted for $6,371,000 of contributions to the national Democratic coffers.[25]

The Democratic Charter of 1974 provides for a National Finance Council with "general responsibility for the finances of the Democratic Party and the Democratic National Committee." At a June 1977 meeting of the executive com-

[21] *Republican National Committee—1979 Chairman's Report*, pp. 21–22.

[22] 18 March 1959, *Congressional Quarterly*, CQ note to editors, precis of Francis M. Carney's study of the DNC under Butler, Washington, D.C.

[23] "Minutes of Committee on Fund Raising Techniques," meeting of 22 February 1958, and letter of Roger L. Stevens of 14 June 1960, both in Papers of David D. Lloyd, DNC National Finance Committee folder, Truman Library.

[24] Walter Pincus, "Internal Struggle for 1968 Campaign Funds Grips Democrats," *Washington Post*, 4 February 1968.

[25] Herbert E. Alexander, *Money in Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1972), pp. 96–98. John Criswell points out the FDR connection in a note to Marvin Watson with attached program for the launching dinner, 20 January 1945 in Office Files of the President (Territo), Political, DNC, etc., LBJL.

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mittee of the council, 100 members each pledged to raise $200,000 for the party over the next four years. Each is to give $20,000 and recruit nine other persons to give $20,000. If all goes well, this will produce "a golden nest egg by 1980 of $20 million in all, contributed by just 1,000 donors."[26]

We believe that public funding programs currently on the statute books have probably, on balance, aided the national committees and enhanced their autonomy. The federal support for nominating conventions relieves the committees of about a million dollars of fund-raising responsibility, beyond the host city and nonpartisan committee contributions. The statutory reservation to the committees of an expenditure entitlement separate from the campaign subsidy to the presidential candidate guarantees each committee an integral role in the campaign,[27] and the direct mail, sustained membership pledge programs offer the national committees the secure and continuous financing they require.

Nationalization and Integration

Charles H. Longley has proposed that the emerging model of party organization in the United States is one of *nationalization* rather than the hitherto prevalent model of decentralized and diffuse party structures.[28] Similarly, Austin Ranney in analyzing the impact of post-1968 reforms concluded that "the national party organs' power to make rules governing presidential nominating processes is . . . at its highest peak by far since the early 1820s."[29] These statements reflect a change of major proportions in American party organization. In fact, this process of nationalization is a long-term trend with antecedents dating to the 1940s. The nationalization of party organization in the United States thus is not an abrupt result of the turbulent 1968 Democratic National Convention. The two major parties do, however, show significant differences in how they have adapted to this trend.

[26] John B. Oakes, "Democrats' Nest Egg," *New York Times*, 21 June 1977, p. 33. Also see Herbert E. Alexander, *Financing the 1976 Election* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1979), pp. 704–6.

[27] *The Presidential Campaign Finance Act of 1966* (80 Stat. 1539), which never took effect, is of historical importance as marking the crossroads at which the choice was made between public payments to the party or payments to the candidates in support of campaign costs. The 1966 act provided for the former and if not suspended, as it was the following year, might have led to a different kind of national party organization than has been developing since—with more of the old presidential focus. The Senate debate on the "Long Act," as it was called, and on proposals to repeal it in 1967, include classic disquisitions on American party theory, especially by Robert Kennedy and Albert Gore.

[28] Charles H. Longley, "Party Reform and Party Nationalization: The Case of the Democrats," in *The Party Symbol*, ed. William J. Crotty (San Francisco, Calif.: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1980), pp. 374–75. Also see Longley's "Party Reform and the Republican Party" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 31 August–3 September 1978).

[29] Austin Ranney, "The Political Parties: Reform and Decline," in *The New American Political System*, ed. Anthony King (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), p. 230.

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Longley's definition of nationalization stresses the subordination of state and local parties to the national party.[30] We believe this emphasis limits the utility of the concept by excluding patterns of increased *interdependence* between different levels of party organization. We therefore suggest the following as critical elements of party nationalization:

—increasing uniformity of norms for state party participation in national party processes;

—decreasing range of differences in structures and processes of the state parties;

—greater interdependence between the state and national party organizations.

This conception of nationalization accommodates both those regularities among state parties that are mandated by the national party under penalty of sanctions—the most extreme of which would be refusal to seat a state delegation to the national party convention—and regularities that develop as a result of processes that do not involve sanctions.

Integrating State Parties into the National Democratic Party

The recent panoply of Democratic reforms can be traced to the efforts of the party to impose standards of loyalty to the national party upon the members of the Democratic National Committee, state party organizations, and national convention delegates. The initial DNC intrusion on state party autonomy came when the national committee demanded that its members seek to assure state voters of the opportunity to vote for electors pledged to the national party's presidential ticket.

The issue of state party loyalty to the presidential ticket emerged clearly at the 1948 convention. Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina sent delegates to the convention who were pledged to withhold support from President Harry Truman or to walk out if Truman were nominated or if the convention failed to adopt a states' rights plank. Virginia reserved the right, by state convention, to name a presidential candidate other than the national nominee, and that state's delegates went to the convention instructed that they were not to be bound by the convention decision.

The 1948 convention Credentials Committee recommended that the Mississippi delegation be seated and, in effect, that the convention accept the state's reservations. By a voice vote the convention seated the delegation and accepted an extremely dilute standard of loyalty as a condition for participating in future conventions.[31] Mississippi and Georgia filed written affirmations of loyalty that

[30] Longley defines nationalization in terms of a redefinition of "the traditional authority relationships between national and state parties" resulting in "a growth in the importance of national party organization over state and local organization," and the circumscription of "the traditional autonomy of state parties" (Longley, "Party Nationalization in America," pp. 2, 17).

[31] Richard C. Bain and Judith H. Parris, *Convention Decisions and Voting Records* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1973), p. 288.

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invoked an escape clause approved by the Credentials Commiteee. The Texas delegation gave verbal assurances that created the impression they had taken the pledge. Virginia, South Carolina, and Louisiana took no action to satisfy the loyalty resolution and when asked about their intentions, "indicated that they expected to remain as observers while the platform was adopted and the nominees selected."[32]

The general election confirmed the existence of a strong insurgent pull among the state Democratic parties of the South. In Alabama, it was not possible to vote for the national Democratic nominees, Truman and Barkley. They were not on the ballot, nor were electors pledged to them. Dixiecrats Strom Thurmond and Fielding Wright were the regular Democratic party nominees for president and vice-president so far as Alabamans were concerned, and their names or the names of electors pledged to them appeared under the regular state Democratic party emblem in Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina, too.[33] Thurmond won in all of these states.

At its August 1949 meeting, the Democratic National Committee took up the issue of the disloyalty of some of its members in the 1948 campaign and voted to remove six "disloyal" members from Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. The new chairman, William M. Boyle, Jr., (1949–51) announced the action to the press, grounding it on "Rule 11 of the Manual of the Democratic National Committee."[34] At the same time Boyle recognized as "acting members" of the DNC two persons from Mississippi who had not been nominated by the recalcitrant Mississippi party.[35]

The improvisations by which the national party sought to quell state party insurrections following 1948 revealed the need for general rules of prospective application, which would, in clarifying powers and duties of the national party organization, necessarily circumscribe the state parties and impose restraints on them.

Succeeding Democratic national chairmen recognized this and set about the process of developing a set of party rules. An early result of these efforts was a 1952 internal staff document proposing a "constitution" under which state par-

[32] Paul T. David, Malcolm Moos, and Ralph M. Goldman, *Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952*, vol. 1, *The National Story* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1954), pp. 130–131, 133–134. 'That for this convention only, such assurance shall not be in contravention of the existing law of the state, nor of the instructions of the state Democratic governing bodies" (p. 130).

[33] This analysis draws upon DNC, "Research Memorandum of Developments in Eight States Involved in 'Loyalty Oath' Controversies at Democratic National Conventions in 1944, 1948, and 1952," 29 November 1954, Records of the DNC, Clipping File, Box 90, DNC Disposition of Loyalty Oath folder, Truman Library.

[34] The document to which Boyle referred is the "Democratic Manual for the Democratic National Convention," compiled by Congressman Clarence Cannon, and codifying "the rules, the decisions of chairmen, and the customs and usage of the Convention."

[35] DNC Press Release, 26 August 1949, Records of DNC, Clipping File, Box 88, Meet. Set for Aug. 24, 1949 folder, Truman Library.

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ties would apply for affiliation with the national Democratic party.[36] The convention or DNC could act favorably on such applications only if the purpose of the applicant state party was found to be consistent with that of the national party and the applicant's structure and operation were democratic. As a condition of being seated, national convention delegates were required to state that they were Democrats and would support the party nominees in the general election. DNC members were obligated to support the nominees as well as the party platform and could be expelled for opposition to the presidential nominee. The roots of the 1974 Democratic party Charter thus extend back to the problems of southern disloyalty in 1948.

The dilute standard of loyalty adopted by the 1948 convention together with the Dixiecrat revolt of that year assured that seating of Dixiecrat delegates would be a major issue at the 1952 convention. These state organizations did not want their delegates bound to support the 1952 party nominees. The issues reached the floor of the convention when the Virginia, South Carolina, and Louisiana delegations were challenged as not having fulfilled the loyalty requirement. Permanent Chairman Sam Rayburn ruled that these states had not met the loyalty requirement and were therefore ineligible to participate in the nominating proceedings. His ruling was reversed in two prolonged and turbulent votes.[37]

At its April 1955 meeting, the DNC authorized the appointment of a committee to draft rules to govern the national party. The committee recommended that no loyalty oath be required of 1956 convention delegates. Instead the convention should adopt specific rules affirming the responsibilities of state party organizations to insure that the presidential and vice-presidential nominees selected by the convention, or the names of trustworthy electors, or both, would be placed upon state ballots under the name and state insignia of the Democratic party. The committee also recommended that party officials undertake responsibility for the conduct of campaigns to support the nominees of the national party. The 1956 convention adopted these proposals and thereby formally asserted increased authority of the national party over state organizations.[38]

[36] Unsigned note on "Rough Draft #1 of Constitution of the Democratic Party of the United States," attached to "Memo Concerning Rules for the Democratic Party," 7 May 1952, Papers of the President, President's Secretary's Files, Box 58, Frank McKinney folder, Truman Library.

[37] David, Moos, and Goldman, *Presidential Nominating Politics*, pp. 139–49.

[38] *Official Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, 1956*, published under the direction of the Democratic National Committee (Richmond, Va.: Beacon Press, Inc, n.d.) pp. 144–48. The concern for electoral votes was well founded. In 1948 seven Southern governors met and agreed to attempt to withhold their states' Democratic electoral votes from an antisegregation Democratic presidential candidate. In five other states this was discussed. See Ruth C. Silva, "State Law on the Nomination, Election and Instruction of Presidential Electors," *American Political Science Review* 42 (June 1948): 523–29. In four states—Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina—the Democratic electors were pledged to Thurmond and Wright. See DNC, "Research Memorandum on Developments in Eight States Involved in 'Loyalty Oath' Controversies at Democratic National

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This enlarged national party authority was stressed by DNC Chairman Paul Butler in a memorandum to DNC members and state chairmen dated 1 March 1960. He formally advised state party leaders that any policy or device that sought to relieve Democratic electors of their obligation to cast their ballots for the Democratic nominees would result in a challenge before the 1960 Credentials Committee.[39]

The 1960s moved to a reform tempo, and the Mississippi Freedom Democratic party (MFDP) set the reform beat at the 1964 Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City. The MFDP's purpose was to send a delegation to the convention that would be a plausible alternative to the delegation of the traditional Democratic party, which it judged to be racist in composition and in policy. The MFDP opened an office in Washington, D.C., in May 1964 and managed to secure resolutions of support from nine party delegations and the Americans for Democratic Action before the beginning of the convention.[40] The very least that the challengers could expect from their efforts was a national media focus on their claims and demands for party reform.

After White House intervention, a formula was developed to which a divided Credentials Committee and the leaders of the two contesting delegations could assent, and a floor fight was avoided. Under its terms the DNC would require states in 1968 to certify that delegates had been selected through nondiscriminatory processes, and the DNC chairman would establish a special committee on equal rights to aid the states in meeting the new standards for 1968.[41]

The Special Equal Rights Committee, mandated by the 1964 convention, was chaired by Governor David Lawrence of Pennsylvania, who had piloted the Credentials Committee through the shoals of the MFDP challenge. The Special Equal Rights Committee staff collected statutes and state constitutional provisions, and the rules, by-laws, and constitutions of the state Democratic parties. The committee held two days of hearings in October 1965, but with Lawrence's death in November 1966, and the lapse of the DNC's commitment of staff to the committee, its work languished until 1967 when Governor Richard Hughes of New Jersey was appointed chairman.

The Special Equal Rights Committee report recommended six "elements" to guide delegate selection for 1968. As adopted by the Democratic National Committee in January 1968, these included: open and publicized party meetings,

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Conventions in 1944, 1948, and 1952." As late as 6 May 1959, Butler sought legal guidance on possible efforts in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi to relieve presidential electors "from any obligation to vote in the Electoral College for the Democratic . . . nominees even if the ticket carried the home state of the electors" (Butler to Harold Leventhal, DNC Records, Chairman Butler Files, Box 442, Leventhal folder, JFKL).

[39] Papers of Stephen A. Mitchell, Box 24, Background '48, '52, '54 Rules Committees folder, Truman Library.

[40] Leslie Burl McLemore, "The Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party: A Case Study of Grass-Roots Politics" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Massachusetts, 1971), chap. 2, esp. pp. 128, 130.

[41] Ibid.

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nondiscrimination, broad registration drives, publication of selection procedures, and publication of qualifications for party officeholding.[42]

The McGovern-Fraser commission later took these six elements as demonstrating "the intention of the Democratic Party to ensure a full opportunity for all minority group members to participate in the delegate selection process," and it announced additional requirements that it stipulated "to supplement the requirements of the 1964 and 1968 Conventions."[43] William Crotty has noted the striking similarity between the basic elements of the Hughes committee and the more elaborate guidelines of the McGovern-Fraser commission that followed the 1968 convention.[44]

The openness and participation provisions of the post-1968 Democratic reforms, which have come to receive the most attention, can be interpreted as a necessary adjunct of bringing the state parties to a threshold of loyalty to the national party. This process necessarily involved assurances to those elements of the mass electorates who had shown a disposition to vote Democratic if allowed to vote of the opportunity to participate in party affairs. The alternative to extending to such groups rights to participate in the regular state Democratic party was the proliferation of factional claimants to the status of regular Democratic party at the state level.

Party Nationalization within the Republican Party

The Republican party in recent decades has experienced no equivalent schism to that within the Democratic party between 1948 and 1968. Hence, its "reform" actions often appear pale by comparison to those of the Democrats. If the Republicans had a problem during this period, it was the problem of surviving nationally as an effective competitor to the electorally stronger Democratic party. By contrast, the Democrats' problem was to bring under control the centrifugal pressures that threatened to fractionalize the party

The Republicans had, however, confronted in 1912 a problem similar to that later experienced by the Democrats. The Republican response to the disloyalty problem of 1912 was to impose standards of loyalty for RNC members. It was this rule that the Democratic party unabashedly copied in the 1950s.

The loyalty problems that plagued the Democratic party from 1948 to 1968 did not pose major difficulties for the GOP. As a result, during this period there was less concern about the authority relationships between the national and state parties within the Republican party. Another difference between the parties was in the character of the respective party rules. The Democratic rules had

[42] The six elements abbreviated here are given in full in the report of the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, *Mandate for Reform* (Washington, D.C.: Democratic National Committee, April 1970), p. 39, n. 1.

[43] Ibid. p. 39.

[44] William J. Crotty, *Decision for the Democrats: Reforming the Party Structure* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 10.

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an improvised quality and were therefore an obvious target for review and reform in an era of conflict between national and state parties. By contrast, the Republican party's rules were a highly codified set of carefully worded and indexed party statutes that contained detailed statements on the organization, operation, and powers of the convention and RNC.

Although the GOP was not embroiled in turmoil following its 1968 and 1972 conventions, the Democratic concerns about nomination practices had a spillover effect on the Republicans, which resulted in two reform committees: the Committee on Delegates and Organization (DO committee) appointed in 1969 and the Rule 29 Committee in 1973.

The key difference between the recommendations of the DO committee and the McGovern-Fraser commission was that McGovern-Fraser mandated affirmative action programs, whereas the DO committee only *recommended* the election of larger numbers of minority delegates. Thus while the Democrats were moving toward a nationalized set of procedures for delegate selection, the GOP retained its confederate legal character. This pattern reasserted itself in the work of the Rule 29 Committee, which made its report to the RNC in 1975. The Rule 29 Committee also rejected the mandatory procedures to assure openness and minority representation which the Democrats had adopted. It did recommend a "positive action" program under which the RNC would review and comment on state party affirmative action programs. This intrusion into the traditional domain of state party organizations, however, was rejected by the full RNC, which insisted on retaining a states' rights status for its state organizations. The balance of the Rule 29 Committee recommendations, which were accepted by the RNC and the 1976 convention, dealt with structure of the RNC, for example, terms of office for the chairmen, budgetary procedures, composition of the executive committee. The net effect of these changes was to limit slightly the national chairman's discretionary power and to strengthen the power of the full national committee.

The national Republican party, like its Democratic counterpart, has gained significant strength in the 1970s. As the brief account of the DO committee and Rule 29 Committee indicates, however, increased national party influence has not been achieved via reform of party rules. Rather, the RNC's increased power is derived from *organizational reform*, that is, providing extensive services to state party organizations and candidates. Increased interdependence between national and state organizations thus is being achieved through the provision of services and not through formal legal sanctions.

Republican National Chairman Bill Brock's program for rebuilding stresses strengthening the party's state and local base. He has been particularly concerned about making gains in the legislative and gubernatorial elections in 1978 and 1980 in order to protect the party against unfavorable effects of redistricting after the 1980 census.

Brock is not the first RNC chairman to embark on a major program of organizational reform. Chairman Ray Bliss (1965–69) had such a program after the disastrous 1964 elections. Bliss's program stressed strengthening state and

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local party organizations through assistance from the RNC.[45] The scope of the RNC programs under Brock, however, goes well beyond anything done in the 1960s. Brock's program is also different from Bliss's in terms of the extent to which the RNC has become involved in state party matters and is working with state and local Republican candidates.[46]

The Brock program of organizational reform involves: the organizational director program designed to encourage organizational development at the state and local levels through RNC payment of the salary of an organizational director in each state headquarters at an annual cost of $1 million;[47] regional political directors appointed to work with state organizations in their regions; regional finance directors who provide technical assistance in state party fund raising; the Republican party data processing network (REPNET) which provides computer services to state parties at minimal cost; a local elections campaign division which provides direct assistance in state legislative campaigns; and the support of gubernatorial candidacies.

Through these programs, the RNC has achieved increased power and an enlarged role in the political system. Clearly, there is now much more interdependence between the national Republican party and the state parties. Although the Republicans have shunned rule changes that would significantly alter the confederate legal structure of the party, the RNC has interjected itself into the organizational and campaign activities of the state parties. By contrast, the DNC's increased power has been achieved via rule reform—vesting legal authority over the presidential nominating process with the national party.

Elite Insurgency for Control of Party Organizations

Concurrently with the institutionalization and nationalization of the parties, a third transforming process has been at work: elite insurgency conducted by the representatives of recently mobilized electoral groups.[48] These new elites have challenged the regnant elites and sought to bring a change in the control of the parties. The party reforms of the 1970s represent, in part, the culmination of a process of competition among elites within the parties, which began for the Democrats with the mobilization of women, urban workers, blacks, and young people into the New Deal realignment of 1932. The differential roles played by

[45] On Bliss's rebuilding strategy, see John F. Bibby and Robert J. Huckshorn, "Out-Party Strategy: Republican National Committee Rebuilding Politics, 1964-66," in *Republican Politics: The 1964 Campaign and its Aftermath for the Party*, eds. Bernard Cosman and Robert J. Huckshorn, (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 205-233.

[46] For a more detailed consideration of the RNC organizational reform under Brock see John F. Bibby, "Party Renewal in the National Republican Party," in *Party Renewal: Theory and Practice*, ed. Gerald Pomper (New York: Praeger, forthcoming).

[47] The organization director program was discontinued in 1979 because of the expense involved and because there was no way of insuring that the director was used for organizational development in the various state headquarters.

[48] See Kristi Andersen, *The Creation of a Democratic Majority, 1928-1936* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

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the elite representatives of these voting groups in recent party reform processes is partly explained by their mode of entry into party politics, the group's organizational relationships with party, and the reciprocal expectations and benefits associated with party participation.

The two demographic groupings that have received the largest enhancement of role as a result of recent party reforms are minorities and women. These are precisely the groups that have applied direct political action to level barriers to full political participation. Women early set integration into national party organization as a major goal. Upon achieving this, they proceeded to use party resources to carry forward a program to achieve equal status within the parties and equal opportunity to take control of party organization and the nominating structures. Blacks somewhat later achieved elite representation within the Democratic party and, through the technique of delegate challenge, used the national nominating structure to contest for equal participation and opportunity to control at the state level. Women, of the four groups, have the longest, most continuous, most frustrating, and most successful record of pressure for change within the party; but it is paralleled by successful political effort in the legislative and judicial arenas.

The Parties and Minority Voters

Few movements have been more significant for the American political system in this century than the drive of blacks for civil rights. The internal functionings of the Republican and Democratic parties have not been exempt from the consequences of a movement that first sought the right to vote and then pressed for the right to participate in major political institutions. The rights of minority participation within the Democratic party were codified starting with the mandatory affirmative action programs of the McGovern-Fraser commission reforms in the late 1960s. Although the Republicans have avoided mandatory rules on participation, they too have given formal recognition to black voters in their organization by supporting in the 1970s a National Black Republican Council, with RNC authority to charter state affiliates.

Carter's 1976 victory—winning the South with a minority of the white vote and the overwhelming majority of the black vote, and winning the nation on the same division—marks the near completion of a transformation in electoral politics from the era of exclusion of blacks from voting and party affairs. The mobilization of black elites into the national party organization and the effort by that organization to mobilize black voters seem to have begun, for the Democrats, in 1928. In that same year the RNC established a Colored Voters Division.[49] The Democratic National Committee established a Colored Voter Division, apparently as part of the Women's Division, in 1933.[50] Cor-

[49] George F. Garcia, "Herbert Hoover's Southern Strategy and the Black Reaction" (MA Thesis, University of Iowa, 1972), p. 64.

[50] Papers of Women's Division of DNC, Box 5, Colored Voters Division 1933-1934, 1935-1936 (1 and 2), FDRL.

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respondence in the files of this DNC division for 1933 to 1934 reflect a dogged, unremitting effort to get patronage for blacks. The Truman administration patronage files also contain correspondence from individuals in private and public positions, frequently officers of "Democratic Colored Voters Clubs," and from all parts of the country, calling for patronage appointments for blacks.[51]

The DNC headquarters segregated its black staff until the late 1940s. An Associated Press story in the *Washington Star*, 4 August 1948, reports that "the Democratic National Committee has banned race segregation in its headquarters staff in a new bid for Negro support in the presidential election." National Chairman J. Howard McGrath (1947–49) issued a press release confirming the change and saying that he expected to appoint a black assistant to the chairman. In a move which may have set the precedent for abolishing the Women's Division five years later, McGrath said that the DNC was dropping its "Negro" division and distributing black DNC staff among other units at party headquarters.[52] It is not known whether the RNC staff was also segregated prior to the 1940s. The *Washington Star* story reported that the RNC "maintains a Negro division" and quotes the RNC publicity chief to the effect that "several Negroes are employed on the headquarters staff."

In 1948 William Dawson, the Chicago congressman, became vice-chairman and in 1961 Louis Martin, Chicago publisher, became deputy chairman of the DNC, probably the highest ranking positions occupied by black politicians in either party since John R. Lynch of Mississippi was elected temporary chairman of the Republican National Convention of 1884.[53] Martin stayed on through the Kennedy administration and into the Johnson years. A number of his reports as division head at the DNC are included in the Johnson White House files. These reports and White House-DNC correspondence disclose Martin's influence in securing positions for blacks in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and encouraging black office-seeking around the country.[54]

While the bulk of DNC attention may have been directed at black voters and candidates, this did not exhaust the party's concern for minorities. A DNC memorandum to Chairman John Bailey (1961–68) on conflicts among Chicano elites and their problems with Democratic party leaders found its way to the Kennedy White House.[55] The breadth of the DNC concern for nationality

[51] Truman Papers, OF300–A, Patronage Matters, Box 975, Truman Library.

[52] "Democrats Drop Segregation on National Committee Staff," *Washington Star*, 4 August 1948.

[53] Cotter and Hennessy, *Politics Without Power*, p. 160.

[54] See the following in the LBJ Library: Martin memo to Bailey, Weekly Report, 2 April 1964, DNC Records, First Series, Box 84, Weekly Division Head Reports to Chairman DNC folder; George Reedy to President, 2 December 1964, White House Name File, DNC Box 126; Louis Martin to Marvin Watson, 13 September 1966, attached to Kintner to President, 4 October 1966, White House Central Files, Ex Pl 2, Box 86, folder for 31 August–1 November 1966; DNC Press Release B-4124, DNC Records, First Series, Box 89; Louis Martin to Marvin Watson, 14 November 1966 and attached DNC News Release DC138, 10 November 1966, White House Central Files, Ex Pl 7, Box 122, folder for 30 August 1966–5 April 1967.

[55] Carlos McCormick to John Bailey, memo, 17 September 1963, DNC Records, First Series, Box 84, LBJL.

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groups is indicated by a "Guide to Nationality Observances" for 1967 which included ninety-four dates with explanations of their significance for various nationalities.[56]

In the 1960s, the DNC placed special emphasis on voter registration programs primarily aimed at black voters. Its Voter Registration Division was headed by Matthew A. Reese, Jr., an assistant to the chairman. During this period, the DNC worked with the White House to create a Presidential Commission on Voting and Registration. The DNC proposed the commission, nominated members, gave assurances that the commission would be safely composed, and later, when the commission was created, worked closely with its chairman, Richard Scammon.[57]

In 1973 Saloma and Sontag made the following assessment of the efforts of blacks to gain secure positions within the respective national committees.

> Although blacks constitute more than 10 percent of the electorate and by some estimates 20 percent of the national Democratic party vote, they have had to fight to maintain black programs in both national committee headquarters. Since Louis Martin completed a long and influential career as head of the DNC's Minorities Division, the position of minority-group programs has been tenuous. In 1969, the RNC under Rogers Morton abolished the Minorities Division that had built up a staff of 35 under Ray Bliss. Perhaps reflecting a middle-class white bias that permeates both parties, the RNC bluntly stated that it had "no separate 'Black' operation, as such, but successfully uses Special Assistants to the Chairman in this area who work with the Political Division." (The Republicans reinstituted a separate Black Political Division under Morton's successor, Senator Robert J. Dole of Kansas.) The DNC under Lawrence O'Brien attempted a similar consolidation but resistance was sufficiently strong to force the retention of a separate black Minorities Division within the Office of the National Chairman. The top black aides at both national committees, John Dean at the DNC and Clarence L. Townes, Jr., at the RNC, resigned prior to the 1970 elections and their positions remained vacant for several months with scarcely any public comment.[58]

This brief survey of pre-1968 DNC activities to recruit minority voters and candidates makes clear the long-standing nature of the effort to recruit minorities into the party. Less extensive but parallel activities characterized the Republican National Committee. These programs laid partial groundwork for the representation reforms of the 1960s and 1970s.

The Parties and Women

Molly Dewson, director of the DNC Women's Division from 1932 to 1936, writes that so exclusively masculine was the 1924 platform committee that Eleanor Roosevelt could not gain admission to address it.

[56] DNC Records, First Series, Box 89, "President Makes First Nomination of . . ." LBJL.

[57] See DNC Records, First Series, Box 83, Research Reports 1964, LBJL.

[58] John S. Saloma III and Frederick H. Sontag, *Parties: The Real Opportunity for Effective Citizenship* (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1973), p. 98.

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> Mrs. Roosevelt had told me how in 1924 she had hung around the door of the room where the Program Committee was in session, hoping to be allowed to present her planks in person, but without success, and at last, she had given them to an unknown man who said he would present them to the Committee. Whether he did or not she never heard.[59]

Dewson and Mrs. Roosevelt actively recruited women and sought larger scope for their influence within the Democratic party during the 1928 Al Smith campaign, the 1928 and 1930 New York gubernatorial campaigns, and the 1932 Roosevelt campaign.

In 1932, for the first time, women were included on all Democratic convention standing committees, including the Committee on Platform and Resolutions.[60] As a tactic for increasing the influence of women with the Platform Committee, Dewson formed a fourteen-member women's Advisory Platform Committee in 1936. The charge to this committee reflected a highly traditional view of the political role of women: They were to "decide which political and social issues benefit the home and the family, and to urge their inclusion in the planks of the platform." But the creation of the committee and successful lobbying for a convention rule permitting each state to designate, in addition to its delegate member of the Platform Committee, an alternate member of the opposite sex suggests a determined and politically astute effort to increase recognition for women in convention proceedings. Dewson reports that as soon as this rule was adopted the members of her platform advisory committee won designation as alternates from their states and "made off for the open meeting of the Platform Committee."[61] The next step was predictable. In 1940, the Democratic convention passed a resolution enlarging the Platform Committee to two members from each state, one of whom had to be a woman.[62] For the 1944 Democratic convention women were named in equal numbers to the convention Executive Committee and the Committee on Arrangements, and women were appointed to cochair major committees for the first time—Platform, Rules, Credentials, and Permanent Organization. For the first time, too, women were designated permanent convention officers.[63]

[59] Unpublished autobiographical manuscript, "An Aid to the End," vol. 2, p. 128, Mary Dewson Papers, FDRL. This manuscript is also available at the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe College, Cambridge, Mass.

[60] Office of Women's Activities, "The Participation of Women in Democratic National Conventions," 28 February 1959 (authors' personal files). See also "Women and Party Organization Activities," in *Women in the Twentieth Century: A Study of Their Political, Social and Economic Activities*, ed. Sophonisba P. Breckinridge (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1933, reprint ed., New York: Arno Press, 1972), chap. 17; and the extension from this by Marguerite J. Fisher and Betty Whitehead, "Women and National Party Organization, *American Political Science Review* 38 (October 1944): 895-903.

[61] *Democratic Digest* (July 1936): 16-23, Truman Library; Dewson, "An Aid to the End," vol. 2, pp. 129-31, FDRL.

[62] Dewson, "An Aid to the End," vol. 2; Office of Women's Activities, "Participation of Women"; and *Democratic Digest* (August 1944): 9.

[63] *Democratic Digest* (August 1944): 9.

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The 1956 convention rules did not contain a requirement for equal representation of men and women on the major convention committees, but the rules adopted by the 1960 convention contained a provision for sex equality on the committees.[64] Forty years of continuous lobbying within the party for a larger role for women reflect in the different treatment accorded women delegates at the 1936 convention, at which the DNC encouraged states to add women delegates-at-large with half a vote each, and the 1978 mid-term convention where the decision favoring fifty-fifty division of the full delegation from each state was adopted.[65]

A similar metamorphosis occurred in the Republican party. Bertha Adkins, vice-chairman of the Republican National Committee in the 1950s, reports that eight women served on convention committees in 1928, the first woman was appointed to the Resolutions Committee in 1932, twelve served on convention committees in 1936, and by 1940 ten women served on the Arrangements Committee and thirty-five on other committees. In 1944 women received equal representation with men on the Resolutions (Platform) Committee. In 1948, for the first time, a woman served as secretary of the Republican National Convention, and women chaired the Permanent Organization Committee and a subcommittee of the Resolutions Committee (Labor and Social Welfare).[66]

From the 1930s through the 1960s, when political scientists assert patronage declined steadily both in availability and as an incentive to party activity, the DNC Women's Division emphasized patronage and importuned presidents for appointments of women. A large part of Dewson's extant correspondence pertains to appointments for women—not the abstract principle of appointing women, but appointments of specific women whose names are advanced as candidates for specific positions, at times competing with prospective appointees submitted by the party chairman and other influential party members. Not only FDR, but Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson received incessant demands for appointments of women candidates for available positions. It is common knowledge that the Carter administration has not escaped this. On the Republican side, Bertha Adkins, during the 1950s, worked assiduously to document the entitlement and availability of women to federal positions within Eisenhower's appointing power, and then sought to secure such appointments for candidates whose names she submitted. If, indeed, job patronage is for the

[64] "Report of the Committee on Rules and Order of Business of the 1960 Democratic National Convention," with cover note on Rules Committee members, 11 July 1960, signed by Gov. Herschel C. Loveless, chair., Vel Phillips, cochairman, and Stephen A. Mitchell, counsel, Committee on Rules and Order of Business, Papers of Stephen A. Mitchell, Box 26, 1960 Convention Rules Committee, Truman Library.

[65] *Democratic Digest* (March 1936): 24. The official formula was two delegates for each member of Congress to which the state was entitled and two for each senator—hence the four at-large delegates.

[66] Bertha Adkins, "Women in the Public Service," August 1958, White House Central Files, General Files, Box 477, folder 109-A-1, Women, 1958, Eisenhower Library.

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most part a vestigial reminder of an earlier era of politics, it nonetheless has great significance for transitional groups.

From 1968 to 1978 women achieved changes in party policy and strengthened their role within the parties. But the movement and agenda for these gains did not emerge full-grown in 1968. This summary review of women's activities within the parties since 1930 suggests it took about a generation to achieve the goals that were pretty much established in that depression decade.

Conclusion

It is misleading to interpret recent party reforms as emerging from the 1968 Democratic National Convention and the spirit of revolt against political institutions that developed with the Vietnam War. Insofar as it leads to the view that the changes were abrupt and cataclysmic, this interpretation may obscure our perception of important transformations that are now occurring at the level of the national party committees.

As the national committees became more institutionalized, they became less exclusively focused on presidential politics. The distance between the national committees and presidential candidates and even incumbent presidents has been increased by recent developments in campaign organization, in the cycle of campaigning, in party rules, and in public policy. The national committees are reacting to these forces and adding to them as today they arm themselves with programs to serve nonpresidential constituents and pursue stable financing independent of presidential campaigns. Thus they are protecting their institutional autonomy.

The nationalization process, especially as it has applied to the Democratic party, reflects the continuity of issues with which the party has to deal over the last thirty years. Since 1948 the Democratic party has been faced with a problem of how to cope with local party insurgency, which threatened to fractionalize the party and preclude participation by groups, such as blacks, who are inclined to vote Democratic, and even threatened to keep the national party nominees off the ballot in some states.

While the Democrats were coping with the problems caused by autonomous state party organizations, the Republicans faced a quite different problem: how to survive as a strong competitive force against the electorally dominant Democrats. Local insurgency was not the GOP problem. It had been dealt with via the party rules following the schism of 1912. It is not therefore surprising that there were few strong pressures within the Republican party to replicate the McGovern-Fraser type reforms promulgated by the Democrats. Instead, the Republicans have been using the substantial resources of the national party to strengthen their state and local organizations and assist candidates at this level. As a consequence, the national and state GOP organizations have grown more interdependent and the influence of the RNC has been enhanced through its service functions. The party nationalization, therefore, that has been taking place

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in the GOP, at least since the mid-1960s, is quite different from the nationally mandated process of nationalization that has occurred within the Democratic party. The changes appear gradual and continuous in both parties, but the problems that precipitated the process have caused the two parties to follow quite different routes toward nationalization.

From the perspective that guides this article, the party reforms appear to follow from an agenda for change that has been pressed vigorously by insurgent party elites for over forty years and to respond to centrifugal forces evident primarily within the Democratic party, which pressed urgently for resolution since at least 1948. The new, reform-minded elites represent the electoral groups that were mobilized into the New Deal realignment. They have conducted an insurgent movement from within the national party headquarters during decades of erratic yet persistent institutionalization of the party committees. Representatives of emergent groups pressed for rights of political participation at the state and national levels. Southern party resistance to this movement and to national Democratic policies favoring it triggered changes that helped nationalize the party.

It has taken about a generation for the consequences of the New Deal electoral mobilization to be implanted in the structure of national party rules and the composition of party elites. As Sundquist observes, "The established leadership of a party consists of politicians who are, by definition, the beneficiaries of the party system as it is."[67] One would expect therefore that the regnant party leaders who actively promoted programs for electoral mobilization of emergent groups would be resistant to importunities to share power with representatives of these groups. One would expect also that the newly politicized groups would require time for socialization, constituency building, and the accomplishment of short-range goals before launching a vigorous pursuit of broad programs to increase their influence within the party.

A generation-long lag between emergent groups' electoral mobilization and their leaders' achievement of commensurate status in party organization requires explanation. The rise of these groups to prominence in party organization comes at a time when political scientists agree that the next electoral realignment is past due. This presents us with an anomaly, the explanation of which is beyond the scope of this article. As part of this anomaly, it is noteworthy that the national parties are gaining institutional strength and greater integration with the state parties, while the disaggregation of the electorate proceeds, and fears are expressed for the ultimate decomposition of the parties.

The institutionalization of the national parties appears to commence simultaneously with the shaping of the New Deal realignment. More work and more thought may result in a plausible attribution of causal linkage between these concurrent developments. Beyond this, however, it may be that more

[67] James L. Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1973), p. 283.

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thought is needed about the possible role of institutionalizing and nationalizing processes as forces that interact with the other elements in Burnham's dynamic of party transformation.[68] For example, would the institutionalization and nationalization of parties as described here enable the two parties to retard the adverse consequences for party institutions which political scientists tend to infer from electoral disaggregation? For how long, and under what circumstances, can the United States have strong institutional parties in the face of erosion of electoral support? From the vantage point of this research, the two national party committees appear capable of surviving further inroads on party electoral support and perhaps even an electoral realignment; and this prospect is enhanced by recent congressional legislation and the changing relation of the national committees to the state and local party organizations.*

[68] Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970); and his two essays, "Party Systems and the Political Process," and "American Politics in the 1970's," in *The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development*, 2d ed., eds. William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).

* Thanks are due to the Eleanor Roosevelt Institute, the Harry S. Truman Library Institute, and the Lyndon Baines Johnson Foundation for grants-in-aid of the research on which portions of this article are based. The directors and staffs of the Hoover, Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson presidential libraries were generous and competent in their assistance and guidance. The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee provided sabbatical support, and the UWM library covered the costs of copying materials from the presidential libraries. We also wish to thank the Democratic and Republican National Committees for cooperation and permissions which facilitated this research.

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Perspectives on Soviet Intervention in Africa

HENRY BIENEN

The Soviet Union has projected its military power in Africa, first to Angola, then to the Horn of Africa. These developments, in conjunction with the collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran, rapid increases in oil prices, instability in the Persian Gulf and South Asia, and the Soviet military build-up in the context of SALT negotiations, have increased the virulence of debate about the way the United States should respond to the Soviet Union and should define its political, economic, and security interests in Africa, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf. Much of this debate has been presented in terms of globalist versus regionalist perspectives on U.S. policy toward countries and regions in which the Soviet Union has intervened and projected its military power.

Globalists and regionalists ask many of the same questions: What are the principal U.S. interests in a given region? What is the nature and magnitude of the Soviet threat? What policies should the United States pursue to advance its interests and deal with the Soviet Union? But the order or priority of the questions and the weight given to answers frequently differ. Globalists ask first about the behaviors, motivations, and threats of the Soviet Union or other large powers. Regionalists usually start by trying to define U.S. interests in a particular region and to understand the situation in its own terms. Globalists accuse regionalists of having parochial concerns and of being unwilling to see broad U.S. interests; regionalists argue that globalists are frequently ignorant of, and refuse to deal with, the specific conditions in a country and are therefore given to sloganizing about regional power vacuums or "arcs of instability."

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The debate is not a new one. Discussions about containing the Soviet Union in Europe after World War II, about falling dominoes in Asia in the 1950s and 1960s, or about the implications of Cuba becoming a Communist state in the late 1950s and 1960s frequently were stated in global-regional dichotomies. Sometimes these arguments were disagreements between those who considered themselves experts on a particular country or region of the world and those whose main avocation was to study international relations. Sometimes the positions had institutional underpinnings: desk officers in the State Department versus National Security Council staff members, or desk officers and assistant secretaries versus a secretary of state, as occurred during the Angola crisis.

Not all regional specialists, of course, argue a regionalist position. Nor is it true that globalists are more willing generally to intervene than regionalists. Regionalists argue for the need for more foreign aid or for more attention to be paid persistently to the countries of their concern. It is more accurate to say that globalists have been more concerned about the projection of Soviet military strength and more ready to use American military assistance or force because they see a strong U.S. response to Soviet actions as essential. Moreover, globalists tend to stress security concerns more than economic ones. Since American economic positions in trade, aid, and investment in the Third World are vastly stronger than Soviet ones, those who stress the importance of economic interests believe that those interests can be expressed within a wide set of security and political relationships. Thus, they argue, the United States can accommodate political changes given its relative economic strength vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Changes in leadership or regime type will not necessarily alter those fundamental economic relationships which will still govern a great deal of behavior between states. Regionalists also believe that the United States's global military strength is sufficient to maintain U.S. security and that changes in most countries will not threaten U.S. vital interests. The corollary to this position is that regionalists tend to define more narrowly U.S. interests vis-à-vis particular countries.

Globalists on the other hand believe that weakening military positions will lead ineluctably to weakening economic positions and that, in any case, security interests, defined first in military terms, must be paramount in any discussion of U.S. policy.[1]

The purpose of this article is to explore the globalist-regionalist debate and to consider the ramifications of this debate for U.S. policy in Africa. The projection of Soviet military power in Africa has been great, and in the short run it has been decisive for the outcome of conflict in the Angolan civil war and important in the Ogaden and in Eritrea. Soviet assistance to anti-Muzorewa guerillas residing in the front-line states facing Zimbabwe is growing. Analysts of Africa speculate about the impact of the Soviet Union in southern Africa. Conferences are convened and discussion groups held on the question of U.S. responses to the

[1] Obviously, individuals within various groups differ in their approaches and emphases. I am not going to characterize individuals here.

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Soviet Union in Africa.[2] A growing public-policy literature has been addressed to the subject.[3]

The Regionalist Perspective

Although this article defends a regionalist perspective for understanding U.S. interests and for framing U.S. responses in the aftermath of recent Soviet interventions in Africa, no attempt is made here to formulate a U.S. policy for Africa. Indeed, while the United States has some general interests in Africa, one can argue that it cannot or should not have an "African foreign policy." African countries are so diverse and conflict situations within and between countries so complicated that most continental policies would be too general and without content and therefore would wind up being qualified or ignored. It is possible, however, to have a perspective on Africa that functions as a way of starting off in thinking about policies and that helps to order events. Perspectives of course ought not become blinders or become a prism which filters out facts that do not fit premises. A regional perspective need not lead to these outcomes.

A regional perspective starts by trying to understand what is happening in regional, subregional, and individual country contexts. That is, a regional perspective starts with the assumption that unless one knows what is possible in those contexts and unless one has a good understanding of local factors that are operating, policies are likely to fail or to be counterproductive. A regional perspective need not and should not postulate that U.S. interests in Africa or in specific African countries should be placed above global interests. That would be a foolish argument. No matter how important a continent is in economic, strategic, or political terms, global interests must be defined first. That is, the widest set of interests a country has must be specified before one can elaborate bilateral or continent-wide interests and relations in defense of those interests. Because relations with superpowers, and especially with the Soviet Union, intrude so heavily on very general U.S. interests, such as the avoidance of nuclear war or

[2] I have benefited from participation in two such groups. The Council on Foreign Relations held discussion group meetings on the Soviet Union in Africa during 1978–79. I benefited from those meetings and from a conference on Implications of Soviet and Cuban Activities in Africa, which was held under the auspices of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, 20–21 April 1979, Washington, D.C.

[3] See, among others, Bruce Palmer, Jr., "U.S. Security Interests and Africa South of the Sahara," *AEI Defense Review* 2, no. 6 (1978): 1–43; Helen Kitchen, ed., "Options for U.S. Policy Toward Africa," *AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review* 1, no. 1 (1979); William P. Yarborough, *Trial in Africa: The Failure of U.S. Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1976); Roger Pearson, ed., *Sino-Soviet Intervention in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Council on American Affairs, 1977); Jennifer Seymour Whitaker, ed., *Africa and the United States* (New York: New York University Press, 1978); Henry Bienen, "U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing Africa," *Political Science Quarterly* 93 (Fall 1978): 443–64; U.S., Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, *Perceptions: Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978).

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the peaceful settlements of disputes, global policies tend to be formulated with superpower relations very much in mind or with critical countries in mind like Saudi Arabia or China. Indeed, short-run relations with such countries often influence mightily the very formulation of global policies. It is clear, for example, that thinking about the Horn of Africa specifically and about U.S. postures of strengths more generally is influenced by a concern to make sure the Saudis know that the United States considers access to Saudi oil and a friendly regime in Saudi Arabia a vital U.S. interest. General policies that are formulated on human rights wind up being modified when they have to take account of U.S. relations with countries that are deemed important for U.S. interests such as the Philippines or Iran under the Shah.

The essence of foreign-policy making is to understand the interaction between general interests, the goals that are derived from those interests, and the policies that are designed to further the goals and interests on the one hand and the specifics within regions and countries that allow or constrain maximization of goals on the other hand. States try to maximize their position in a world in which there are many short-run and long-run conflicts between goals and interests and between global and regional concerns. We can raise innumerable questions that make these conflicts apparent: How does the United States deal with violations of human rights in Ethiopia when its general interests in human rights clash with its strategic concerns in the Horn of Africa? How does the United States react toward internal strife in Angola when it is worried about internal stability in Portugal and the rise of Eurocommunism, or when the United States must consider how its policies will affect relations with South Africa and the rest of Africa; or when the United States sees itself in competition with the Soviet Union for influence in Africa and other parts of the Third World? How does action or inaction affect the perceptions of other powers or other countries worried or happy about Soviet activities?

A regionalist perspective does not say that the definition of policies in specific crises or in more general circumstances should be bounded by regional considerations without being immediately cognizant of general concerns. The regional perspective does say that unless the configuration of power and interest in the Horn of Africa is well understood, unless there is an accurate assessment of the strength of internal factions in Angola and a perception of how South African intervention in Angola will be received, no accurate analysis of the tradeoffs between costs and benefits of different policies can be made. Nor will there be any good way to understand the tools available to affect situations in the Horn of Africa, or Angola, unless the instruments of foreign policy—diplomacy; military intervention; economic trade, investment, or assistance; clandestine activities—are set in regional perspectives. It would make sense to undertake military policies even in a country that was unimportant per se if one were convinced that such successful activity was essential to important positions elsewhere or if one could make a convincing argument that wider conflicts would occur unless successful intervention took place. This might be called the "small-war-to-prevent-the-large-war" phenomenon. For example, those who argued that Hit-

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ler should be stopped in Czechoslovakia in 1938 did not have to argue that Czechoslovakia was intrinsically important but that aggression in Central Europe should be stopped before Germany grew stronger. Whether the outcome would have been different in 1938 than it was when Hitler invaded Poland is another matter. That is, did the forces exist to stop Hitler in Central Europe by that time? It would make no sense to intervene militarily if it was known in advance that the regional configuration of forces made successful intervention impossible whether in Central Europe in the 1930s or in the Horn of Africa and in Angola in the 1970s. This is what a regionalist perspective is all about: the asking of what is possible, or likely to happen, on the ground where one's policies are going to be carried out, in Africa or elsewhere.

From this point of view, U.S. policy in Angola under the Nixon-Kissinger administration was a disaster because it was formulated and carried out without a good sense of regional possibilities, much less with a comprehension of the forces at work in southern Africa and in Angola. Whatever the estimation of Soviet intentions in Angola and in Africa, whatever the challenge perceived to U.S. global positions or to détente, a policy that at best would have trouble winning support at home, would be widely opposed within Africa, and might well fail unless heavily escalated inside Angola cannot be considered an intelligent policy irrespective of the set of global considerations that were set forth. The regionalist perspective was one much more aware of the constraints on the U.S. policy in Angola and in the Horn of Africa. Specialists on Angola knew, and not just in retrospective, how weak were all the factions in Angola. They understood the limited fighting abilities and constituencies of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) headed by Holden Roberto. They knew about the danger of the link between Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and South Africa, and that South African intervention could easily lead most African countries to support Neto's Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), as occurred.[4] The specialists inside and outside the State Department did not prevail on Angola. Indeed, policymaking was closely held at the top by Secretary of State Kissinger, and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that U.S. policy toward Angola did not reflect a wide consensus among lower-level officials and Angolan experts.

Policy in the Horn of Africa much better reflected the views of African experts who resisted Saudi, Iranian, and Egyptian pressures to counter Soviet military assistance with U.S. military assistance to Somalia. Regionalists were sensitive to the impact that U.S. aid to Somalia would have on Kenya with whom the United States has had a close relationship. They also knew that most of Africa did not support the Somali attempt to alter by force its boundaries with Ethiopia. And, regionalists were convinced that Ethiopian nationalism was a

[4] See Nathaniel Davis, "The Angola Decision of 1975: A Personal Memoir," *Foreign Affairs* 57 (Fall 1978): 109–24; John A. Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," *Foreign Affairs* (April 1976): 407–25; John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978); John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978).

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force that would make future Ethiopian-Soviet relations unpredictable. Furthermore, regionalists insisted that the Horn of Africa was an example where it was very difficult to use country and regional conflicts to support global policies because there were no good regional options. Whatever the Soviet challenge with its heavy intervention in Ethiopia, where did the United States have to go? How should it have supported Somalia, not a traditional ally, an aggressor and seen to be so in Africa, and militarily a fairly slender reed in any case? The regional context dictated the response the United States made under the Carter administration, which was not to intervene.

But, it is argued by globalists, what of the Saudis' reaction to U.S. nonintervention? What of the perception of U.S. weakness? What of allowing the Soviet Union to intervene militarily with impunity? To all these questions the regionalist answers: pick your spot if it is necessary to make a response from wider considerations. But let it be a response that makes sense in regional as well as in global terms. And do not have illusions about overcoming long-run problems via short-run actions. If you have a weak position in a conflict situation between countries or within a country, a "quick fix" intervention is not likely to hold. Nor will linking the conflict to policies elsewhere be likely to solve problems.

U.S. policy in Zaire provides some further illustrations of global and regional interactions in the American context. The Carter administration tried to avoid formulating a response to the first invasion of Shaba Province which was derived from Soviet-U.S. competition. The second invasion of Zaire's Shaba Province launched from Angola, coming on top of massive Cuban involvement in Ethiopia, led to a shift in U.S. policy. Concern with the Soviet Union seemed to dominate at least some policymakers in Washington. It would have been domestically difficult not to make a response in Zaire. Policymakers feared seeming powerless. A limited intervention by the United States, coupled with a larger French, Moroccan, and Egyptian intervention, kept Mobutu in power. Globalists saw this as a victory for U.S. policy. Regionalists were more skeptical. The fundamental problems of political and economic life in Zaire remained unchanged. What would have happened had Mobutu been permitted to fall? Would forces aligned with Angola or the Soviet Union have dominated Zaire? Would anyone have been able to consolidate power in Zaire in the reasonable future?

There are no easy answers to these questions. And I do not suggest that positive reconstruction of Zaire would have taken place "after Mobutu" if the Shaba invasion forces had prevailed—positive for either U.S. or Zairian interests. Nonetheless, fundamental problems were not solved in Zaire. Policymakers often prefer to maintain the status quo with which they are familiar than to support forces of change that may lead to uncertainties; and they prefer not to destabilize interests in the short run. Interventions to shore up unpopular regimes, however, can work against one's long-run interests. Would Iran in 1979 be more or less friendly to the United States if Mossadegh had not been removed in 1953? This would involve a long and hard speculation about the un-

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folding of nationalist forces in Iran under different circumstances, which of course no one could answer with certainty. Perhaps there would be less difficulty in thinking about whether events in Cambodia would have been better for the United States—and the Cambodians—if U.S. intervention had not occurred. Thus, short-run military and political responses to what are perceived as hostile forces do not necessarily serve long-run interests even when the interventions are "successful."

Global and Regional Interactions

It is now necessary to discuss more directly global and regional interactions with respect to U.S. interests in Africa, U.S.-Soviet relations, and U.S. global interests. These are all huge topics and will be treated only in a broad fashion.[5]

A good regionalist analysis should start with U.S. global interests. Some major U.S. interests have very little to do with Africa at all; others have quite a bit to do with Africa. For example, it is not in the interest of the United States to let the Soviet Union achieve nuclear superiority; but, nothing that happens in or to Africa, in the long or short run, including a Soviet satellite country coming to power in South Africa, is likely to affect Soviet-U.S. nuclear parity. This is an extreme case. Even in less cosmic military terms, strategic balances between the superpowers will not be affected by regime changes or foreign-policy realignments in Africa. Africa is not consequential for the United States's ability to deliver its military might on a global basis. Black Africa has never figured large in the U.S. strategic postures of military planners with the exception of the sea lanes around the Cape and through the Suez Canal through which pass large quantities of oil.

There are other global issues about which the United States is concerned and to which Africa is relevant in varying degrees. The United States is concerned with nuclear proliferation; thus the ability of some African states to acquire a nuclear capability would immediately transcend regional interests and would be a matter of global importance. South Africa is, of course, the most likely candidate to acquire nuclear weapons capability. This issue, however, has not been prominent in the globalists' discussions of U.S. policy in Africa.

There are other issues that have a global scope. Negotiations with African states on north-south economic issues or sea-bed mining must be seen in global as well as regional contexts. But again, globalists have been relatively silent on how these issues will be dealt with on a transregional basis. Similarly, the United States expresses a global concern for human rights and the basic needs of human beings, but globalists have not paid much attention to these issues in their discussions of global and regional linkages. They have concentrated instead on global-regional interactions with respect to Soviet interventions in Africa.

[5] For a fuller discussion see Bienen, "U.S. Policy in a Changing Africa."

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Soviet intervention in Africa does require trying to analyze the relationships between shifts in overall strategic power and a superpower's regional influence. It is possible that a general strategic reversal in the overall balance of power will allow a superpower to intervene more aggressively within a region. A number of commentators have argued that this has happened between the United States and the Soviet Union and that the shift has been in favor of the Soviets. According to these observers, subsequent regional changes in the balance of power work back to affect strategic balances negatively for the United States. Their conclusion is that the defense of regional interests is necessary to preserve global positions.[6]

How does one assess this argument from a regionalist perspective? Looking at what has been happening in Africa and in the United States and Soviet Union over the last decade, one can see that the Soviet Union intervened in Africa more aggressively than did the United States, but this occurs irrespective of any strategic shift in the balance of power, except in one regard. The Soviet Union now has a greater naval and air capacity to intervene as it showed in Angola and the Horn. It has acquired facilities in South Yemen that have made interventions in Africa easier. And facilities acquired in one country make intervention in the next country of a particular region physically and militarily easier. The combined effects of regional changes, the Soviet Union's own growth in military capacity for regional intervention, and the U.S. post-Vietnam wariness about military responses and intervention make Soviet interventions easier. These developments, however, do not stem from a strategic reversal between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nothing could be done about the Soviets acquiring their own capabilities. Nor would further growth in U.S. military capabilities make Soviet intervention less likely if the African possibilities are favorable. And indeed, changes in Africa over the last decade have facilitated Soviet intervention.

The African interstate system has been undergoing rapid change since 1960. Norms, including those honored in the breach, have been altered. The norm of nonintervention by outsiders, certainly never upheld perfectly, has broken down completely. States now assert their sovereign right to call in outsiders for their defense; the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has sanctioned this right in the name of state sovereignty. Only Nigeria, as the largest power in black Africa, seems to have much commitment to nonintervention by superpowers. Others react on the basis of short-run political and military interests. It is no surprise that Mobutu would call in French and Moroccan troops to help him stay in power. Nor is it unexpected that different factions in the Angolan civil war or in Chad would enlist the support of outside actors to bolster their positions. Mobutu called on foreign troops in the 1960s as well as in the 1970s, and factional adversaries in Africa have received weapons, equipment, money,

[6] See for example, Walter F. Hahn and Alvin J. Cottrell, *Soviet Shadow Over Africa* (Coral Gables: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1976).

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political support, and technical help since the end of direct colonial rule. What is striking is that almost no African actors any longer uphold even the principle of nonintervention in African affairs. When Algeria and Morocco came into conflict in the 1960s and even when countries formed into rival Monrovia and Casablanca groups, nonintervention was a principle frequently stated. Attempts were made to settle inter-African disputes through African mediation. Now, different countries not party to a dispute will support or reject outside intervention depending on whether they are in support of a particular regime. This means that the Soviet Union can find significant African support for its interventions in Angola and Ethiopia, as can France for its intervention in Zaire or the Central African Empire. It also means that analysts can perhaps look forward to overt superpower support for a direct attack by one African country on another and not only for intervention on behalf of factions or military struggle within a country under attack. The possibilities for Soviet intervention in Africa are likely to widen, not to contract.

Also, African states have become more differentiated by wealth, power, and military capability. More, not less, conflict can be expected between them, if only because the logistical capability for such conflict now exists; witness Zaire-Angola; Uganda-Tanzania; Ethiopia-Somalia. And outside assistance and intervention are readily available from not only the Soviet Union but from states like Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Libya, and South Africa, each of whom has regional interests of its own. There are many new small and medium military and economic powers who are now involved in Africa—including the Cubans, East Germans, Saudis, Japanese, Indians, and Chinese—plying aid, trade, investment, and military support. Persistent ethnic, religious, ideological, and territorial conflicts within and between states provide many openings to those who would intervene. And in most places, the protective umbrella of the colonial power has been withdrawn.

Whatever the Soviet Union's own policy stance—grand design or incremental opportunism in the service of grand design, or helter-skelter reaction—opportunities abound for Soviet intervention. And racial conflict in southern Africa complicates responses by the United States and makes life easier for the Soviet Union, for the most part, since the Soviet Union is quite willing to provide military assistance to guerilla forces. Conflicts and changes in Africa have opened opportunities for the Soviet Union more than any relative decline in the United States's power and influence.

What of the United States itself? Has there been a weakening of U.S. positions in Africa that stems from a general inability to project its power globally and from misguided or inept policies? Does relative decline in influence in one country or region lead ineluctably to decline in other regions and a global decline in power?

No one should deny that changes that work against a superpower in a given country may have regional significance. And alterations in regional balances of power may have effects in other regions or globally. But these have to be

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shown, not assumed. The burden is on the globalists to show them convincingly. No one has demonstrated that the outcome of struggles in Angola or in the Horn of Africa has either been a consequence of a general American weakness (rather than a disposition not to intervene in those places) or that these outcomes have been consequential for global balances of power. Admittedly, one of the most vexing problems for a regional perspective is that of the perceptions of leaders in other countries and regions outside of black Africa. The Egyptians and Saudis are said to be very nervous about the weakening of U.S. positions in the Horn of Africa and in central Africa. Sadat wanted a vigorous response to the invasion of Shaba Province because he feared the growing might of the Soviet Union and Cuba in the Horn and elsewhere in Africa. The Moroccan leadership apparently shares these perceptions. How much of a constraint on U.S. policy should Arab perceptions be when Egypt and Saudi Arabia are of such major concern to the United States?

There is no simple answer to this question. The United States cannot let the Saudis define U.S. policies in Africa any more than they can be allowed to define U.S. interests in the Middle East. At the same time, their own perceptions and possible responses are factors to consider in formulating U.S. responses. The regionalist perspective should and can take account of the possibility that the fears and desires of nonregional actors can alter regional developments. Thus, for example, Saudi concern with Soviet intervention in the Horn has led it to support Somalia. The United States has had to consider the possibilities of Iranian or Saudi intervention in the Horn. U.S. policies have tried to insulate regional conflicts from those in other regions and from global conflicts, although the United States has not always been consistent in this stance.

The idea of having regional policemen, the "new influentials," was in part a response aimed at containing regional conflict by working with dominant regional powers. There are many difficulties inherent in this policy. New influentials can be unstable. They may be in conflict with each other, and they have the capacity to cause rather than to moderate conflict and instability. Frequently, there is an incongruence between U.S. interests and those of regional powers who are ostensibly allies. Moreover, aside from Nigeria and Egypt, Africa has few candidates for the status in any case. South Africa has some special liabilities.

Nonetheless, while the use of regional influentials was not appropriate, the idea of insulating regional conflicts from outside intervention was a good one. The United States wisely resisted the temptation to work through surrogates in the Horn. If outside military forces are to be used, as in Shaba, this should be done in confined roles and with short-time horizons. For just as Soviet intervention in the Horn or Angola infuses regional conflict with new concerns for the United States, although it does not necessarily change the basic facts of the regional conflict and should not willy-nilly lead the United States to a different response than the one it might make in any case, so may medium-power intervention in intercountry conflicts lead to escalation of the conflict, complicate its

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resolution, and create new difficulties. Saudi or Iranian intervention in the Horn might well have produced those effects. Nor has French, Moroccan, and Egyptian intervention in Zaire "solved" that country's internal difficulties or settled Zairian-Angolian conflicts. The regional perspective starts with a bias against intruding new actors into regional conflicts, but where this occurs, the regionalist argues that we must not lose sight of specific regional circumstances and must not immediately translate these regional conflicts as having global importance simply because nonregional actors may be intervening.

Again, no one should deny that if changes within a country or between countries work against the United States, power balances may alter regionally. And, a change in regional power balances may have global effects. But the regionalist insists that the specifics of the situation be addressed. It is hard to find African countries with the importance of Iran in economic and strategic terms. Nigeria, South Africa, and Zaire are the candidates in Africa south of the Sahara. It would be unwise to conclude that failure to maintain particular governments in any of those countries would alter global balances. The main concern in these cases would be access to Nigeria's oil, Zaire's cobalt, manganese, and copper, and the wealth of minerals in South Africa, including gold, uranium, and rare metals.

I have argued elsewhere that Soviet ability to deny those resources to the United States, or the West more generally, is not great either through direct interdiction of trade or through exploiting political changes within countries. Granted, political change can alter relationships between host governments and foreign investors. This has already occurred in Libya, Nigeria, and Tanzania, among others, in Africa. Prices of goods, however, are determined by supply and demand relationships and by the ability of producers to create cartels, not by Soviet power projected to Africa.[7] Even friendly nations have not lowered oil prices below what the market will bear or a cartel can deliver. Only when a regime is a completely dependent client of another state and maintenance of an elite's power rests on outside power solely can one envision significant pricing policies in favor of the dominant state.

Neither Angola nor Mozambique has tried to cut off relations with American companies. Gulf Oil continues to pump oil from Cabinda, and Texaco has entered into new agreements with Angola. Mozambique has tried mightily to get American investment into that country, not out of it. Guinea and Ghana continued to have major U.S. investment during radical phases. Thus, while the terms of investment for multinationals might change with a change of regime, we cannot assume that the United States would be cut off from access to African resources as a consequence of such a change. Nigeria used its oil weapon against Ghana and Chad to try and force compliance with Nigerian wishes; it nationalized British Petroleum's holdings and from time to time linked its oil policies with Western policies on southern Africa. But Nigeria must sell oil to keep

[7] See Bienen, "U.S. Policy in a Changing Africa," especially pp. 457–61.

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afloat; it is not Kuwait. It requires constant revenues. True, the United States imports more oil from Nigeria than from any state except Saudi Arabia. But the United States could buy Nigerian oil on world markets even if Nigeria should decide not to sell directly to the United States. And, Nigeria has its own weaknesses. It needs Western technology and it needs, increasingly, imported food. Economic weapons would be a two-edged sword for any Nigerian regime.

South Africa is the most important African mineral supplier to the West. Would the destruction of the white regime in South Africa and its replacement with a regime no friendlier to the United States than Mozambique's, for example, lead willy-nilly to the loss of access to South Africa's minerals? Would that South African regime be a client of the Soviet Union, having a relationship similar to those the United States had with Central American republics or the British had with Gulf sheikdoms? The Soviet Union might well like to benefit from cartelization of gold and diamonds and chrome, all of which both South Africa and the USSR produce in quantity. Threats to reliability of supply, however, are more likely to come from disruption in southern Africa, as for example when the Benguela Railroad was cut in Angola, limiting export of Zambian copper, than from embargoes by hostile governments. It does not follow that support for South Africa is the best way to maintain influence in southern Africa and to guarantee access to raw materials there and in the rest of Africa any more than it follows that overall U.S. trade and investment policies in Africa benefit from support of South Africa.[8]

It is the overwhelming economic strength of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan vis-à-vis the Soviet Union that gives these countries a huge comparative advantage as a market for African goods and as an exporter of capital, technology, and foodstuffs to Africa. Whereas the Soviet Union must project direct military power (or the threat of it) to have persistent political influence in Africa, and less frequently makes a commitment of economic assistance, Western countries and Japan exert influence through trade, aid, and investment policies.

The nature of Soviet activities in Africa and the nature of African politics make it likely that the Soviet Union can continue to project its power. There will be opportunities to affect factional conflicts by infusion of limited resources at low risk. Moreover, even apart from southern Africa, the gamut of north-south issues that need to be negotiated and the strained relations that will often arise from those negotiations provide a context in which the Soviet Union will be looked on sympathetically by at least some countries unhappy with the West. But the Soviet Union has not itself been very constructive on north-south issues and remains outside of the dialogue on major issues of trade, finance, and development. And the West remains relevant to Africa, even when Soviet military and political power is manifested. The desire of Angola and Mozambique for more, rather than less, economic relations with the West is to the point, as is the

[8] This discussion draws from ibid.

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modest economic support the Soviet Union has given Ethiopia until recently when the USSR increased its economic aid.

Conclusions

The Carter administration started off with the intention of formulating its African policies from a regionalist perspective without always deriving those policies from the exigencies of global competition between the Soviet Union and the United States. The continued Soviet intervention in the Horn of Africa, the second invasion of Shaba from Angola, and the continued worry about openings for the Soviet Union and Cuba in Rhodesia and more generally in southern Africa, however, led to renewed concern with the Soviets in framing U.S.-African policies. The collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran accentuated this development. It has been felt necessary to assert U.S. strength vis-à-vis its major global adversary, and policymakers have worried more and more about "arcs of instability" and regional power vacuums that the Soviet Union can exploit or perhaps help to create.[9]

Major regional or country changes should always lead us to reassess positions in other countries or regions. But they should not lead us to abandon sound beginnings. Moreover, not all global concerns can be defined in terms of U.S.-Soviet balance of power. New policy directions toward Africa should and must take account of general north-south issues that involve international finance and trade, nuclear proliferation, environment, and resources.

Surely, policies aimed at states or groups of states in Africa must be put within continental and global contexts. There will be a constant dynamic between evolving bilateral relations and U.S. regional, continental, and global interests. For example, the United States must pay attention to the influence of struggles in the Horn of Africa on neighboring countries and on relationships with Arab states. As one tries to formulate a U.S. response to the specific conflicts in the Horn one comes up against the problem of defining U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean and in Africa more generally. At the same time, if the nature of and prospects for conflict in the Horn of Africa are not understood in their own terms, policies will be built on sand. The strengths and weaknesses of regional positions must be seen clearly. Attempts to shore up weak regional positions by "linkage," that is, by postulating that other changes will take place in Soviet-U.S. relations, is not a strong basis for either regional policies or Soviet-U.S. relations. It means formulating policies from weakness. This is not to say that countermoves cannot be made in one's own area of strength. But where regional positions are weak, one can expect continued probes of those positions

[9] It is a curious phenomenon of American foreign-policy making that terms, such as "new influentials" or "arcs of crisis or instability," become semantic symbols that start to dictate what the real world is supposed to be like. They are terms from globalist perspectives and they become terms in search of a policy.

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directly by the Soviet Union or by its allies or by states who find a current Soviet relationship congenial. Just as global dictates can get one in difficulty in regional politics, so trying to save regional positions through global linkages and moves elsewhere is likely to have short-lived success.*

* This article was written under the auspices of Princeton University's Center of International Studies. It is a revised version of an essay presented to the Council on Foreign Relations in April 1979. The author is grateful for comments made by participants in the Council discussions.

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Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus

GLEN D. CAMP

The island of Cyprus has always been at the center of strategic trade routes, always athwart invading empires. The "foreign factor," as Cypriots term the impact of foreign power upon their lives, began in the Bronze Age (ca. 2300–1050 B.C.) when copper production transformed Cyprus into a center of commercial importance in the eastern Mediterranean. By the Late Bronze Age (ca. 1600 B.C.), Cyprus had become a focus of international politics. Assyrian and Egyptian control lasted from 800 to 550 B.C.; Persian from 500 to 322 B.C.; Hellenistic from 322 to 58 B.C. Alexander was succeeded by Romans, Byzantines, Lusignans, and Venetians. Turks ruled Cyprus from 1571 until the British came in 1878, and England's imperial control lasted until the Zurich and London Accords of 1959–60 established the Republic of Cyprus. From 1960 until the Turkish interventions of 1974, Cyprus experienced a tumultuous independence marked by clashes between Greek Cypriots, who make up about 80 percent of the population, and Turkish Cypriots, who make up about 18 percent. Though Greeks are clearly a dominant majority on Cyprus, Turks are less clearly but equally a dominant majority in the eastern Mediterranean region.[1]

The adroit diplomacy of Archbishop Makarios III, first president of the Republic of Cyprus, was but the latest example of an illustrious Byzantine tradition. Yet serving as both archbishop and president, Makarios was trapped by that very tradition. In the end he failed to separate church and state, unable to resolve the dilemma of serving Greek Cypriots as religious ethnarch while serving all Cypriots as secular president.[2] Yet if Makarios, born and bred on

[1] See Laurence Stern, *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy* (New York: Times Books, 1977), p. 80.

[2] Kyriacos C. Markides, *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 150.

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Cyprus, was unable to resolve the island's agony, what are the policy prescriptions for success? First, no policy can be forced upon either Greek or Turkish Cypriots; it must be negotiated. Second, and paradoxically, internal initiatives must be aided by external pressures, for internal forces cannot overcome the deeply rooted obstacles. Third, only the U.N. secretary-general enjoys the requisite confidence in all capitals to serve successfully as mediator; yet to achieve a lasting settlement he must be strongly supported in the background by the United States, the United Kingdom, Western Europe, and Canada.

Even with these policy prescriptions for success, negotiations will be long and difficult. They will surely be profoundly alien to the American genius for quick results based upon tacit consensus on constitutional processes, for it is precisely the absence of such consensus on Cyprus that is the central problem. Yet the history of Cyprus offers hope that if justice is wisely meshed with power, a federal polity acceptable to both communities can be achieved, for ethnic harmony has been achieved on Cyprus in the past.

Like British policy before it, U.S. policy toward Cyprus has been largely based on the structural imperatives of *Realpolitik*, or "policy of realism." Such a policy assumes that the role of diplomacy is to develop solutions to international problems that ratify an existing distribution of power rather than solutions that would change that distribution in the direction of greater equity. The statesman is thus a realist seeking a settlement based upon the existing balance of power, not an idealist seeking to rectify passionately felt injustices. Yet such injustices may be organized into effective political movements as was the case in Cyprus; and in such cases of revolutionary nationalism the realistic statesman must take them into account. Nationalist movements in Cyprus, both Greek and Turkish, were and are relevant actors in the same sense that states are: they have the capacity to impose or subvert stability. Structurally, however, a policy of realism often neglects justice and tends to apotheosize stability regardless of how achieved; thus it places effective governance above just governance. When effective governance is threatened by morally based movements such as revolutionary nationalism, however, the structural imperatives of *Realpolitik* require that such movements be considered as relevant international actors, for a policy of realism must, by definition, treat all power factors as morally neutral.

Secretary Kissinger, however, imbued his policy toward Cyprus with an apparent personal dimension, a generalized enmity toward nationalism which was neither shared by many other British or American statesmen nor required by the logic of *Realpolitik*. This generalized animus apotheosized stability at the expense of equity, deprived U.S. policy of a normative appeal which Americans could enthusiastically support, and further alienated two of the United States's staunchest allies—Greece and Turkey. Apparently unable to assess accurately either Greek- or Turkish-Cypriot nationalism, Kissinger saw only the threat of communism emanating from an essentially conservative nationalist Greek Orthodox prelate. A true realist might have seen that Archbishop Makarios carefully excluded the entire Cypriot Left, including democratic socialists

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(EDEK) and pro-Moscow Communists (AKEL), from his cabinet. Makarios in fact had far more immediate reason to fear communism than Kissinger.[3]

The Zurich-London Accords of 1959–1960

The crisis in Cyprus, however, is not entirely attributable to erroneous U.S. foreign policy. The British in the 1950s had also refused to deal with Cypriot national feeling as expressed in the early and quite modest demands for self-determination posed by the Greek Cypriots. Had the British moved to meet those demands *before* Turkish-Cypriot nationalism became nonnegotiable, the problem of developing a common bicommunal Cypriot national consciousness might have solved itself. Instead, some of the roots of later communal strife developed from Britain's use of Turkish Cypriots as auxiliary police in the British campaign against General George Grivas and his EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) guerillas. British resistance was rooted in objective, not personal, enmity, however, for Whitehall regarded Cyprus as an essential base for England's dwindling empire.[4] Just as the United States later refused to use any port other than Athens as the home port for its Sixth Fleet (even though alternatives existed with only incremental inconvenience)[5], so the British refused to compromise down to the limited "special base areas" which now seem quite adequate for their security needs. In retrospect it seems that both the United States and the United Kingdom as alliance leaders failed to con-

[3] Hans J. Morgenthau suggests how Kissinger often failed by apotheosizing stability as the sole relevant value: "Since the causes and effects of instability persist, a policy committed to stability and identifying instability with communism is compelled by the logic of its interpretation of reality to suppress in the name of anticommunism all manifestations of popular discontent and stifle the aspirations for reform. Thus in an essentially unstable world, tyranny becomes the last resort of a policy committed to stability as its ultimate standard" (cited in John G. Stoessinger, "Kissinger and a Safer World," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, ed. Thomas G. Patterson [Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1978], 2: 508). In a characteristically trenchant but atypically emotional passage, Karl W. Deutsch suggests the cumulative effect of nationalism as a mobilizing force upon developing nations and its further effect upon world politics: "The result is that today all people are involved in the growth of national awareness, and that soon there will be no peoples left to play the role of submerged nationalities or underlying populations, or passive bystanders of history, or drawers of water and hewers of wood for their better organized neighbors. . . . Within each people, all social strata have been mobilized, socially, economically, and politically. . . . Wherever this social mobilization has progressed, it has undermined the patterns of authority and privilege inherited from an earlier day. . . There has never been a period like this in the history of the world" (cited in Arend Lijphart, ed., *World Politics: The Writings of Theorists and Practitioners, Classical and Modern*, 2d ed. [Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971], p. 101).

[4] For a discussion of British policy by a Greek-Cypriot scholar, see Marios L. Evriviades, "The Problem of Cyprus," *Current History* 70 (January 1976): 19, n. 15.

[5] See Thomas Keagy and Yiannis P. Roubatis, "Homeporting with the Greek Junta: Something New and More of the Same in U.S. Foreign Policy," in *U.S. Foreign Policy toward Greece and Cyprus: The Clash of Principle and Pragmatism*, eds. Theodore A. Couloumbis and Sallie M. Hicks (Washington, D.C.: Center for Mediterranean Studies and The American Hellenic Institute, 1975), pp. 49–66.

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sider their allies' feelings and thus unnecessarily weakened their alliances. As Lawrence Durrell concluded, "The tragedy . . . need not have happened."[6]

While British policy weakened the empire by tying down large forces in an unsuccessful drive against EOKA guerillas, it also split NATO by pitting Greek against Turk, Athens against Ankara. Such a split had ominous implications for the resolution of the Cyprus crisis, for any effort to establish union with Greece or independence under self-determination required the support or benevolent neutrality of both Turks and Turkish Cypriots. Since Britain mobilized Turkish Cypriots against both union and independence, Whitehall appears to bear responsibility for the sanguine results.

Turkey could not but be intimately involved in the Cyprus crisis since the character of an independent Cyprus was of legitimate and direct concern to Ankara. A centralized unitary province of Greece such as Grivas demanded would bring Greek military power to a large island only forty-three miles from Turkey. Other Greek islands have been reported as fortified since then in violation of Article 13 of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.[7]

The Zurich-London Accords in July 1960 ended the first phase of EOKA's struggle by Greek-Cypriot nationalists to establish an independent Cyprus under their control.[8] However, they did not get their maximum demand: union with Greece.

Although signed by all parties concerned, the accords were negotiated without participation of the parties most affected: Greek and Turkish Cypriots.[9] Yet without some minimal consensus between the two communities, the ponderous and ramshackle structure of the Zurich and London Accords was almost sure to collapse.

It is hard to accept the accords as anything but a desperate and nearly unworkable compromise dictated by grim political exigency. The accords were an effort to substitute legal structure for political consensus. Thomas Ehrlich suggests the dilemma clearly: the accords failed because the Cypriots did not have the will to make them succeed. He also suggests, however, that "if the crisis is to be permanently resolved, substantial cohesive pressures must be brought to

[6] Lawrence Durrell, *Bitter Lemons* (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1957), p. 128.

[7] See Article 13 in League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 28, pp. 22–23; for a newspaper columnist's view see Ian Vorres, "Aegean Illusions," *Providence Journal* (Rhode Island), 30 August 1976, p. A–14b.

[8] For text of the accords, see Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, Cyprus Cmnd. 1093, London H.M.S.O., July 1960; and Cmnd. 1252, 16 August 1960. See also the United Nations, Secretariat, *Treaty Series*, 382 (1960); *Treaty Series*, 397 (1960): 289, and *Treaty Series*, 382 (1960): 4. The Zurich Agreement was reached on 11 February 1959 and was subsequently incorporated into the London Agreement of 19 February 1959 and signed by the foreign ministers of Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey. In addition, Archbishop Makarios signed for the Greek Cypriots and Dr. Fazil Kuchuk for the Turkish Cypriots. The extent of Makarios's reservations on the accords is a hotly contested issue today. See *Conference on Cyprus*, Cmnd. 679, London H.M.S.O., February 1959 and for signatories' statements, see Cmnd. 680.

[9] See Evriviades, "The Problem of Cyprus," p. 19a.

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bear from outside the Island, for they will not develop within it. There must be some new force that will alter the prescription and approach of all participants."[10]

Under the accords, Cyprus was to be independent and sovereign, allied to Greece and Turkey but not to NATO. The Republic of Cyprus was enjoined to forego both union (*enosis*) with Greece and partition (*taksim*) between Greece and Turkey. In accordance with Article I of the Treaty of Guarantee, political or economic union with any other state was specifically forbidden. In accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 185 of the Republic of Cyprus Constitution of 1960, "the territory of the Republic " was "one and indivisible" and the "integral or partial union of Cyprus with any other State or a separatist independence" was "excluded." Article II of the Treaty of Guarantee repeated the prohibition of point 22 of the Zurich accord against union or partition.[11]

The establishment on 24 December 1967 of a Provisional Turkish-Cypriot Administration and the installation on 13 February 1975 of an alleged Federated Turkish-Cypriot State seem clearly to violate all these accords signed by Ankara as coguarantor.[12]

In accordance with Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee each of the guarantor powers reserved the right to take *unilateral* action, if necessary; but only "with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the . . . Treaty."[13] Many Western observers agree that Ankara had a strong case under international law for its initial landing of 20 July 1974. Neither U.N. Charter article 2:1 nor 2:4 would seem to rule out a Turkish landing *in support* of the accords, especially if the requirement for prior consultation were observed as it was when Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit flew to London before his troops landed on Cyprus.

Yet the Turkish legal case for intervention was severely constrained by the very article (IV) of the Treaty of Guarantee which authorized it. For any guarantor power might act unilaterally, but only "to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by" the treaty.

In law and justice the Turks seemed to have had a good case for their first landing of July 20 and it is probably true that "the Treaty of Guarantee endorsed the territorial integrity and political independence of the island and gave the

[10] Thomas Ehrlich, "Cyprus, the Warlike Isle: Origins and Elements of the Current Crisis," *Stanford Law Review* 18 (May 1966): 1089.

[11] For discussion and excerpts from the accords from the Greek point of view, see Nicos Kranidiotis, *The Cyprus Problem: The Proposed Solutions and the Concept of the Independent and Sovereign State* (Athens: C. Miahalas S.A. Press, 1975), pp. 27, 42. For the Turkish point of view, see Zaim M. Nedjatigil, *Cyprus: Constitutional Proposals and Developments* (Nicosia: Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, Attorney General's Office, n.d. [circa August 1977]).

[12] Kranidiotis, *The Cyprus Problem*, p. 42 and following.

[13] Article IV, Treaty of Guarantee. For text and commentary, see Linda B. Miller, *Cyprus: The Law and Politics of Civil Strife*, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, no. 19 (Cambridge, June 1968), p. 4. For Miller's view of Greek and Turkish positions on Article IV, see ibid., pp. 16–21.

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three outside signatories the right to act singly or collectively to prevent annexation or partition."[14] It is generally agreed that Athens's attempted coup of 15 July 1974 was clearly intended to achieve annexation of Cyprus by Greece in obvious violation of the Zurich-London Accords. Such annexation posed a clear and present danger to Turkish security by bringing Greek military power to a juridically independent island forty miles away, thus permitting Turkey to exercise its inherent right of individual self-defense under U.N. Charter Article 51.

But if the Turks were in conformity with the accords and the U.N. Charter in their July 20 landing, they contravened both by their forced expulsion of Greek Cypriots from their lands and their homes and by settlement on Greek-Cypriots' properties of Turkish colonists brought over from the mainland. Moreover, nothing in the accords or the U.N. Charter would seem to justify *subsequent* Turkish invasions of Cyprus such as that of 14–15 August 1974 which expanded the Turkish-occupied zone and destroyed the territorial integrity of Cyprus which Turkey had pledged to defend.[15]

The Crisis of 1963–64

The Cypriot Constitution of 1960 posed an insoluble problem for President Makarios or any Cypriot leader interested in combining effective and majority rule. The president had to be Greek; the vice-president, Turkish. Each was to be elected separately by his ethnic group, and each enjoyed a veto over foreign affairs, defense, and security matters vital to the republic's existence.[16] The result was somewhat as if President Lincoln's vice-president had been Jefferson Davis—a situation originally contemplated before passage of the Twelfth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Under the 1960 Constitution, representation in most Cypriot elective and appointive offices was specified by ratio (Greek to Turk): the army was 60:40, the civil and security services 70:30. These ratios were to obtain regardless of service needs or employee competence. Separate communal majorities were required for passage of vital legislation such as taxation, while separate "communal chambers" guaranteed autonomy in education, religion, cultural affairs, personal status, and community taxes. Some provisions of the Constitution of

[14] Ibid., p. 4.

[15] In its communique after its initial landing of 20 July 1974, the Turkish government stated: "The purpose of our peaceful action is . . . to restore the independence, territorial integrity and security and the order established by the basic Articles of the [1960 Cypriot] Constitution. . . . Our purpose in Cyprus . . . is . . . to restore the situation prior to the coup and the legitimate order" (cited by the Council of Europe, Commission of Human Rights, Report in response to charges by the government of Cyprus concerning atrocities committed by Turkish troops in Cyprus [Strasbourg, June 1977], pp. 6–7, as excerpted from the special issue "Cyprus" of the Turkish quarterly review, *Foreign Policy* [Ankara, 1974–75], pp. 224–25).

[16] For discussion see M. Necati Munir Ertekun, *Inter-Communal Talks and the Cyprus Problem* (Nicosia: Turkish Federated State of Cryprus, 1977), pp. 1–11, 20–24; see also Kranidiotis, *The Cyprus Problem*, p. 11; see also Nedjatigil, *Cyprus*, pp. 3–9.

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1960 were even declared "immutable" and thus could never be amended even if the survival of the republic required it; other provisions required separate two-thirds majorities for amendment.

Clearly the 1960 Constitution represented federalism gone beserk, a constitutional straitjacket precluding that adaptation essential to the growth and survival of any body politic. Could the constitution have worked? Most scholars who support the Greek position, such as Kranidiotis, argue no, that it was "inherently unworkable" and was "imposed upon" the Cypriots by outside powers. Van Coufoudakis agrees. A minority view is expressed by Dimitri Kitsikis who strongly supports the viability of the accords including the 1960 Constitution.[17]

Scholars who support the Turkish position, such as Kemal Karpat, seem unanimous that it was a fine constitution as it stood.[18] Linda Miller argues that it "might have worked, despite the limitations its drafting imposed, had the two communities shown a greater willingness to cooperate."[19] The evidence presented in this article suggests that politically the situation mandated either a restraining constitution or partition and that to blame the British exclusively for its failings is pointless for the constitution reflected the real fears of Turkish Cypriots. It was a lack of consensus that ultimately destroyed the Constitution of 1960. Turkish Cypriots were simply unwilling to entrust their fate to Greek Cypriots or to rely upon "evolutionary political processes as a means of securing their rights. Their insistence on specific, rigid provisions expressed their misgivings about their fate as a minority."[20] These misgivings are substantiated by a Greek scholar who points out that historically the Turkish Cypriots had a realistic basis for their fears.[21]

When President Makarios tried to break out of the constitutional straitjacket imposed upon him, he had two basic options: renegotiate the accords or alter them unilaterally. He altered them unilaterally with disastrous results. On 30 November 1963 he proposed his "thirteen points," officially if rather inaccurately termed "Suggested Measures to Facilitate the Smooth Functioning of the State and Remove Certain Causes of Inter-Communal Friction." All thirteen amendments were intended to end the power of the Turkish-Cypriot minority to block action desired by the Greek-Cypriot majority, including the abolition of majorities in both Greek and Turkish sides of the legislatures, the abolition of separate judicial systems for the two groups, the elimination of separate city governments in the five major towns, and the elimination of the veto power of

[17] See Kranidiotis's view in *The Cyprus Problem*, p. 11; see also Van Coufoudakis's view in "U.S. Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question: A Case Study in Cold War Diplomacy," in *U.S. Foreign Policy toward Greece and Cyprus*, Couloumbis and Hicks, p. 111; see also Kitsikis's divergent view in the discussion in ibid., pp. 145–46.

[18] Kemal H. Karpat, "Solution in Cyprus: Federation," in *The Cyprus Dilemma: Options for Peace*, Institute for Mediterranean Affairs (New York: Institute for Mediterranean Affairs, 1967), p. 41.

[19] Miller, *Cyprus*, p. 5.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Kitsikis, in Couloumbis and Hicks, *U.S. Foreign Policy toward Greece and Cyprus*, p. 146.

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the Turkish-Cypriot vice-president. When on 1 January 1964 Makarios announced his intention to abrogate the accords, the Turkish Cypriots quite correctly feared a Greek-Cypriot move to alter their relations to the state and their rights as a minority.[22] Major violence broke out which almost led to Turkish military intervention on the ground and did lead to Turkish air force bombing of Greek-Cypriot positions.

Supporters of the Turkish position agree with Karpat's judgment that instead of seeking multilateral renegotiation, "President Makarios chose to achieve his aim by a unilateral act of abrogation."[23] Many observers of the Cyprus problem also agree in part with Merlin who suggests that had Makarios "chosen to press for renegotiation instead of indulging in a willful act of unilateral abrogation, the tragedy . . . might have been avoided."[24] Certainly Makarios's actions amounted to unilateral abrogation of a multilateral treaty package; certainly it violated *pacta sunt servanda,* the sanctity of treaties. Even worse, his action placed the full political support of the other signatories on the Turkish side of the dispute.

Yet what was Makarios to do? This Karpat, Merlin, and Miller do not explain. Makarios was responsible for the survival of the republic which he felt was threatened by the accords imposed upon it. He could not accept the provisions of the accords, nor could he realistically hope to renegotiate them given Turkish attitudes. He was placed in a "no win" situation. His chosen policy—unilateral abrogation—further ripped the fragile threads of consensus so painstakingly woven together in 1960. Intercommunal fighting broke out and only the strongest pressure from Washington prevented a Turkish landing in 1964. Greek-Cypriot positions at Kokkina on Morphou Bay were bombed by the Turkish air force, which elicited the famous letter from President Johnson to then Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu. Johnson criticized Ankara for using NATO weapons against Greek Cypriots when they were intended only for defense against aggression directed at Turkey. He "implied that if Turkey became embroiled in an armed dispute with the Soviet Union because of Cyprus she may not expect assistance from NATO."[25] At least twice before August 1964 the United States pressured Turkey to avoid hasty action. President Johnson personally intervened in June 1964 and later sent a strongly worded letter to Turkey's leaders indicating that Washington would not honor its NATO defense commitments to Turkey if Ankara intervened in Cyprus.[26]

It should be carefully noted that such pressure was *not* exerted by President Nixon or Secretary Kissinger before the Turkish invasion of 1974 although the

[22] For the text of Makarios's "Thirteen Points," see the journal *Cyprus To-Day* 1, no. 6 (Nicosia, November-December 1963): 1-8. See also Ertekun, *Inter-Communal Talks,* appendix 7, p. 63; see also Kranidiotis, *The Cyprus Problem,* appendix 1, p. 56.

[23] Karpat, "Solution in Cyprus," p. 43.

[24] Comment by S. Merlin in Institute for Mediterranean Affairs, *The Cyprus Dilemma,* p. 71.

[25] Karpat, "Solution in Cyprus," pp. 46-47.

[26] Miller, *Cyprus,* p. 52.

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Sixth Fleet remained in position. President Johnson went to extraordinary lengths to avert a Turkish invasion by sending Dean Acheson, George Ball, and Senator J. William Fulbright to the island on mediation and fact-finding assignments.

Western Cyprus Policy

Western policy toward Cyprus was predicated on three main concerns. First, the British were concerned over their dwindling empire and their perceived need to anchor a position in the eastern Mediterranean with Cypriot bases. Second, the Greeks and Greek Cypriots feared that bringing NATO into the Cyprus issue would penalize them since NATO would tilt toward Ankara as the capital providing more troops than Athens. Third, the United States and Britain feared weakening NATO's vital eastern flank.

We have already examined the first concern in discussing the British campaign against EOKA and EOKA-B. The Acheson-Ball Plan of 1964 was intended to allay the fears of Greeks and Greek Cypriots. It failed because the Greek Cypriots and particularly Makarios saw it as a disadvantageous NATO approach to the Cyprus problem. The plan was a modified form of "double enosis" or partition of the island between Greeks and Turks. The method of implementation and the exact areas to be turned over to Turkey varied with the different versions of the plan. All versions, however, involved partition and thus elimination of an independent Cyprus under Makarios.[27] Its fatal weakness lay in its neglect of the views of the Greek Cypriots and President Makarios; it was to be negotiated with Athens and Ankara and imposed upon Nicosia. Unlike Kissinger's policy, however, the Acheson-Ball Plan did not result in disaster for Washington because of strong action by President Johnson and because of the administration's unwillingness to push the plan to the point of military confrontation. It failed because partition could be imposed on the Greek Cypriots only by force, which the Johnson administration was quite unwilling to impose in 1964 but which the Turks were willing to impose ten years later.

The third Western concern was the fear of weakening NATO's eastern flank. Such concerns were exacerbated by the strong anti-NATO posture of the Greek Communist party (AKEL) and Makarios's ambiguous relationship to it. Numbering some 10,000 members, or about 3 percent of Cyprus's adult population, AKEL (Progressive Party of the Working People) enjoyed support from an extensive network of farmers', women's, and youth organizations, which constituted about 30 percent of the total electorate, as well as support from the Pan-Cypriot Labor Federation (PEO).[28]

[27] See Evriviades, "The Problem of Cyprus," p. 18, n. 4; see also Van Coufoudakis, "U.S. Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question," pp. 113–17.

[28] Figures from T. W. Adams and Alvin J. Cottrell, *Cyprus between East and West* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), pp. 14, 19.

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Political convenience shaped the relations between AKEL and Makarios's Patriotic Front party. For quite different reasons, both opposed NATO and both were ambivalent toward union with Greece. Makarios's dispatch of trade and arms-buying missions to Moscow both pleased AKEL and frightened the West. Friction between Athens and Nicosia is suggested by Mikes who observes that in 1965 while Athens was urging an annexed Greek Cyprus as a gain for NATO, Makarios "gaily proclaims it is a condition of Enosis to dismantle all military bases on the island."[29]

The West thus had reasons for suspecting Makarios. His anti-Communist posture was not publicized for domestic political reasons but his anti-NATO posture was. Moreover even Cypriot party leaders found Makarios eliptical and difficult. As for Western statesmen, the normally "unflappable" George Ball became so annoyed with Makarios during negotiations over the Acheson-Ball Plan that he reportedly shouted, "God damn it, your Beatitude."[30] The prevailing Western view was that Makarios was "unreliable, demogogic, anti-Western and obstructive to any final settlement of the Cyprus problem."[31]

Though perhaps not known by top U.S. policymakers, it was common knowledge at the State Department's Cyprus desk that President Makarios, like Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, was not fundamentally anti-Western. Makarios permitted clandestine U.S. activities on Cyprus, including U-2 flights from the British base at Akrotiri as well as CIA radio monitors along the north coast near Kyrenia.[32] Miller agrees and concludes that despite certain policy congruencies between Moscow and Nicosia, "Moscow does not 'control' Makarios in any organized fashion. . . . The Archbishop uses whatever material and other support he garners from Russia for his own political purposes."[33]

This writer views Makarios as a charismatic, somewhat authoritarian nationalist of a profoundly conservative Greek-Orthodox bent fighting desperately for survival and convinced that only neutrality would permit it. Indeed, stylistically, Makarios's diplomacy had more than a few similarities with Kissinger's: subtle, pontifical, secretive, Byzantine, and authoritarian.

Top American policymakers, however, tended to see Cyprus only in the context of the cold war. In that Manichean struggle of absolute good against absolute evil, neutrality was equivalent to immorality, while "nonalignment" which included flirting with Moscow was morally outrageous. The West demanded a clear-cut policy of active anticommunism publicly announced and implemented. Makarios obviously did not regard such a policy as in his interest, given the strong AKEL base of support on Cyprus. Moreover, the anti-

[29] George Mikes, "Letter from Cyprus," in *The Cyprus Dilemma*, Institute for Mediterranean Affairs, p. 64.

[30] Laurence Stern, "Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus," *Foreign Policy* 19 (Summer 1975): 57.

[31] Ibid., p. 58.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Miller, *Cyprus*, p. 53.

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Communist but democratic socialist party, Unified Democratic Center Union (EDEK), was also in favor of nonalignment, and Makarios needed EDEK support in his struggle to force a unitary form of governance upon the Turkish Cypriots.

What of American policy? Was it consistently directed toward liquidating the Republic of Cyprus? Even Van Coufoudakis, the principal exponent of the "conspiracy" view of U.S. Cyprus policy, admits to real U.S. concern over Makarios's relations with AKEL and Moscow. According to Coufoudakis's "Theory of Continuity," Washington followed a single, premeditated, unswerving pro-Turkish partition policy from the Acheson-Ball Plan of 1964 to Kissinger's tilt toward Ankara of 1974. He does admit, however, a "practical policy alternative" to the assumed U.S. push for partition, and perhaps inconsistently cites an alleged secret Ball-Grivas approval of union with Greece.[34] Such an approval is clearly inconsistent with any partition policy.

There are other difficulties with Coufoudakis's "Theory of Continuity." If U.S. policy were so unswerving, why did it wobble so incontinently back and forth from union with Greece to partition between Greece and Turkey? If the United States were as omnipotent in the eastern Mediterranean as Coufoudakis assumed, why was it unable to achieve its basic alleged goal: partition with elimination of a nonaligned independent Cyprus and the island's integration into NATO? In contrast to Coufoudakis's analysis, however, U.S. Cyprus Desk Officer Tom Boyatt offers a compelling and reasonable alternative explanation: U.S. Cyprus policy resulted from human frustration and confusion in the face of rapidly changing and totally unexpected events. Boyatt insists that there was no "conspiracy" between Washington and Athens to overthrow Makarios, annex Cyprus, and liquidate its putative Communist threat. He argues persuasively that Greek dictator Ioannides's policy (that is, war with Turkey over Cyprus) was neither rational nor predictable and that U.S. policy was neither unswerving nor premeditated as its abject failure all too clearly suggests.

Boyatt does note a split among U.S. policymakers on Cyprus between what he terms "total pragmatists" (top-level policymakers) and "idealists" (working-level desk officers). He implies that the former view Cyprus primarily in terms of alliance (NATO) and alliance-manager (U.S.) goals; while the latter view Cyprus primarily in terms of human values and Cypriot goals. The validity of Boyatt's dichotomy between policymakers and desk officers accords with common sense and a good deal of published research.[35] It is exacerbated by several

[34] For Van Coufoudakis's "Theory of Continuity" in U.S. Cyprus policy, see *Greek World* 3 (August–September 1978), p. 15a. For Stern's apparent agreement, see Stern, *Wrong Horse*, pp. 160–61. For Van Coufoudakis on U.S. Cyprus policy in general, see Couloumbis and Hicks, *U.S. Foreign Policy toward Greece and Cyprus*, pp. 111, 115, 128, 130, n. 15; for U.S. Cyprus Desk Officer Tom Boyatt's opposing views, see Couloumbis and Hicks, *U.S. Foreign Policy toward Greece and Cyprus*, pp. 140–41.

[35] See for example, Stern, "Bitter Lessons," p. 71.

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factors not mentioned by Boyatt. First, policymakers have global responsibilities and are often brought in from outside professions such as the academic community, law, or banking. They often lack specialized area competence and concomitant empathy with the people of an area; the opposite is true of desk officers. Moreover, policymakers must often "prove" their policy and personal toughness to a much more demanding and aggressive constituency of the U.S. foreign-affairs elite; this seems particularly true of the special assistant to the president for national security affairs and his NSC community. Desk officers, on the contrary, are career civil servants usually appointed via a competitive examination. They are professional diplomats and area experts and as such are often more insulated from the overly aggressive image that characterizes some elements of the Defense Department and clandestine services. They are also more insulated from the winds of popular opinion. And U.S. Cyprus policy may well have fallen victim to a perceptual lag of popular and elite opinion left over from the coldest days of the cold war, when total opposition to Stalinist expansionism made sense on both pragmatic and idealistic grounds. After détente, however, pragmatism and morality were no longer infrangibly linked; the Communist challenge became both more sophisticated and more polycentrist. Ironically this attenuation of the Communist challenge represented not a failure, but rather a successs of American policy, a success to which Kissinger himself contributed significantly by reifying détente.

The tragedy of Cyprus was that Kissinger did not reify détente toward Nicosia as he did toward Peking and Moscow. U.S. Cyprus policy seemed mired in the reactive and fundamentalist "cold warrior" modes of the 1950s; the times had changed but U.S. Cyprus policy had not.[36] As the cohesion of pragmatism and morality which had unified U.S. policy during the cold war broke apart, Kissinger was unable effectively to mesh morality with power, consensus with coercion. Lacking the moral support enjoyed by Acheson and Ball in 1964, Kissinger waffled until events on Cyprus forced him to choose between Greece and Turkey. In vacillating before selecting the more powerful, he lost both to the NATO alliance as committed members.

Greek and Turkish Cyprus Policy

A third crisis began in November 1967 when bloody fighting broke out between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. As in 1964 the Turks threatened to invade and issued an ultimatum demanding withdrawal of mainland Greek forces and dissolution of the Cypriot National Guard. In 1967 Washington again intervened to prevent a Turkish incursion as it did *not* do in 1974. An agreement acceding to Turkish demands was signed by Greece and Turkey and communicated to Nicosia by Cyrus Vance, then President Johnson's special representative. Although Makarios strongly opposed dissolution of the Na-

[36] Ibid., p. 40.

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tional Guard, Papadopoulos ordered his forces back to Greece. As Kranidiotis observes, it was the extreme nationalist Greek dictator who was thus responsible for "leaving Cyprus undefended in case Turkey should . . . invade,"[37] as it did in 1974. Miller sees the 1967 crisis in a different perspective, suggesting that it arose after Makarios sent police patrols into two Turkish-Cypriot villages, Ayios Theodoros and Kohphinou, at a "cost of over thirty Turkish Cypriot lives."[38] Miller estimates that the withdrawal involved 8,000 to 12,000 mainland Greek troops who, she suggests, had illegally infiltrated Cyprus since 1963.

Greek Cyprus policy is a study in contradiction, ranging from rejection of union, through indifference, to passionate support. In 1915 Britain offered Cyprus to Greece as payment for joining the Allies in World War I.[39] When the Greek king hesitated, the offer was withdrawn. Recent Greek and Greek-Cypriot views have divided three ways. First, Greece's shifting policy, sometimes supporting and sometimes opposing union. Second, General Grivas's EOKA and EOKA-B policy steadfastly supporting union. Lastly, Makarios's policy steadfastly supporting an independent and neutral Cyprus, but wavering on union with Greece and flirting with Moscow.

Turkish views on Cyprus have been much more consistent than Greek as confirmed even by Greek-Cypriot analysts.[40] Both Turks and Turkish Cypriots wanted partition or some form of cantonal or federal system based on geographical separation. A careful search of the literature reveals few policy differences between Ankara and Turkish Cypriots before the landing of 20 July 1974.[41] Perhaps this striking difference between the two communities and their respective metropoles is explained by the smaller size and greater vulnerability of the Turkish Cypriots who number only about 100,000. Yet the difference applies even to the better protected and armed secret TMT ("Turkish Resistance Force") which became the Turkish counterpart to the Greek-Cypriot EOKA-B.

The ambiguity of Athens's Cyprus policy was considerably exacerbated by the actions of Greek dictator George Papadopoulos and his successor Dimitrios Ioannides. In 1968 when Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot leaders seemed near agreement, Papadopoulos upstaged the Cypriot statesmen and destroyed a possible settlement in secret talks with Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel. By demanding union with Greece and other tough concessions, Papadopoulos forced Demirel to reject his proposals, and the hope of a peaceful settlement negotiated by the two Cypriot communities collapsed.[42]

[37] Kranidiotis, *The Cyprus Problem*, p. 26.

[38] Miller, *Cyprus*, pp. 43–44 *passim*.

[39] Mikes, "Letter from Cyprus," p. 60.

[40] Evriviades, "The Problem of Cyprus," p. 20b.

[41] After establishment of the "Attila Line" such splits evidently did occur. See the resignations of Alper Orhon and Nejat Konuk, the latter quondam prime minister of the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" who reportedly opposed Denktash's policy toward Nicosia. See also Adamantia Pollis, "The Cyprus Nightmare," and Joseph Stephanides, "Eliminating Racial Discrimination," both in *Greek World* 3 (August–September 1978): 10a–10c, 11b.

[42] Evriviades, "The Problem of Cyprus," p. 20b.

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But Athens apparently went much further in its machinations. It appears that Papadopoulos and Ioannides unleashed at least three assassination attempts against Makarios: "Operation Hermes" (1970); "Operation Apollo" (1971); and "Operation Aphrodite" (1974), which drove Makarios from office. In Operation Hermes, Makarios's helicopter was shot down and the pilot killed; Makarios was not injured. In Operation Aphrodite, which began the so-called July Days, Makarios was almost killed again but escaped abroad, later to return to a dismembered and ravaged Cyprus after the July Days.[43] In sum, realistic grounds evidently existed for Makarios's poignant letter of 2 July 1974 accusing the Ioannides regime of trying to kill him.[44]

While one can sympathize with Makarios surrounded by deadly enemies in Cyprus, Athens, Ankara, and elsewhere, one must also concede that the Turks had good reason to distrust him. For Makarios was either unable or unwilling to subordinate his role as Greek religious ethnarch to his function as secular president of all Cypriots— Greek and Turkish alike. Like so many of his classical and Byzantine compatriots, he seemed incapable of transcending the narrow ethnic constraints of his city-state to construct multiethnic political institutions. Yet only through such institutions could a truly Cypriot national identity develop.[45]

In November 1973, Papadopoulos was overthrown on the somewhat unpersuasive grounds of "excessive leniency" toward the revolting students of the Athens Polytechnic Institute. He was replaced by a political general, Dimitrios Ioannides, chief of the Greek Military Police or ESA. The moral level of this group is suggested by a comprehensive Amnesty International report of 1968.[46]

General Grivas died 27 January 1974 and Nikos Sampson, Cypriot newspaper publisher and personal friend of Ioannides, took over as leader of EOKA-B. Ioannides was thus placed in control of the entire Greek anti-Makarios *Ethnikofron* or ultranationalist faction on Cyprus, leaving the archbishop only his police and intelligence services. Without citing any proof, Stern and Evriviades charge Washington with financing the post-Grivas EOKA-B after

[43] Stern, "Bitter Lessons," pp. 43, 56; for Stern on "Operation Apollo" see ibid., p. 46.

[44] Ibid., p. 53.

[45] Ibid., pp. 38-39. See also the *New York Times* editorial and obituary of Archbishop Makarios on 4 August 1977, p. A-26, and Markides, *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic*, pp. 50, 54, 150, 159, 166-167, and 172-173. Markides concludes: "If Makarios succeeded as a charismatic Ethnarch, he seems to have failed as a statesman" (pp. 54-55).

For two analyses of the failure of Cypriot nationalism, see Adamantia Pollis, "Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy, The Case of Cyprus," *Comparative Politics* 5 (July 1973): 575-99, especially where she concludes: "It is evident that Cyprus does not have the institutional requisites, nor does its population have the individual behavioral patterns, necessary for forming or maintaining a nation-state" (p. 599). See also her article, "International Factors and the Failure of Political Integration in Cyprus," in *Small States and Segmented Societies*, ed. Stephanie Neuman (New York: Praeger, 1976).

[46] "Amnesty International Report on Torture" of 27 January 1968, cited in Stephen Rousseas, *The Death of a Democracy: Greece and the American Conscience* (New York: Grove Press, 1968), pp. 199-203.

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February 1974.[47] If true, this would place a heavy additional burden of responsibility on Washington for the events which today embitter Greeks and Turks alike.

It was this new EOKA-B under Ioannides's control and led by the reputed "Turk killer" and assassin Nikos Sampson, which carried out the July 15 coup code-named "Aphrodite," which ushered in the July Days of 1974. Though Secretary Kissinger suggested that the United States was caught off guard, the Turks were apparently better informed for they were massing an army to land on Cyprus.[48] After the coup, Sampson found himself without support from the balkanized political groups on Cyprus which Makarios had so adroitly managed.

The July Days

The extent of Ioannides's miscalculation became apparent during the so-called July Days as the Turks landed in force on 20 July 1974 and the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 353 that same day demanding "an immediate end to foreign military intervention in . . . Cyprus." The council also called for withdrawal of all foreign military personnel without delay from the island and urged Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain "to enter into negotiations without delay for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government in Cyprus."[49] A cease-fire accompanied by U.S. mediation was set for July 22, by which date Turkish forces had occupied a large fortified line of defense and linked up with the main Turkish-Cypriot enclave north of Nicosia.

In Athens the Greek general staff reportedly mutinied on July 21 when ordered by Ioannides to attack Turkey; on July 23 the Sampson regime in Nicosia collapsed. By July 24 Constantine Caramanlis replaced General Ioannides in Athens while Sampson was ousted in Nicosia. Constitutional government had returned to both Greece and Cyprus.

Before the landing of July 20, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit flew to London apparently to persuade Britain to undertake joint action with Turkey as coguarantor power under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee. Though London reportedly did not agree to such action, Ecevit clearly made an effort to fulfill the "consultation" requirement of Article IV; in fact Turkey clearly stated that the Guarantee Treaty was its authority for intervention on Cyprus.[50]

[47] Evriviades, "The Problem of Cyprus," p. 21b, and Stern, "Bitter Lessons," pp. 47–48. See also the CIA evaluation, "Post Mortem Report and Examination of the Intelligence Community: Performance Before and During the Cyprus Crisis of 1974" [Classified], mentioned in Evriviades, "The Problem of Cyprus," p. 21a, n. 29.

[48] Evriviades, "The Problem of Cyprus," p. 39a; and Stern, "Bitter Lessons," p. 41.

[49] Full text in Kranidiotis, *The Cyprus Problem*, pp. 63–64.

[50] Nedjatigil, *Cyprus*, p. 22. See also the official Turkish government statement upon landing on Cyprus on 20 July 1974, as excerpted from special issue on Cyprus of the Turkish quarterly *Foreign Policy* (Ankara, 1974–75).

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While the guarantor powers met to discuss a cease-fire, Turkish troops advanced slowly. From the time the first cease-fire took effect on July 22, as mandated by Resolution 353, to immediately prior to the second phase of the Geneva Conference on August 8, the area under Turkish occupation increased only slightly, from approximately 2 percent to 4 percent of the island.

On August 13, however, the situation changed radically when the Turks demanded both territorial separation and cession of one-third of the island. When the Greek side asked for thirty-six hours to study the proposals, Turkish troops heavily bombed Nicosia and seized 38 percent of the island.

Supporters of the Greek position would argue that during two critical periods—from July 15 to July 20 and from July 20 to August 12—"crisis diplomacy" might have saved Cyprus. It might have saved Cyprus from devastation and 200,000 refugees; it might have saved Turkey from occupying a fiscal albatross at a time of financial distress at home; and it might have saved NATO from the defection in all but name of Greece and Turkey. Here were two golden opportunities for crisis management, for the crisis was real and demanded immediate management. After the invasions of August 14–15 and later, the opportunities were lost, for by then it would be too late for diplomacy to reverse a strategic *fait accompli* imposed and maintained by armed force.

Why did Washington temporize? Why did Kissinger not oppose a Turkish landing as President Johnson had in 1964 and 1967? Supporters of the Greek position find such unwonted passivity by Kissinger explicable only if it were immaterial to him whether Athens or Ankara controlled Nicosia. Greek supporters find "absentmindedness," as suggested by John Stoessinger, particularly unpersuasive in view of Kissinger's activism elsewhere.[51] It is particularly ironic also that Kissinger did not try for a peace based on *Realpolitik*, that is, a peace based on balance of power during these two crucial periods. Instead Washington tilted first toward Ioannides and Sampson (toward union) during the first period (July 15–20), then toward Ecevit and Denktash (toward partition) during the second (July 20 to August 12). It was the status quo on Cyprus itself which Kissinger apparently opposed, and either Greek or Turkish occupation would achieve his goal of replacing a neutral government with a pro-NATO government in Nicosia.

What Kissinger evidently did not foresee was what actually happened: 40 percent of Cyprus under Turkish occupation, a divided republic flooded with refugees but still viable as a nonaligned state, bitter enmity toward the United States from all sides, and disarray on NATO's eastern flank.

Negotiations with the Turks

The three guarantor powers met in the first round of Geneva talks from July 25–30 pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 353. The first and second

[51] Stoessinger, "Kissinger and a Safer World," p. 510.

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cease-fires were nibbled away as the Turkish army inched forward, perhaps awaiting the U.S. and British response. That response was a subtle but important tilt toward Turkey. The second cease-fire of July 30 called not for an immediate end to foreign military intervention but merely for the timely and phased reduction of all armed forces in Cyprus.

It appears that British Foreign Secretary Callaghan seriously overestimated the probability of success in this second round of talks at Geneva and that Washington either accepted his assessment or did not care so long as the status quo was not restored. In either case, it quickly became apparent that Ankara was simply not interested in serious negotiations, at least without heavy pressure from Washington which was conspicuous by its absence.

Evidently supported by Secretary Kissinger in the background, Turkish Foreign Minister Turan Gunes suggested at Geneva that six new districts be controlled by an autonomous Turkish-Cypriot administration, a proposal which recalled the Acheson-Ball Plan of 1964.[52] The Gunes proposal would have increased the area of permanent Turkish control to 34 percent of Cyprus, even though Turkish Cypriots were only 18 percent of the population. Clearly also the Gunes-Kissinger plan would have destroyed the Republic of Cyprus and thereby violated the Treaty of Guarantee under which Turkey originally intervened in the island.

When Greek Foreign Minister George Mavros asked for thirty-six hours to check with Athens and the Turks refused, British Foreign Secretary Callaghan angrily accused the Turks of coming to Geneva not to negotiate, but to demand surrender. After the breakdown of the second round of talks (August 8–13), the Turks began the large-scale invasion that transformed the entire strategic situation and violated Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee. Yet the official U.S. reaction signaled to the Turks that Washington was not opposed to their invasion and perhaps even supported Ankara in altering the strategic situation.[53]

The worldwide impression that the Turks were not really interested in negotiations was further strengthened by the lack of progress in the subsequent Vienna talks held 28 April to 2 May, 5 June to 7 June, and 31 July to 2 August 1975. It was strengthened even more by the announcement in Ankara on 13 February 1975 of the installation of a so-called Federated Turkish-Cypriot State and by the colonization of Greek-Cypriot lands by farmers imported from Turkey. Kranidiotis seems correct in asserting that by importing some 20,000 colonists into the Famagusta, Kyrenia, and Morphou areas, the Turks were attempting to "change by force the demographic character of the island."[54] The Turkish colonization of occupied areas both contravened international law and, more importantly, erected new obstacles to resolution of the Cyprus problem.

[52] Stern, *Wrong Horse*, p. 131.

[53] Ibid., p. 133.

[54] Kranidiotis, *The Cyprus Problem*, p. 49; see also the *New York Times*, 10 December 1978, p. 13.

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Toward the middle of November 1978, Matthew Nimetz, counselor of the U.S. State Department, advanced a twelve-point U.S. plan reportedly with the participation of Britain and Canada. This Nimetz plan envisaged a federal Cypriot state with separate Greek and Turkish regions and the return to Greek-Cypriot control of sizeable territories which had been seized by Turkish forces in 1974. Although its text has not been made public in English, a fairly accurate and complete version was published in the Istanbul daily *Hurriyet* and a summary appeared in the *New York Times*.[55]

It is still something of a mystery why the Nimetz plan was rejected by the Kyprianou government in Nicosia in view of its pro-Greek thrust. One hypothesis is that the rejection came about because of pressure by AKEL and EDEK, both which apparently opposed the plan's constitutional provisions for federation and which demanded a unitary government in Nicosia.[56] It is further reported that the Turkish Cypriots and Ankara were quite surprised by this rejection since the Nimetz plan would have very considerably improved the Greek-Cypriot position. Moreover, the effect of the Greek-Cypriot rejection was to relieve the Turkish side of a good deal of Western diplomatic pressure which could hardly have been in Nicosia's interest.

At this point the U.N. secretary-general stepped in and apparently altered the Nimetz plan substantially. Waldheim reportedly dropped the constitutional proposals unacceptable to the Greek side because they allegedly weakened the unitary character of the Nicosia government. But he kept the Varosha proposals that were acceptable to the Turkish side, and he also evenhandedly suggested the reciprocal lifting of economic and trade restrictions, which was not part of the Nimetz plan.

United Nations Cyprus Policy

Makarios's fear of a NATO tilt toward Ankara explains why he resolutely opposed Western mediation of the Cyprus problem and instead elevated the crisis to international importance by bringing it before the United Nations (at the cost, perhaps, of its earlier resolution). His efforts were rewarded in terms of world public opinion, however, particularly in terms of Third World support

[55] The plan's twelve points are summarized in Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Offers New Cyprus Plan," *New York Times*, 29 November 1978.

[56] The "Nimetz plan" proposed creation of a federal Cypriot state with separate Greek and Turkish "regions" and the return to Greek-Cypriot control of significant territory seized by Turkish forces. Negotiations were to be mediated by the U.N. secretary-general, which should have encouraged the Greek Cypriots as should the fact that the reported British and Canadian help in drafting the plan would increase its chances of acceptance. The Kyprianou government's rejection seems all the more inexplicable since on 10 February 1975 it had made substantial territorial concessions on the size of each "region." See Kranidiotis, *The Cyprus Problem*, p. 40; see also Steven V. Roberts, "Greek Cypriots Lose Leader," *New York Times*, 4 August 1977, p. A-3.

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for Nicosia in the U.N. General Assembly. A long list of General Assembly resolutions supports this conclusion.[57]

Former Secretary-General U Thant first named Sakari Severi Tuomioja as his special mediator, and after the latter's untimely death on 9 September 1964 (and after a temporary replacement, Pier Spinelli), he named Galo Plaza Lasso on 17 September 1964. Shortly thereafter, Turkish sources criticized Plaza for having "overstepped his mandate when he presumed to act as arbitrator rather than mediator." Karpat further objects that Plaza allegedly "advocated the rule of the Greek majority and offered the Turks the option of either accepting minority status with duly guaranteed rights or of settling in Turkey."[58]

A major flaw in Makarios's policy was that U.N. resolutions could not solve the Cyprus problem, for only Turkey could do that and it would only negotiate on its terms: partition into two separate "states" with a weak central government. As far back as 1965, Plaza with striking accuracy foresaw the lineaments of Turkish policy which were only to be realized in 1974: total geographic separation in a federal system composed of autonomous Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot states. He noted "the establishment of a federal regime requires a territorial basis and this basis does not exist."[59] This "territorial basis" for federalism now does exist owing to Turkish action, even though the numerical preponderance of Greek over Turkish Cypriots continues.

The formation of the U.N. Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in March 1964 placed the United Nations in the midst of a civil war for the first time since the Congo crisis of 1960–61. As in the Congo, the U.N. Security Council provided only minimal political guidance through a vaguely worded "mandate" which represented the outer limits of member-state consensus. Greek Cypriots promptly demanded that UNFICYP unify Cyprus under Greek control; Turkish Cypriots demanded that it enforce partition. U Thant described UNFICYP's dilemma: "The plain fact . . . is that [UNFICYP] is in the most delicate position that any UN mission has ever experienced, for it is not only in the midst of a bitter civil war, but it is dangerously interposed between the two sides of that war."[60]

UNFICYP troopers have sometimes been called "soldiers without enemies," but they often seemed closer to being "soldiers without supporters" and thus fair game for both sides. The U.N. peace*keeping* force was not engaged in peace*making*; only statesmen could do that. The best any U.N. force could do was buy precious time to allow the intricate, prolix, and tedious job of peacemaking to proceed. Again U Thant put the matter clearly: "The life and economy of the Island remain disrupted and abnormal, and it would be

[57] These United Nations resolutions are conveniently summarized in Kranidiotis, *The Cyprus Problem*, pp. 61–77.

[58] Karpat, "Solution in Cyprus," p. 44.

[59] Report of the U.N. mediator on Cyprus to the U.N. secretary-general, S/6253, 26 March 1965, cited in Kranidiotis, *The Cyprus Problem*, pp. 22–23.

[60] S/5959, September 1964, para. 221, cited in Miller, *Cyprus*, p. 40.

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unrealistic to expect any radical improvement until a basic political solution can be found."[61]

The basic U.N. strategy for dealing with Cyprus has been to stabilize the existing situation with its peacekeeping force while urging the two sides to settle their differences. Although this is probably the only effective approach, this strategy often seems as frustrating as it is tedious. Certainly it risks a veto from both Athens and Ankara over the results of lengthy and painstaking negotiations. Just as agreement seemed near in 1968, only to be vetoed by Athens, a so-called package deal seemed near in 1973, only to be vetoed by both parties. In 1973 both sides evidently wanted the whole loaf, and neither would take a crumb less. The Greeks wanted complete union, while the Turks wanted complete partition; the former demanded a completely unitary and the latter a completely federal polity.

Intercommunal talks were adjourned after the April 2 meeting over this basic issue of a unitary versus a federal polity. Prime Minister Ecevit demanded a solution within "the framework of an independent and *federal* state," while Mr. Clerides rejected any "partitionist, *federalist*, cantonal, or other solutions equivalent to the creation of a state within a state." Archbishop Makarios concluded that "this Turkish stand makes the failure of the talks a foregone conclusion."[62]

Not until after President Carter's inauguration was the United Nations again able to resume the talks. Following a "summit meeting" of Makarios and Denktash arranged by Waldheim's special representative, Javier Perez de Cuellar, on 27 January 1977, a second meeting was held under Waldheim's chairmanship at UNFICYP headquarters in Nicosia on 12 February 1977. This latter meeting produced the "four-point guidelines" which formed an agreed agenda for later talks and which are still considered by all parties as a basis for settlement.

In summary form, the four-point guidelines provided for an independent, nonaligned, and bicommunal Federal Republic of Cyprus, with territory to be administered by each community in the light of economic viability, productivity, and land ownership.[63] The guidelines also provided that questions such as freedom of movement and settlement and property rights were to be discussed in terms of a bicommunal federal system as well as certain practical difficulties faced by Turkish Cypriots. Lastly, the central federal government was to safeguard the country's unity with regard to the bicommunal character of the state.

[61] Ibid.

[62] United Nations, Secretariat, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus* (for the period from 2 December 1973 to 22 May 1974) (S/11294), 22 May 1974, p. 17, para. 60, and p. 18, para. 61 (emphasis added).

[63] For the full text of the four-point guidelines of 12 February 1977, see United Nations, Secretariat, *Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 401 (1976)* (S/12323), 30 April 1977, p. 2, para. 5.

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Greek Cypriots contend that their acceptance of the four guidelines represented a significant concession, since they had not before accepted the concept of a federal state. They still reject the "bizonal" or "two-state" confederational partition which Turkish policy has consistently advocated since at least 1965.

Talks based on the guidelines began in Vienna on 31 March 1977 under Waldheim's aegis and further meetings followed under Perez de Cuellar's direction. The Greek Cypriots offered a detailed territorial proposal including a map to which they added a statement of general principles.[64] They did not table a detailed constitutional proposal, however. The Turkish Cypriots reversed this process by offering a detailed constitutional proposal but no detailed territorial proposal and no map.[65] They offered basically a confederation of two sovereign and equal states with a very weak central government. This proposed confederation, which seemed quite dubious to some skeptics, would be invested with "limited functions" that "would be expected to grow"— a process which the Turkish Cypriots termed "federation by evolution."[66]

The Greek Cypriots responded that the Turkish plan envisaged "a confederal system without [central] powers which would evolve, if at all, in the direction of complete separation."[67] The Turks still refused to submit any territorial counterproposal or draw lines on any map. They also rejected the Greek-Cypriot proposals as creating a unitary, not a federal state.[68] In one sense, the criticisms of both sides were accurate: the Greeks did want a unitary state and the Turks a very loose "confederal" state. Both sides were also inaccurate, however, for if a system were truly "federal" it could not be either unitary or confederal. Still the term federal is sufficiently elastic to cover a wide set of variations of central power, as the constitutions of many federal states demonstrate. A compromise therefore does not seem beyond the wit of leaders with the will to achieve it.

The Turkish-Cypriot constitutional proposals (annex D) summarized the substantive and procedural failings of the 1960 Cyprus Constitution in terms both eloquent and wise; they demanded a federal system both "flexible" and "free from cumbersome legalistic barriers."[69] But the Turkish proposals of April 1977 were, in the view of some skeptics, even more tenuous than the constitution they so justly criticized. The Turks urged the creation of two separate states linked by a nominal central government, which in essence amounted to partitioning the Cypriot Republic out of existence—thereby producing two com-

[64] For the text of the Greek-Cypriot general proposal and map, see annexes B and C of S/12323 of 30 April 1977.

[65] For the text of the Turkish-Cypriot constitutional proposal, see annex D of S/12323 of 30 April 1977, pp. 1-6.

[66] Ibid.

[67] For the text of the Greek-Cypriot constitutional proposal, see annex E of S/12323, 30 April 1977, pp. 1-11.

[68] Annex D of S/12323, 30 April 1977, pp. 1-2.

[69] Ibid., p. 1.

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munities inhabiting the same island but organized as separate nation-states, with separate languages, separate identities, and separate national destinies.

After rejecting the Turkish proposals of April 1977, the Greek Cypriots submitted a detailed constitutional document of their own[70] which the Turks in their turn rejected, quite accurately noting that it provided for a unitary and not a federal polity.[71] This stalemate continued for nearly one year despite urgings from the United Nations and Western countries.

The Turkish Cypriots tabled both detailed constitutional and territorial proposals on 13 April 1978.[72] As in their April 1977 proposals, they offered both a brilliant defense of federalism and a compelling attack on the accords. These 1978 proposals were the most extensive and precise guide to Turkish thinking on the future of Cyprus ever published; they also amounted to a complete rejection of all obligations imposed by the Zurich-London Accords. The Turks proposed the creation of a dual structure of power and ceremony, with two presidents (one Turkish, one Greek) with "solely ceremonial powers" to be rotated every two years; with the dual structure carried through the entire system including the federal secretaries to assist the presidents; the armies and their commanders; the security forces, the public service system and public service commissions, and federal judges.

As in 1977 the Greeks rejected these proposals as "totally unacceptable" and also as in 1977 Secretary-General Waldheim tried to salvage some modest agreement on "partial measures" to move the talks into more constructive channels. In his "Famagusta Suggestion" of 31 May 1978, Waldheim urged resettlement of Varosha (a suburb of Famagusta occupied by the Turks but kept uninhabited since the flight of its Greek-Cypriot population) and reopening the Nicosia International Airport.[73] Since both Varosha and the airport were under UNFICYP observation, Waldheim hoped this would ease U.N. administration. The leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community, Rauf J. Denktash, picked up the secretary-general's suggestion on 20 July 1978 and in a letter proposed resettlement of Varosha under U.N. auspices simultaneously with the resumption of intercommunal talks. This proposal was supported by Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit but was immediately rejected by Greek-Cypriot President Kyprianou for reasons which remain obscure to most observers to this day but which are rumored to have mostly to do with Kyprianou's coalition of Greek-Cypriot political support. Kyprianou also demanded that Varosha be returned to his government's control rather than be placed under interim U.N. control. Finally in his rejec-

[70] For the text of the Greek-Cypriot constitutional proposal, see annex E of S/12323, 30 April 1977, p. 1–11.

[71] Annex D of S/12323 of 30 April 1977, p. 2.

[72] Text of the proposals submitted by the Turkish-Cypriot interlocutors on 13 April 1978 in annex of United Nations, Secretariat, *Report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Operation in Cyprus* (for the period 1 December 1977 to 31 May 1978) (S/12323), 31 May 1978, pp. 1–32. For the text of the "dual authorities," see ibid., pp. 13–14 and following.

[73] Text of the secretary-general's "Famagusta Suggestion" of 31 May 1978 in ibid., p. 20, paras. 78–79.

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tion, Kyprianou demanded that a plan for "true" federation of Cyprus be accepted by the Turkish Cypriots and suggested that the motive for the Denktash suggestion of 20 July may have been merely to persuade the U.S. Congress to lift its arms embargo against Turkey. Even if this were true, however, it hardly explains the Kyprianou rejection of a proposal that would seem so clearly in his government's interest, that is, the resettlement of Varosha.

Perhaps the Greek Cypriots felt that maintaining the arms embargo against Turkey and the diplomatic pressure against Ankara by means of U.N. General Assembly debates was of greater long-range value than resettling Varosha. Or perhaps they were as opposed to a true compromise settlement of the Cyprus issue as were the Turkish Cypriots themselves. One can only speculate on so convoluted a diplomatic record.

The situation remained stalemated from July through the end of 1978, the Turks insisting on their 13 April 1978 proposals and the Greeks using the U.N. General Assembly as their preferred forum for appealing to world public opinion. In December 1978, however, Cypriot Foreign Minister Nicos A. Rolandis came to New York at the suggestion of President Kyprianou and urged Waldheim to develop a basis and agenda for renewed intercommunal talks.[74] From 14 to 18 December 1978 Rolandis and Waldheim discussed the Cyprus problem. On 19 December Secretary-General Waldheim submitted to both sides the first of a series of tentative working papers on the resumption of intercommunal talks.[75] The first draft of the first paper was a shorter paraphrase of the U.S. Nimetz plan with the Varosha annex incorporated in toto from the U.S. proposal. A later draft dropped the Nimetz constitutional proposals, added the idea of mutual ending of economic and trade restrictions, and kept the plan for Varosha resettlement. Further papers were submitted in an effort to bridge the wide differences that remained on major issues. These efforts continue to the present day.

Clearly, however, all this preliminary maneuvering well before the intercommunal talks began boded ill for their success. On 9 January the Turkish Cypriots linked a Varosha resettlement to a lifting of the Greek-Cypriot economic blockade of the Turkish area. The Greek Cypriots rejected any such linkage. Moreover the Turkish Cypriots also appeared to be having second thoughts even with respect to their own Varosha proposal.

On 4 April 1979 Rolandis, in a memorandum given to Waldheim in Geneva, urged a high-level meeting between President Kyprianou and Denktash to break the impasse that had developed. On 9 April Kenan Atakol, the Turkish-Cypriot foreign affairs spokesman, met Waldheim in Zurich and reaffirmed his community's position in favor of a high-level meeting.[76] On 30 April Perez de Cuellar, the U.N. undersecretary for special political affairs, went to Cyprus

[74] United Nations, Secretariat, *Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly* (A/34/620), 8 November 1979, p. 3, para. 5.

[75] Ibid., para. 6.

[76] Ibid.

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for preliminary talks with both sides. Both parties reaffirmed the role of the secretary-general as well as the Makarios-Denktash four-point guidelines of 12 February 1977. Reports again circulated, however, that President Kyprianou's declared skepticism about the value of a high-level meeting shook the secretary-general as he proceeded to Nicosia on 17 May 1979 for the meeting.

The "high-level meeting" which had been the subject of such intricate diplomatic maneuvering finally opened at UNFICYP headquarters in Nicosia under Waldheim's personal auspices on 18 May 1979. After intensive negotiations, accord was reached on 19 May 1979 on a "ten-point agreement" (sometimes termed the "19 May accord") which incorporated the earlier Makarios-Denktash four-point guidelines of 12 February 1977 as well as previous U.N. resolutions on Cyprus.[77] This ten-point agreement provided for intercommunal talks to resume 15 June 1979 and specified that these talks deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects of the Cyprus problem with priority given to Varosha resettlement. The agreement also committed both sides to give importance to "initial practical measures"—diplomatic language for a lifting of the restrictions imposed mainly by the Greek Cypriots on the Turkish-Cypriot community. The sides would discuss demilitarization and guarantees of the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and nonalignment of Cyprus against union, partition, or secession. The talks were to be continuous, sustained, and held without delay in Nicosia.[78]

As provided in the 19 May accord the intercommunal talks finally resumed 15 June in Nicosia under the auspices of Perez de Cuellar. The Greek-Cypriot representative, or "interlocutor," George Ioannides, urged priority for resettlement of Varosha under U.N. auspices. The Turkish-Cypriot representative, Umit Suleyman Onon, urged that before taking up Varosha, agreement should be reached on the principles of the Makarios-Denktash guidelines of 12 February 1977 and U.N. resolutions on Cyprus. He also asked the Greek representative to acknowledge that the 1977 guidelines in addition to their published text also included the two concepts of "bizonality" and "security of the Turkish-Cypriot community."[79] Since agreement on these points was evidently not achieved, de Cuellar recessed the talks 22 June until the secretary-general could assess the situation. As of this writing (March 1980) the talks are still recessed. Further intensive efforts to get them started continued, however. On 30 July 1979 Denktash put forward a proposal for resuming them, but he also asked the Greek side to reconfirm publicly the statement made in the U.N. Security Council on 31 August 1977 by then Cypriot Foreign Minister Christophides that the Greek-Cypriot proposals of April 1977 were based on a

[77] Text of the ten-point agreement, or 19 May accord, of 19 May 1979 in United Nations, Secretariat, *Report by the Secretary-General on the U.N. Operation in Cyprus* (for the period 1 December 1978 to 31 May 1979) (S/13369), 31 May 1979, p. 13, para. 51. See also A/34/620, annex V, pp. 1–2.

[78] A/34/620, p. 3, para. 7.

[79] Ibid., p. 4, para. 8.

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"bizonal solution" of the Cyprus Republic's territory. Denktash further called for the intercommunal talks to establish four committees—on Varosha, on point 6 of the 19 May agreement (initial practical measures and nonjeopardization of the talks), on a constitution, and on territory. On 2 August Denktash reconfirmed his support for the validity of the 19 May accord and suggested that his proposal was in agreement with it.

On 2 August the Greek-Cypriot representative Ioannides published a memorandum accepting "bizonality" in the sense of federation of two constituent parts but not in the sense of the Turkish-Cypriot view of the relation between those parts. He further stated that any matters, including bizonality and security, could be raised at the reconvened intercommunal talks, as could the establishment of committees.[80] The secretary-general then concluded that the 19 May accord (ten-point agreement) really focused on four "matters" with which any renewed talks must deal: Varosha resettlement; "initial practical measures" for removing restrictions on the minority Turkish Cypriots; constitutional aspects of any future national government of Cyprus; and territorial aspects of such a government.[81] After sounding out both sides during August and September 1979, it became apparent to the secretary-general that "no meeting of minds had been achieved."[82]

The obstacle appeared to be concern by each party over the negotiating positions and tactics of the other. The Greek Cypriots argued that the Turkish side was imposing "extraneous preconditions" to the implementation of previous agreements including that on Varosha in order to legalize the partition of Cyprus and dismantle its government. The Turkish Cypriots expressed concern over Greek-Cypriot appeals at international meetings held in Colombo (Sri Lanka), Lusaka (Zambia), Havana, and Rio de Janeiro. In their view the Greek side was jeopardizing the outcome of the talks, which was a violation of point 6 of the 19 May accord. The Turkish Cypriots argued further that the Greek Cypriots were "not interested in a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem but were again seeking to achieve a unitary rather than a federal system."[83] In this judgment the Turkish side may well have been correct, since the Greek Cypriots did not indeed appear interested in a confederal solution to their dilemma, preferring instead to keep up the outside pressure until the Turkish Cypriots agreed to a solution that would permit reimposition of Greek majority control upon a unitary government.

Once again the indefatigable secretary-general tried to get the parties to agree to reconvening the intercommunal talks and once again he almost succeeded—but not quite. In consultations with President Kyprianou and Rolandis during the thirty-fourth session of the U.N. General Assembly, Secretary-

[80] Ibid., p. 4, paras. 10–11.

[81] Ibid., p. 5, para. 13.

[82] United Nations, Secretariat, *Report of the Secretary-General on the U.N. Operation in Cyprus* (for the period of 1 June to 30 November 1979) (S/13672), 1 December 1979, p. 13, paras. 51–52.

[83] Ibid., p. 13, para. 53.

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General Waldheim discussed resuming the talks. He also spoke with Foreign Minister Rallis of Greece, Foreign Minister Okcun of Turkey, and Atakol. On 27 September 1979 Okcun told Waldheim that Denktash might be prepared to resume the talks, and on 1 October Denktash accepted the secretary-general's four matters as the basis for resuming intercommunal talks.

Again, however, President Kyprianou was "critical as to both substance and timing of position of the Turkish side."[84] It is perhaps not accidental that Kyprianou was in New York to address the U.N. General Assembly at the time he made his negative assessment, for it was at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly on 27 November 1979 that Resolution 34/30 passed, a sixteen-point statement that reiterated previous U.N. resolutions and demanded "the immediate withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence from the Republic of Cyprus," namely, the Turkish troops.[85] Resolution 34/30 also put pressure on both sides by requesting in point 12 that the secretary-general report to the General Assembly by 31 March 1980 on progress achieved in intercommunal negotiations, failing which the president of the General Assembly was to appoint an ad hoc committee of up to seven member states to recommend steps for implementation of previous assembly resolutions on Cyprus. Resolution 34/30 also requested the secretary-general to report to the General Assembly on the implementation of the resolution, that is, to offer his assessment as to who was blocking progress.[86]

In short some real pressure has been created for the parties at least to appear to resume negotiations by 31 March 1980, lest a General Assembly committee be created to intervene in the negotiations, a supervention not to the liking of the Turkish side. It is rumored that the secretary-general has a package of proposals to help break the deadlock, yet the fact is that the talks have not yet begun again. Waldheim is prepared clearly to resume the talks early in 1980; he also remains convinced that intercommunal talks under his auspices "represent the best available method for negotiating a just and lasting political settlement of the Cyprus problems based on the legitimate rights of the two communities." Waldheim (and those who wish him well) has been forced to face the fact that "after nearly five years of intermittent talks, the credibility of this negotiating method hangs in the balance."[87]

It would seem that without strong external pressure, which the United Nations regrettably is unable to apply, neither party really wants a Cyprus settlement enough to pay the high political cost. The cost to the Turkish side might well be the fall of the Ankara government, while the cost to the Greek-Cypriot side might well be the fall of the present Nicosia government. Both sides therefore seem adamant: Greek Cypriots will only accept a settlement based on

[84] Ibid., pp. 13–14, paras. 54–55.

[85] United Nations, General Assembly, *Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly*, (A/RES/34/30), 27 November 1979, p. 2, point 5.

[86] Ibid., p. 3, point 16.

[87] S/13672, p. 17, para. 66.

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their control of a unitary Cypriot state; Turkish Cypriots will only accept a settlement based on near-total partition of Cyprus into two separate, sovereign states, a "Hispaniola solution." In the meantime the loss of Iran to the Western alliance suggests the increased value of Turkish bases so that the vital "external pressure" viewed as essential for settlement of the Cyprus dilemma is unlikely to be applied in the near future. Perhaps General Assembly Resolution 34/30 will help, but it surely requires additional support from member states with influence in Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia.

Conclusions

In view of the course of Cyprus negotiations from the 1950s until the late 1970s, this analyst must conclude that the Turks have apparently lost interest in any settlement not based on complete partition. This is true, I would add, despite the fact that their push for partition clearly violates the very territorial and political integrity of Cyprus, which they pledged to support, as well as violating those provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee under which they originally intervened.[88]

Yet if Turkish policy is simply a "push for partition" why negotiate at all? More specifically, why negotiate over the details of an unwanted central government? Apparently the Turks are merely responding to outside pressures and do not wish to bear the onus for the stalemate their policy has consciously produced;[89] in short they wish the best of both worlds: stalemate without responsibility for causing it.

What is wrong with this stalemate? It is unacceptable because it is both unstable and dangerous; it could at any time spark a Greco-Turkish war with possible escalation into world war. In sober words, Secretary-General Waldheim noted in April 1977, "the status quo must not be assumed to constitute an available viable alternative since potentially dangerous elements of instability are inherent in the prevailing situation."[90] Unless this stalemate is somehow broken by an act of creative statesmanship comparable to the Venizelos-Attaturk or de Gaulle-Adenauer rapprochements, a Greco-Turkish war in the Aegean over territory, fortifications, or mineral rights could break out. Such a war might—through miscalculation—sweep NATO and the Warsaw Pact into World War III. Only an agreed settlement can resolve the Cyprus agony, and a Turkish policy of force today can no more resolve the problem than could a Greek policy of force in 1963. True settlement must be negotiated and meet the minimum essential security needs of both communities.

[88] Kranidiotis, *The Cyprus Problem*, p. 49; see also the *New York Times*, 10 December 1978, p. 13.

[89] For example, see Nicholas Gage, "Turkey Seeks Long-term U.S. Aid," *New York Times*, 10 June 1979, p. 1.

[90] S/12723, p. 20, paras. 78–79.

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True settlement certainly requires improvement on the two current facts of Cypriot politics: Turkish occupation has created a territorial basis for federalism, yet Greek Cypriots remain the overwhelming majority of the island's population. Turkish Cypriots will not and cannot accept as permanent a siege environment in which they must fear constant attack from their neighbors; Greek Cypriots will not and cannot accept a permanent partition of Cyprus enforced by Turkish troops.

If the cycle of hate is to be broken, it can only be by a negotiated settlement establishing a federal state whose exact powers are defined in long, painful, and tough bicommunal talks. And the bitter relations among major world capitals over the Cyprus issue mandate a leading role for the U.N. secretary-general in those talks; only he can mediate the talks.

Paradoxically, the convoluted history of Cyprus negotiations suggests that external diplomatic pressure is essential to help internal political forces reach a consensus acceptable to both communities. Such pressure should be mobilized from the United States, Britain, Canada, and Western European nations with strong ties to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. Since federalism as a concept admits of almost infinite gradations, a consensus on the powers of the central Cypriot government is not beyond the wit of man. Still, to do the job properly in so embittered a stalemate, one must use the right tools with great persistance. One must also use carefully measured pressure.

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Role Perceptions of Women in the Ninety-fourth Congress, 1975–76

JOAN HULSE THOMPSON

Although they have never exceeded 5 percent of the total membership of the U.S. House of Representatives, congresswomen have gradually come to resemble their male colleagues in terms of education, occupation, and political experience.[1] Reacting to their minority status, have congresswomen tended to adopt a legislative orientation very different from that of congressmen? Or, has the convergence of their political careers meant that women in Congress view their job very much as men do?

"Role orientations," wrote John Wahlke and his associates, "are legislators' own expectations of the kind of behavior they ought to exhibit in the performance of their duties. They may be considered as providing the premises in terms of which legislators make their decisions."[2] Thus, the role perceptions of the women, particularly as they differ from those of congressmen, can be an indication of their differential impact on the output of the legislature.[3]

This article uses interview data to supplement public information concerning the roles women, individually and collectively, fulfill in the House of Representatives. Personal interviews were conducted in 1976 with thirty-six individuals, including twelve of the nineteen congresswomen serving in the Ninety-fourth

[1] See Joan Hulse Thompson, "Career Patterns and Role Perceptions of U.S. Congresswomen Since 1916" (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1978).

[2] John C. Wahlke et al., *The Legislative System* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962), p. 246.

[3] Another indication of differential impact can be found in an analysis of voting behavior. Recent congresswomen appear to be more liberal than the average for congressmen. See, Kathleen A. Frankovic, "Sex and Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1961–1975," *American Politics Quarterly* 5 (July 1977): 315–30, and Thompson, "Career Patterns," pp. 240–46.

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Congress (1975–76). For ten of these respondents, a staff member was also interviewed to obtain background information on the viewpoints of the representative as well as her staff's perspective on her role priorities. For the seven congresswomen not interviewed directly, it was necessary to confine the interviewing to one or two members of their staffs. Although no congressmen were interviewed, Roger Davidson's judgments of role selections of male politicians in the Eighty-eighth Congress (1963–64) are included for comparison.[4]

Women's Place in the Legislative Environment

One aspect of role formation is the legislative environment encountered after election to Congress.[5] In the 1920s, the House of Representatives adopted the policy of appointing women to minor committees and treating them with extreme gallantry in floor debate. Contemporary accounts suggest that women were treated with a degree of chivalry that excluded most of them from the serious business of the House.[6] However, changes in societal attitudes toward women, the election of more politically experienced congresswomen, and the inevitable exit of congressmen committed to the old attitudes has resulted in the apparent elimination of incapacitating deference.

In the formal operations of the House, those highly visible to the public, women are not discriminated against. Indeed, in official congressional activities women may be included more often than men because their presence is desirable for photographs and press releases.[7] In terms of committee assignments, the 1973 Democratic party decision to award each party member a major committee assignment means that Democratic congresswomen (and three of every four congresswomen in 1976 were Democrats) cannot be relegated to minor committees as they were in the 1920s.

Among the major committees that had at least one woman member in the Ninety-fourth Congress were Ways and Means, Appropriations, Armed Services, and Budget. According to congressional staff members, there was a conscious effort to place at least one woman on every major committee. As a result, congresswomen at the opening of the Ninety-fifth Congress had better assignments than those of the Eighty-seventh Congress in 1961–62 (Table 1). Neither numbers nor seniority can explain the improvement. Both Congresses included eighteen women, and the average tenure of the earlier group was actually about

[4] Roger H. Davidson, *The Role of the Congressman* (New York: Pegasus Publishers, 1969). Davidson identifies the trend toward more internally based roles as being the result of long-term institutional transformations not short-term changes in the political environment (p. 189). Therefore, a comparison of congresswomen of the Ninety-fourth Congress with men from the Eighty-eighth can be considered as at least suggestive of the role differences existing between men and women in the House.

[5] For a chart summarizing the generation of role concepts, see, Wahlke et al., *The Legislative System*, p. 22.

[6] Duff Gilford, "Gentlewomen of the House," *American Mercury*, October 1929, p. 151.

[7] Interview with Representative Helen Meyner, U.S. Capitol, Washington, D.C., 7 June 1976.

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five years higher. It is thus no longer legitimate to relegate women to minor committees or only to ones dealing with social rather than economic questions.

Recognized as representatives of their sex, congresswomen have had an "impact out of proportion to their numbers."[8] The Congresswomen's Caucus, organized by Margaret Heckler (R-Mass.), Elizabeth Holtzman (D-N.Y.), and Shirley Chisholm (D-N. Y.) in April 1977, provides a vehicle for unity among the women to maximize their power within the House.[9] The tiny proportion of women in Congress has contributed to their sense of responsibility to represent, as former member Patsy Mink (D-Hawaii) expressed it, "all the women who have no representatives here."[10] Congresswomen (or their staff aides) were asked in 1976 to respond to the statement: "Congresswomen have a special responsibility to represent not only their own constituents, but also the women of the nation as a whole." Three-quarters of the replies were positive, with most expressing strong agreement.

The place of women in the House has changed dramatically since the 1920s. Rather than being primarily ornaments at the periphery of the legislative process, they are active participants recognized as representatives of a politically disadvantaged group. A few women also have been admitted to the leadership structure of their party. At the opening of the Ninety-fifth Congress in 1977, Gladys Spellman (D-Md.) served as a regional whip; Cardiss Collins (D-Ill.) was an at-large whip; and Barbara Jordan (D-Tex.) sat on the fifteen-member Democratic Steering and Policy Committee. The Republicans had Marjorie Holt (R-Md.) and Virginia Smith (R-Neb.) on their Committee on Committees with the latter also serving on the Republican Policy Committee.

The committee assignments and leadership posts of women are readily available, but the equally important informal relationships are more difficult for an outsider to judge. Since congresswomen now generally share the same public career and, like congressmen, have proved themselves in political competition, discrimination has certainly eased. Two congressional aides described their impression of attitudes toward congresswomen as follows: "Congressmen may behave chauvinistically towards their staffs, their constituents, and in their votes, [but] the members of Congress among themselves are curiously fair. When it comes to one another, [judgments are based on their] merits as individuals."[11] Speaking of the Ninety-fourth Congress, Virginia Smith said, "I don't think it is any harder for a woman to serve in Congress than a man. Every door in Congress is open to a woman."[12]

[8] Interview with Representative Martha Keys (D-Kan.), Longworth Building, Washington, D.C., 20 July 1976.

[9] Three women who served in both the Ninety-fourth and Ninety-fifth Congresses declined to join the Congresswomen's Caucus when it was organized in the early months of the Ninety-fifth Congress. They were: Marilyn Lloyd (later Bouguard) (D-Tenn.), Marjorie Holt, and Virginia Smith.

[10] Interview with Representative Patsy Mink, Rayburn Building, Washington, D.C., 1 December 1976.

[11] Interview with two legislative aides to a congresswoman, 13 December 1976.

[12] Interview with Representative Virginia Smith, U.S. Capitol, Washington, D.C., 3 June 1976.

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TABLE 1

Committee Assignments of Congresswomen in 1962 and 1977

*Prestige Ranking of Committees**	*1962 Congresswomen*	*1977 Congresswomen*
Rules	St. George (R-N.Y., 2nd)†	Chisholm (D-N.Y., 10th)
Ways and Means	—	Keys (D-Kan., 17th)
Appropriations	—	Burke (D-Calif., 28th) Boggs (D-La., 35th) Smith (R-Neb., 18th)
Foreign Affairs (later International Relations)	Kelly (D-N.Y., 4th) Bolton (R-Ohio, 2nd) Church (R-Ill., 5th)	Collins (D-Ill., 14th) Meyner (D-N.J., 16th) Pettis (R-Calif., 12th)
Armed Services	—	Schroeder (D-Colo., 18th) Holt (R-Md., 8th)
Un-American Activities	—	eliminated
Interstate and Foreign Commerce	—	Mikulski (D-Md., 29th)
Judiciary	—	Jordan (D-Tex., 14th) Holtzman (D-N.Y., 15th)
Agriculture	May (R-Wash., 8th)	Heckler (R-Mass., 8th)
District of Columbia	Weis (R-N.Y., 7th)	Meyner (D-N.J., 8th) Collins (D-Ill., 14th)
Public Works (later added Transportation)	Blitch (D-Ga., 9th) Pfost (D-Idaho, 16th) Reece (R-Tenn., 14th)	Lloyd (D-Tenn., 17th)
Education and labor	Green (D-Ore., 5th) Hansen (D-Wash., 19th)	Pettis (R-Calif., 10th)
House Administration	Green (D-Ore., 11th)	—
Government Operations	Griffiths (D-Mich., 12th) Kee (D-W. Va., 14th) Granahan (D-Pa., 15th) Dwyer (R-N.J., 5th)	Collins (D-Ill., 11th) Jordan (D-Tex., 16th)
Interior and Insular Affairs	Pfost (D-Idaho, 4th) Hansen (D-Wash., 15th)	—
Banking and Currency (later added Urban Affairs)	Sullivan (D-Mo., 7th) Griffiths (D-Mich., 9th) Dwyer (R-N.J., 6th)	Spellman (D-Md., 16th) Oakar (D-Ohio, 28th) Fenwick (R-N.J., 10th)
Merchant Marine and Fisheries	Sullivan (D-Mo., 4th)	Mikulski (D-Md., 26th)
Post Office and Civil Service	Granahan (D-Pa., 5th) Norrell (D-Ark., 12th) St. George (R-N.Y., 8th)	Schroeder (D-Colo., 8th) Spellman (D-Md., 10th)
Veterans Affairs	Kee (D-W. Va., 3rd.)	Heckler (R-Mass., 2nd.)
Budget**	Not in existence	Holtzman (D-N.Y., 8th) Holt (R-Md., 4th)
Science and Astronautics** (later Technology)	Weis (R-N.Y., 7th) Riley (D-N.C., 15th)	Lloyd (D-Tenn., 15th)
Joint Economic Committee**	Griffiths (D-Mich., 11th)	Heckler (R-Mass., 8th)

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TABLE 1 (Continued)

Committee Assignments of Congresswomen in 1962 and 1977

*Prestige Ranking of Committees**	*1962 Congresswomen*	*1977 Congresswomen*
Standards of Official Conduct**	Not in existence	Fenwick (R-N.J., 5th)
Small Business**	—	Fenwick (R-N.J., 8th)

* Prestige rankings are from George Goodwin, Jr., *The Little Legislatures* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970), p. 114.

† The rank after the state of each congresswoman is her committee seniority within her political party.

** Unranked committees.

Does this mean that none of the men feels any hostility toward the women in Congress? Even in the mid-seventies, the House continues to be described by journalists as retaining much of the traditional atmosphere and camaraderie of a "nineteenth century men's club."[13] Several staff members suggested that the extent to which women were able to fit into the informal, personal networks of the Hill was a function of their age and personality.

A young woman, therefore, may have a difficult time because she is perceived as aggressive and a threat to her male colleagues. There is a "gut sexist reaction" to such women, according to one staff observer. "What's her act? . . . What's she want to be, governor, president?"[14] Ambition in a woman makes some men far more uncomfortable than that same ambition in a man.

Another staff member suggested that the older congresswomen, who were not widows of deceased legislators, had developed political careers at a time when women politicians were so rare that they excited little suspicion. As long as women were mere oddities, they posed little threat and were tolerated affably. Recently, the environment has become more hostile in some respects, and several younger women have entered Congress painfully aware of the sex discrimination, either overt or covert, they had faced. Unfortunately, the men in Congress sense their "bitterness" and "react negatively" to them, threatening informal relationships.[15]

In addition to ambition and past experience with discrimination, stereotypes that some men hold about women, such as the inclination toward emotional, irrational reactions to problems, can jeopardize relationships within congressional work groups. Therefore, congresswomen may have to prove themselves logical, practical decision makers before they are fully trusted by their male colleagues.

[13] David Rapoport, *Inside the House* (Chicago, Ill.: Follett Publishing Co., 1975), p. 18.

[14] Interview with an administrative assistant to a congresswoman, 20 May 1976.

[15] Interview with a legislative aide to a congresswoman, 13 December 1976.

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TABLE 2

Role Orientations of Nineteen Congresswomen Serving in 1976

Name	*District**	*Purposive Role(s)*
Sullivan	S	Inventor (Ritualist)†
Mink	S	Tribune (Inventor)
Heckler**	S	Tribune
Chisholm**	S	Inventor
Abzug**	S	Inventor (Ritualist)
Boggs	S	Inventor (Broker)
Collins	S	Tribune
Schroeder**	M	Tribune (Inventor)
Jordan**	S	Tribune (Ritualist)
Holt	M	Tribune
Burke**	S	Inventor (Tribune)
Holtzman**	S	Inventor (Tribune)
Fenwick	M	Inventor (Tribune)
Keys	M	Tribune (Opportunist)
Spellman	M	Tribune (Broker)
Smith	M	Tribune
Meyner	M	Tribune (Ritualist)
Lloyd	M	Tribune (Ritualist)
Pettis	S	Tribune

* S—Safe; M—Marginal. Division is at 60 percent of vote.

† Secondary roles are in parentheses.

** Not personally interviewed—evaluations based on staff interviews, comments from outside observers, and, in two cases, books by the representative.

Sex Differences in Role Perceptions

The basic question of sex differences in role perceptions centers on purposive roles; that is, "those [norms] which have to do with behavior appropriate to the substantive goals or purposes of legislation and legislative operation, as [the legislator] conceives them."[16]

The five purposive roles found among Davidson's sample of eighty-seven congressmen were Tribune, Ritualist, Inventor, Broker, and Opportunist. Davidson describes the Tribune role as "the classic definition of the legislator-as-representative in a democratic polity: the discoverer, reflector, or advocate of popular needs and wants."[17] The Tribune fights the people's battles in Congress on legislative matters and through emphasis on casework. "Parliamentary ritual rather than parliamentary goals absorb" the Ritualist's attention.[18] His object is to specialize in specific subject areas and achieve "mastery of legislative procedures" in committees and on the floor.[19]

[16] Wahlke et al., *The Legislative System*, p. 12.
[17] Davidson, *Role of the Congressman*, p. 79.
[18] Wahlke et al., *The Legislative System*, p. 248.
[19] Davidson, *Role of the Congressman*, p. 80.

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TABLE 3

Primary Purposive Roles for Eighty-seven Men of the Eighty-eighth Congress and Nineteen Women of the Ninety-fourth Congress*

Purposive Role	Men (1963–64)	Women (1976)
Tribune	41 (47%)	12 (63%)
Ritualist	36 (41%)	—
Inventor	6 (7%)	7 (37%)
Broker	3 (4%)	—
Opportunist	1 (1%)	—

Source: Male data from Roger Davidson, *The Role of the Congressman* (New York: Pegasus Publishers, 1969), p. 80.

* χ^2 significant at the .001 level.

The ultimate aim of the Inventor is policy innovation, which may be combined with the Tribune's goal of service to the people. The Broker role of balancing diverse interests is frequently subsumed in the Tribune and Ritualist roles. While few representatives are primarily concerned with the politics of reelection, the Opportunist role is of secondary importance to many, especially those from highly competitive districts.[20]

The primary purposive role was determined for each woman in the Ninety-fourth Congress by reviewing her entire interview, especially the response to the general question asking for a description of the job of being a House member. This is the same question used by Davidson in 1963 and 1964. The researcher's conclusions were double checked with those of two anonymous staff members who were interviewed at length. While all 1976 congresswomen could be termed primarily either Tribunes or Inventors, some of the distinctions were difficult. Several women were judged to have secondary roles as Ritualists, Brokers, or Opportunists (Table 2).

Although the women tended to be either Tribunes or Inventors, the men distributed differently—generally either Tribunes or Ritualists (Table 3). For the women, a few quotations will suffice to illustrate the difference between the Tribune and Inventor roles. Gladys Spellman and Helen Meyner (D–N. J.) were both classified as Tribunes because they stressed the role of their office in working for constituents. Representative Spellman wants to "turn the bureaucracy around so it works for people" without prodding from their congressional representatives.[21] Representative Meyner fulfilled her campaign promise to have three district offices and believes an important aspect of the job is keeping in touch by "getting around your district on weekends."[22]

[20] Ibid., pp. 80–88.

[21] Interview with Representative Gladys Spellman, Rayburn Building, Washington, D.C., 12 May 1976.

[22] Interview with Representative Meyner, 7 June 1976.

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Lindy Boggs (D-La.) and Millicent Fenwick (R-N. J.) were included among the Inventors because the focus of their comments was the initiation of new legislation. Representative Boggs would like more "time to stand off and look at problems" in order to develop new solutions.[23] Beyond voting, Representative Fenwick describes the major job of a member of Congress as preparing "legislation that you think is in the public interest."[24]

Because the 1963–64 sample of congressmen was more than four times the size of the universe of congresswomen serving in 1976, it is not surprising that a few men in the earlier Congress and no women in 1976 were either Brokers or Opportunists (Table 3). At least three congresswomen in 1976 had secondary purposive roles of one or the other, so more women might have resulted in the elimination of this difference. The comparison between men and women in the Tribune, Ritualist, and Inventor categories is of far greater significance. The higher percentage of Tribunes among congresswomen reflects the greater proportion of first-term members among them. The Tribune role is part of a proven campaign strategy pursued by some out of necessity rather than choice. When primary and secondary roles are combined, the percentages are virtually identical for the Tribunes, 82 percent for the men and 80 percent for the women.[25]

Among congressmen the Ritualist role was the second most common, but among women it was of far less importance. No woman expressed herself as primarily concerned with mastering "the substantive work and procedural maneuver that characterize the House and its specialized work groups, the standing committees."[26] Davidson suggested that the Ritualist role was especially common among the congressional leadership in which few women have taken part. Considering both primary and secondary roles, two-thirds of the men and only about one-quarter of the women expressed some aspect of the Ritualist.

Davidson ordered the five roles according to "the strength of role expectations emanating within the legislature itself [versus] the salience of expectations by outside publics or clienteles."[27] By this criterion, the Ritualist and Inventor roles are legislative or insider roles, while the Tribune is an outsider or constituent-oriented role. Davidson stated the belief that the growing professionalism of the House career has led to an increase in insider roles, especially that of the Ritualist, among congressmen. Congresswomen, too, have experienced increased careerism, and yet they are tending toward the Inventor rather than the Ritualist role.

In terms of party affiliation, among both the men interviewed in 1962–63 and the congresswomen of 1976, Republicans are predominantly Tribunes. Among

[23] Interview with Representative Lindy Boggs, U.S. Capitol, Washington, D.C., 16 June 1976.

[24] Interview with Representative Millicent Fenwick, U.S. Capitol, Washington, D.C., 20 May 1976.

[25] Davidson reports the proportions of men who expressed primary or secondary roles as Tribunes, in *Role of the Congressman*, p. 80.

[26] Ibid., p. 92.

[27] Ibid., p. 186.

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the women, Democrats are more often Inventors than are Republicans, but among the men the Democrats tend to be Ritualists. The fact, then, that the women are predominantly Democratic contributes to the explanation of the popularity of the Inventor role. But it does not explain why the Ritualist orientation is so uncommon among congresswomen. Both Democratic and Republican men were Ritualists, but no woman fit in that category. It appears then that women have substituted the insider role of Inventor for that of Ritualist.

Actually, in percentage of Inventors, congresswomen are situated between the women in the state legislature and the men in Congress. Two-thirds of the women state legislators interviewed by Jeane Kirkpatrick in 1972 were Inventors; she too found no Ritualists. The Inventors "conceive their roles [as state legislators] as a search for new solutions to problems and new paths to progress."[28] Less than 10 percent of Davidson's congressmen thought of their roles primarily in terms of policy innovation. The fact that both women and Democrats are more commonly attracted to the Inventor role may be one reason so many recent congresswomen have been Democrats. In any case, the proportion of Inventors among congresswomen is about half as much as among Kirkpatrick's sample of women legislators, but about four times that of Davidson's congressmen.

Regardless of governmental level, women politicians are more inclined to adopt the Inventor role than are men. "Presumably," wrote Kirkpatrick, "women with occupational backgrounds and a political history more similar to that of men would not be especially prone to the 'inventor' role."[29] Perhaps if women were more numerous in Congress this would be true. But for the tiny minority of the Ninety-fourth Congress who were women, neither occupation nor political experience was associated with purposive role adoption.[30]

Slightly over 40 percent of both Inventors and Tribunes were attorneys. Further, approximately six in every ten of the women in each role category had worked in the traditional occupations of congressmen, that is, law, business, and agriculture. More than one-quarter of both Inventors and Tribunes were widows of politicians, the conventional means of political entry for women. Purposive role orientations of congresswomen cannot, therefore, be predicted according to whether they have advanced by a typically female or a convergent pathway.

Roger Davidson determined that having served in the state legislature was associated with the selection of the Ritualist role among congressmen.[31] Among congresswomen, experience in the state assembly is associated with the other insider role, the Inventor. Less than two in every ten of the Tribunes had served in the state house or state senate while more than twice as many of the Inventors

[28] Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, *Political Woman* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 155.

[29] Ibid., p. 156.

[30] There was also no association between role orientation and either occupation or political experience for the congressmen interviewed by Davidson, *Role of the Congressman*, p. 88.

[31] Ibid., p. 90.

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had. When all levels of public office were combined, contrary to Kirkpatrick's hypothesis, the Inventors still had slightly higher levels of experience, 57 to 50 percent. The selection of the Inventor role, therefore, is not a manifestation of lack of political acumen or experience among congresswomen, as Kirkpatrick suggested might be true of women in the state legislatures.

The Inventor role is an alternative role for women who are not Ritualists, but whose perception of their opportunities and responsibilities extends beyond that of the Tribune. This perception, or the freedom to follow it, increases after the first term. While "high seniority is a stimulant for the Ritualist role" among congressmen, the women with more than one term are very prone toward the Inventor role. Half of the women with more than one term in Congress were Inventors in 1976. Similarly, women from urban or mixed districts have higher proportions of Inventors, just as men from those types of districts tend to adopt the Ritualist role.[32]

Unless the distribution of role perceptions has changed drastically among congressmen, in the past decade, this tendency toward the Inventor rather than the Ritualist purposive role sharply divides women and men in the House. Comparable political careers, then, have not resulted in similar role perceptions. In fact, Davidson concludes that "social background variables bear little relation to purposive roles."[33] But rather, these "roles . . . appear to be primarily an outgrowth of the members' socialization in the House."[34] Therefore, one possible explanation for the sharp differences between men and women focuses on the legislative environment faced by women.

The previous section suggested that some degree of suspicion and perhaps even hostility remains in the personal relationships between men and women in the House. In order to achieve the goals of a Ritualist, one must be accepted by colleagues as a cue-giver, at least in certain subject areas. Congresswomen may tend to avoid primary emphasis on Ritualist aims because they sense they are unlikely to gain such recognition. The Inventor visualizes new policy rather than leadership of parliamentary maneuvering. Despite the end of overt discrimination, it still seems a more likely role for a woman in a predominantly male House.

While it is quite possible that the climate in the House acts directly to close off the Ritualist role and channel women into the Inventor orientation, that is not the only conceivable sequence. Women may have a prior preference for the problem-solving role based upon their socialization. Or, some process of self-selection or electoral selection may be at work.

Davidson notes that "Inventors were the only purposive group with distinctive ideological voting habits."[35] Using *Congressional Quarterly*'s "conservative

[32] Percentages for purposive roles by seniority and district type contained in Tables 9.3 and 9.4 in Thompson, "Career Patterns," pp. 290–91.

[33] Davidson, *Role of the Congressman*, p. 97.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid., p. 91.

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coalition" index, he determined that Inventors tended to be liberals disinclined to support the Republican-Southern Democratic alliance. Among the women a far higher percentage were Inventors, but the ideological orientations were the same.[36] The prevalence of the Inventor role may be partly the effect of liberal, urban districts being more inclined to elect women or unconventional, liberal women being more willing to pursue political careers.[37]

Women, of course, realize that politics, especially at the higher levels, is dominated by men. Therefore, those who choose to run for Congress may anticipate that their opportunities to function as legislative strategists will be limited. Thus, at present the small number of women in Congress have a special impact on the House because they tend to identify their role as representatives of women and as liberal policy innovators.*

[36] Only one-third of the Tribunes male or female scored below 20 percent support of the conservative coalition. About two-thirds of the Inventors male and female were below that score. The computation for the women was for votes in 1976 and used Davidson's method of removing the effects of absences, see ibid., p. 91.

[37] See R. Darcy and Sarah Slavin Schram, "When Women Run Against Men," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 41 (Spring 1977): 1–12; Frankovic, "Sex and Voting"; and Thompson, "Career Patterns," pp. 223–25, 247–50.

* The author would like to express her thanks to Professor Milton C. Cummings, Jr., and Robert L. Peabody of The Johns Hopkins University, to Union College, to the congresswomen and to their staffs.

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Just Wars: Doctrines and Institutions

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.

Most people think of international organizations in general as parts of an effort to prevent international war. A close look at the entire range of modern international organizations, however, requires a modification of that notion, for one finds some agencies devoted to activities that seem irrelevant to the problem of war and others whose functions are at best indirectly related to that problem. Prevention of war is clearly not the only, or in every case the primary, goal toward which international organizations are directed.

There is, nevertheless, substantial justification for the popular expectation that international organizations will pursue that goal. The best-known international institutions have been widely advertised as war-preventing agencies, and it is a rare one whose spokesmen and champions repudiate the notion that its activities may in some way contribute to the maintenance of peace. Hence, public support for international agencies tends to be inspired by the assumption that they will be devoted to the effort to prevent war and by the hope that they will succeed.

The relationship between the phenomenon of war and the international organization movement is far more complex than is suggested by the formula, "War is an evil; international organization represents the effort to eliminate it." Some international organizations have been used less for preventing war than for characterizing it—that is, for judging the parties engaged in armed conflict, for choosing sides, and for promoting the victory of the chosen ones. This article will show that the League of Nations and the United Nations are among the organizations that have served as instruments for the implementation of the doctrine of just war.

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Justification of War

The essential preliminary to any serious discussion of just war is the recognition that every war is at least a bilateral phenomenon; it entails action and counteraction by two or more "sides." We sometimes give wars labels that imply singularity—names such as the Boer War or World War I—and, for some purposes, it makes sense to consider any war as a single set of events. In other cases, as when we adopt hyphenated designations such as the Russo-Japanese War, we betray our awareness of the dual nature of warfare. For certain purposes, notably those having to do with the issue of the justifiability of engaging in war, it is essential to divide wars into their component parts, giving separate consideration to the war of A against B and to the war of B against A, the two half-wars that together constitute the A-B War. We are seldom as self-conscious or as explicit about this segmentation of wars as we ought to be. We offer judgment about a given war as if we were talking about the whole war, when in fact we refer to only one-half of it. Take, for example, the so-called antiwar movement that flourished during the Vietnam War: its members were not, by and large, opposed to war in general or even to the Vietnam War in its entirety; they were opposed to the segment of the Vietnam War in which the United States was engaged, but not to the segment in which North Vietnam was engaged. Indeed, they were opposed to opposing the latter. When we talk about a war, we would do well to make it clear whether we mean to be talking about the entire war or about only one or the other of its parts. We cannot discuss the idea of just war without using our analytical slicer; only half of a war at a time can be handled by the doctrine of just war.

The issue of the justifiability of international war can be examined with reference to three logically possible positions. The first is the position that war is *always* justified, morally or legally, on both sides, which is to say that resort to violence requires no justification. The second position is that war is *never* justified, on either side; it can have no justification. The third, falling between the first two, holds that war is *sometimes* justified, on one side or the other and conceivably, though improbably, on both sides. It argues, in short, that war does require and can have justification.

All three of these positions have had some impact upon the history of international relations and the development of international law and organization. The position that war is sometimes justified has had the greatest impact, and the positions that war is either always or never justified have had less influence than has met the eye. It should be noted that the latter positions reject the concept of discrimination; they treat both halves of all wars as either justified or unjustified. This abstention from discrimination may be evidence of laziness, for the task of distinguishing between just and unjust resorts to war is a difficult one. It may express the modest recognition that one does not know enough about the circumstances of a given war to make a confident judgment, or the sophisticated view that it is more useful to search for systemic causes of war than to concentrate on allocating praise or blame to participating states.

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The renunciation of the task of distinguishing between justified and unjustified resorts to war, however, has rarely been entirely genuine, regardless of whether it has been grounded on laziness, modesty, or sophistication. People sometimes think, or pretend to think, that they believe all engagements in war are indistinguishably acceptable and approvable, or unacceptable and condemnable, but rarely do they believe in either of these positions. Human beings, in fact, have a strong tilting instinct that comes into play when they are confronted with a war, a tendency to choose sides, a disposition to sort out the "good guys" and the "bad guys"—for war is, among other things, a spectator sport. We may be aware that discrimination is difficult and dangerous and quite possibly counterproductive; and yet we are likely to find it impossible to refrain from discriminating between what we regard as just and as unjust resorts to war. We may be honest enough to acknowledge that our biases make it difficult for us to judge fairly and shrewd enough to recognize that we are confronted with subtle shades of gray rather than flagrant contrasts of black and white, but we nevertheless feel compelled to reject the general proposition that all engagements in international violence are equally legitimate or equally illegitimate. A doctrine that assures us that there is no choice between a Germany, trying to conquer all of Europe, and on the other side a Poland, trying to resist, a Great Britain, trying to protect, and a United States, trying to liberate, is ultimately implausible to most people. The third position, holding that resort to war is sometimes justified and requiring an effort to sort out the just and the unjust cases, has a stronger hold on mankind than has always been acknowledged. Few people have ever really and steadfastly accepted the view that war either always or never is justifiable; few people have ever really and steadfastly rejected the view that war is sometimes justifiable and sometimes not.

In the history of Western thought about and reaction to war, one can discern five actual positions that derive from and correspond rather closely to the hypothetical positions identified above. They form a rough historical sequence, although of course the chronological boundaries of doctrinal eras are notably indistinct.

The Pacifist Tradition

The first position is the absolute pacifist tradition, which corresponds to the belief that war is never justified. Although it is intimately associated with early Christianity and is therefore in some sense the oldest of the positions to be considered, it is difficult to assign it to a definite period of history, since at no time has it been either dominant or absent.

Pacifism can stem from a cynicism that paints so dark a picture of both sides engaged in conflict that the proclamation of a plague on both their houses seems only sensible. What choice is there between crime and police brutality or between a Hitler and a Stalin? More typically, however, pacifism is rooted in religious idealism. It appears to have been a dominant view among the early Chris-

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tians and has survived as a minority position in modern Christendom. For the absolute pacifist, war is simply indistinguishable from murder, regardless of the cause or the purpose of resort of war; there can be no morally valid authorization to kill human beings. This uncompromising doctrine reflects both a high view of the value of human life and a low view of the authority of human institutions, for it denies to any institution the capacity to make killing anything other than a morally atrocious act. Perhaps the position is the product of idealism about mankind and cynicism about society.

The issue of the moral stature of the pacifist is the focus of endless dispute. Is he a moral hero whom we lesser mortals, acknowledging our incapacity for emulation, should regard with awe? Or does his willingness to condemn the defender along with the attacker of the weak brand him as a moral slacker? The latter question suggests the pragmatic test that should appeal to students of international relations, if not to moral philosophers: what are the consequences of pacifism? If all people everywhere were immutably pacifists, the difficulties of international relations would be measurably reduced. We have to deal, however, with the effects of pacifism as it actually is, maldistributed and inconstant, and these are not altogether helpful to the cause of world order.

It may be argued that pacifism's attitude toward defense provides encouragement for aggression. The corollary of the view that defense is as wrong as aggression is the proposition that aggression is as right as defense. To prohibit defense is, in effect if not in intent, to permit attack. In short, pacifism destroys the possibility of deterrence. In so far as the prevention of war requires the promotion of the expectation that attackers will meet effective resistance, it appears that pacifism helps to cause war by preventing its prevention or inhibiting its inhibition. It would be delightful if the managers of the international system could somehow contrive to transfer quantities of pacifism from states that undertake the responsibility of protecting world order, where a surplus of the commodity is often found, to states that threaten world order, where it is often in short supply. Alas, this variety of international trade has not yet developed.

International difficulties are posed by the inconstancy of pacifists as well as by their uneven and inappropriate distribution among states. People who think and declare that they are pacifists in many cases ultimately discover that they are not, and they may end up fighting in wars that their earlier pacifism helped to cause. It somehow seems unfair to promise aggressors immunity from resistance and then to double-cross them by dropping one's pacifism. It may be, indeed, that the absolute pacifist is particularly suited to become an ardent crusader. The soft idealism of the pacifist seems to be the opposite of the hard idealism of the holy warrior, but it is possible that the commonness of their idealism overshadows their differences. In a parliamentary debate concerning the Greek revolt of 1821–22 against the Ottomans, Castlereagh was pressed by the most strident pacifists in the House of Commons to take more vigorous action in support of the Greeks than he thought prudent, and he twitted their leader, William Wilberforce, by saying it was "really marvellous to see how the friends of peace could sometimes advocate the cause, and most unnecessarily, of

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war."[1] The possible volatility of the moral passions associated with pacifism is worthy of close attention.

Pacifism has not been, nor is it likely to become, the dominant doctrine of any state or international organization. Some flirting with pacifism, however, has occurred whenever the ugliness and danger of war have been particularly apparent. The urge to denounce war unconditionally and indiscriminately is occasionally irresistible.

The Just War Doctrine

The second historical position worthy of note is usually designated the just war doctrine, which corresponds to the view that engagement in war may be justifiable, and must be justified. Some confusion might have been avoided if it had been called the "just and unjust half-war doctrine," even though that is clumsy terminology. The point is that the opposing sides in a given war are to be judged separately, as meeting or as failing to meet the requirements for justification. These evaluations, while separate, are rarely independent of each other, for the attribution of justice to one side usually implies the attribution of injustice to the other. Indeed, the injustice of one side typically provides the basis for the justice of the other; just war consists in opposing certain varieties of unjust behavior. Hence, the applier of just war doctrine normally finds villains and heroes in each conflict to which he addresses himself. Logically, he must identify the unjust half of a war first; if he has spotted the villain, he can easily identify the villain's opponent as the hero.

The doctrine was prefigured in classical Greek and Roman thought, but it is essentially a product of Christian theology and of the changing circumstances of the church under the Roman Empire. When Constantine's conversion paved the way for Christianity to become the official religion of the empire instead of a subversive sect, the church dropped its early pacifism. The question as to when a Christian could participate in a war without committing sin was initially answered by St. Augustine. Fighting was permissible, he said, if the war was just—that is, if one fought on the just side of a war. St. Augustine then took his place at the head of a long line of theologians, natural law philosophers, and international lawyers—including St. Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, and Bynkershoek—who set forth criteria according to which the justness of resort to war should be determined.

Definitions of the requirements of justice in what came to be known as the medieval theory of just war varied considerably and were seldom worked out with precision. It was, after all, a moral doctrine rather than a legal code, and broad principles were in some respects preferable to fine rules. For our purposes, the most important feature of the typical medieval definition of just war

[1] I am indebted to Professor Enno E. Kraehe for calling my attention to this debate, which appears in Great Britain, *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, 2d Series, vol. 7 (London: T. C. Hansard, 1823), p. 1652.

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was its breadth; just war theorists took quite a generous view of the circumstances that might justify a ruler in resorting to war, and the vagueness of the definition tended to enhance its breadth. It was a rare theorist who stopped with defense as the justification for war. Most of them added that war could properly be launched in response to undefined injury or wrongdoing or violation of obligations. Vitoria argued that interference with the preaching of the gospel was a just cause of war, thereby justifying the Spanish conquest of the South American Indians. Francis Bacon held that just war included struggles to maintain the European equilibrium by weakening rulers who threatened to grow too powerful. Pufendorf justified war to collect debts. In short, the traditional doctrine of just war came very close to the proposition that injustice—broadly conceived and left largely undefined—confers legitimacy upon those who react militarily to it. One may properly fight to resist, to overthrow, or to punish perpetrators of injustice; to seek revenge or reparation for injury; and to promote and establish justice.[2]

One can readily identify problems of confusion and dangers of abuse in this doctrine; it is small wonder that pacifists have sometimes regarded just war doctrine as a cover for the indiscriminate approval of war. How, and by whom, are the judgments necessary for the application of the doctrine to actual cases to be made? Difficulties stem from the absence of consensus about what constitutes justice and from the indisposition of rulers to subordinate their policy to the judgment of some Olympian arbiter. To present-day observers, the medieval doctrine of just war seems likely to produce a situation in which each party to a conflict declares itself to be waging a justified battle against injustice and, egged on by the passionate conviction that the wicked must be utterly undone, converts the struggle into a crusade.

These difficulties, however, probably did not loom so large in medieval times as they do today. The era under discussion preceded the rise of the sovereign state. The idea of a judge standing above the prince was by no means unthinkable. Indeed, the church, which provided the doctrine, also provided the judge and the sanctions. Christendom thought it had a consensus on the nature of justice, and it had an authoritative interpreter of the moral law. The day of moral relativism—of "every man his own pope," of the sovereign state exempted by definition from all judgment except self-judgment—lay ahead. One ought not to conclude that the doctrine of just war was systematically implemented, but neither should one believe that the idea of applying the doctrine to the affairs of the real world seemed quite so improbable then as it does now.

War as a Sovereign Right

The medieval notion of the just war was succeeded by the traditional international legal position: the doctrine that sovereign states have an unqualified right to resort to war. As J. L. Kunz has put it: "under general international law, as it

[2] See Joachim von Elbe, "The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law,"

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stood up to 1914, any state could at any time and for any reason go to war without committing an international delinquency. The *jus ad bellum* [right to resort to war] remained unrestricted."[3] This corresponds to the first of the hypothetical positions stated above: war is *always* justified, on both sides, and therefore requires no justification. This right to resort to war is usually explained as emanating from that mysterious thing called sovereignty; war is an act of the sovereign will, which stands haughtily above the necessity of explaining itself or defending its actions.

This doctrine of the sovereign right of states to go to war without the necessity of justification stood essentially unchallenged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. That fact tended to reinforce a deeply cynical and pessimistic view of international politics. The international system was, in principle as well as in reality, a war system; it was indifferent to the tragedy and the evil of war. Legally, it permitted war; morally, it condoned war. What more decisive proof of the profound amorality of the international political scheme could be found? This doctrine, which condones all resort to war, appears to be the polar opposite of pacifism, which condemns all resort to war. It may be, however, that the two positions join in the tendency to encourage aggression. Traditional international law refuses to condemn aggression, and pacifism refuses to condone defense against aggression; these are hardly opposite positions.

Genuine adherence to the view that resort to war is always acceptable, or that it is never acceptable, is exceedingly rare; sometimes is vastly more popular than always or never. This applies even to the period when the international legal system formally endorsed the position that war was always acceptable. The intimation that we ought to look more deeply into the position stated by traditional international law comes from the observation that statesmen regularly claimed justification for their resorts to war, even though the law proclaimed that this was unnecessary. They did not rely upon sovereignty as providing exemption from the necessity to justify engagement in war; in claiming justification and denying that of their enemies, they acknowledged the need for justification. I am aware of no evidence that statesmen were less eager to cast blame upon their enemies for starting or causing wars or to prove their own innocence in such matters in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than at any other time. Why did statesmen develop a legal system that proclaimed an unrestricted right to go to war in which they manifestly did not believe and which they would not exercise?

The answer seems to lie in the proposition that the legalization of both halves of all international wars was a fiction, designed for certain tactical purposes. Statesmen did not really believe that all resorts to war were equally just (or equally unjust), but they found it a useful pretense. This represented the

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American Journal of International Law 33 (October 1939):665–688, and Arthur Nussbaum, *A Concise History of the Law of Nations* (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1947).

[3] Josef L. Kunz, "Sanctions in International Law," *American Journal of International Law* 54 (April 1960): 325.

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triumph of pragmatism over principle—or perhaps it illustrated man's capacity to rise above principle.

The presumed values of this pretense include, first, the avoidance of the difficulties that the application of the just war doctrine increasingly posed. The weakening of both the concept and the institutions of Christendom shattered any reasonable expectation that the distinctions required by the just war theory could be effectively drawn; as Christian consensus, papal authority, and ecclesiastical sanctions lost their sway, European Christendom gave way to the European system of sovereign states—and the medieval plausibility of the application of the just war idea gave way to its modern improbability. If there is no consensus on the meaning of justice, no available judge who can be relied upon to evaluate the positions of competing states with strict impartiality, and no probability that the proud rulers of sovereign states would defer to such a judge if one were available, the just war doctrine becomes simply a recipe for trouble.

An institutionally deficient international legal system that features self-judging states will use the just war doctrine not to inhibit the launching of unjust wars, but to convert all wars into ideological struggles. If the system is not equipped to make the difficult distinctions required by just war theory, why not drop the idea of making the distinctions—not on the ground that there are no distinctions to be made, but on the ground that it is not feasible to make them? If we cannot decide whether A or B is on the better legal footing, should we not simply act as if they are both on the same footing? Some such rationale probably underlies the emergence of the "plague on neither of your houses" doctrine of international law. As Vattel put it: "Since nations are equal and independent and cannot claim a right of judgment over each other, it follows that in every case susceptible of doubt, the arms of the two parties at war are to be accounted equally lawful."[4]

Another possible advantage of this decision to act as if belligerents are on identical moral and legal footings is that it may facilitate the regulation and moderation of the conduct of war. The early modern statesmen of the European system seemed to believe, and they had some basis for believing, that they had to choose between *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* [law of war], between restricting the right to go to war and limiting the manner of fighting. E. W. Hall wrote in 1880: "International law has no alternative but to accept war, independently of the justice of its origin, as a relation which the parties to it may set up, if they choose, and to busy itself only in regulating the effects of the relation. Hence both parties to every war are regarded as being in an identical legal position, and consequently as being possessed of equal rights."[5] There is a certain logic in this notion. Regulation goes with permission, not with prohibition; after you

[4] Cited by von Elbe, "Concept of Just War in International Law," p. 683.

[5] Cited by G.I.A.D. Draper, "Wars of National Liberation and War Criminality," in *Restraints on War*, ed. Michael Howard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 137.

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have said "You must not do that," it seems a bit odd to add "Do it this way, not that way." Moreover, if it seems illogical to attempt to regulate the conduct of the unjust half of a war, there may be a psychological barrier to the regulation of the conduct of the just half. If you declare that one side represents the forces of righteousness, honorably engaging in mortal combat with the forces of evil, you have laid the groundwork for that side's casting off rather than taking on inhibitions. Michael Howard suggests that states have never readily accepted the paradoxical demand "to submit to restraints which prejudiced ones [*sic*] chances of victory when fighting in a righteous cause, to accept the concept of *jus in bello* when one had an unquestionable *jus ad bellum*."[6] Just wars may become holy wars. If each belligerent declares the other a champion of injustice, whose defeat justifies extreme measures, the prospects for making the law of war effective are not bright.

It goes too far to suggest that the just war doctrine and the effort to regulate the conduct of war are utterly incompatible, though Hedley Bull correctly notes that "to the extent that it influences the course of events, the doctrine that war should be fought only for a just cause is injurious to the institutions with which international society had equipped itself for the limitation of war."[7] The effectiveness of the law of war depends almost entirely upon the expectation of reciprocity, and that expectation can best be prompted by encouraging the parties to believe that they are in the same legal position, enjoying the same rights, and being bound by the same duties. Vattel dreaded the possibility of a war in which "each party asserting that they have justice on their own side, will arrogate to themselves all the rights of war, and maintain that their enemy has none, that his hostilities are so many acts of robbery, so many infractions of the law of nations, in the punishment of which all states should unite. . . . the quarrel will become more bloody, more calamitous in its effects, and also more difficult to terminate. Nor is that all: the neutral nations themselves will be drawn into the dispute and involved in the quarrel."[8]

This danger seemed to Vattel to provide ample reason for abandoning the just war doctrine in favor of a scheme that encouraged every belligerent to consider his enemy as fully entitled as himself to the protection afforded by the law of war. The statesmen of the early modern era believed that they had a better chance of regulating the conduct of both halves of wars than of preventing the waging of the unjust halves, and they therefore chose to emphasize regulation rather than prohibition. The doctrine of legal nondiscrimination fits neatly into that scheme of things. This doctrine also provides the essential foundation for the law and practice of neutrality, which, as Vattel suggested, is undermined by the doctrine of just war. Concern for the limitation of the scope of a war, as well

[6] Ibid., p. 5.

[7] Hedley Bull, "The Grotian Conception of International Society," in *Diplomatic Investigations*, eds. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 70–71.

[8] Cited by Peter F. Butler, "Legitimacy in a States-System: Vattel's *Law of Nations*," in *The Reason of States*, ed. Michael Donelan (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), pp. 54–55.

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as for the regulation of its conduct, is manifested in the decision to act as if the parties are prize fighters rather than cops and robbers.

The traditional international legal position should be perceived, therefore, not as an indication of moral obtuseness and indifference to the evils and dangers of war, but as an expression of the modest hope that it might be possible to moderate the effects of war.

The Neo-Just War Doctrine

The next period, running from World War I to roughly 1960, was marked by enormous increase in the technological and ideological intensity of warfare and by two great experiments in international organization that were stimulated by that increase. These years were dominated by the neo-just war doctrine. The prefix is warranted, since the just war position was not simply revived. An altered version of the just war doctrine came to the fore in the aftermath of, and the reaction to, World War I.

Two features of this development deserve special emphasis. The first has to do with the provision of institutional means for the application of just war doctrine. The doctrine had flourished when the Catholic church had a generally acceptable claim to preside over its application; it had languished when the church lost its place in the European political system, and its formal abandonment was influenced by the awareness that the lack of appropriate institutions made it a useless, or worse than useless, doctrine. The leaders of the international system set out, after World War I, to create the necessary international structures and procedures to give effect to a revived and revised just war idea. First the League of Nations and then its successor, the United Nations, were designed with that purpose, among others, in mind. With this came the development of secular replacements for the ecclesiastical accoutrements of the medieval just war doctrine: the League or the United Nations serves as church, the secretary-general as Pope, and the doctrine of collective security as theological creed of the twentieth-century community of saints that is sometimes known as the multistate system. In the scheme of things formulated by President Wilson and his colleagues and successors, multilateral organs are assigned the responsibility of judging the rights and wrongs of engagements in belligerence and of mobilizing collective pressures and actions to prevent the success of those who resort to unjust war or to promote the victory of those who engage in just war.

In one sense, this is a plan for preventing war. One might argue that the earlier just war scheme, over which the church presided, was aimed less at the ruler than at his individual subjects, who needed advice about how to reconcile their religious commitments with their civic obligations; it was designed not so much to inhibit the launching of unjust half-wars as to save Christians from incurring a fate worse than death by taking part in them. The twentieth-century scheme, by contrast, is intended to deter states from initiating unjust military ventures by guaranteeing that overwhelmingly effective just military enterprises

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will operate against them. Unjust war is to be prevented by the threat of just war; that is the essence of the collective security doctrine. But note that this does not entail the prohibition or the prevention of war, in the broad sense. Again, we must resort to our segmentation device. The object of preventing unjust half-wars, which *are* prohibited, is to be achieved by permitting or even requiring states to engage in just half-wars. Collective security theory divides military activity into three categories: the prohibited, the permitted, and the prescribed. Hence, it is as accurate to say that the founders of the League of Nations and the United Nations set out to require just war as to say that they sought to prevent unjust war; the former was conceived as the means to control the latter. The objective of the collective security arrangement is to see to it that the just military expedition wins. If that result is conspicuously assured, perhaps there will be no war.

The twentieth-century effort to provide institutional means for the application of the new just war idea has had mixed results. We have the mechanisms and the formal provisions and procedures—not perfect, but reasonably adequate ones, capable of being improved. It seems improbable that the world will ever again be without the equipment required for putting the just war scheme into practice, as it was in the era following the breaking down of its medieval ecclesiastical equipment. The operation of the equipment is another matter. It does not work automatically, but is controlled by the wills of its operators. For a complicated set of reasons, some of them very good ones, the reliable and systematic operation of the collective security mechanism—the institutional apparatus of the neo-just war doctrine—has not occurred.

Perhaps the most notable feature of the neo-just war doctrine has to do with the substance of just cause for war. As noted earlier, the original doctrine recognized many justifications for resort to war. Twentieth-century revisionists were much more restrictive; they set out to limit just war to *defensive* war, war in response to aggression—as Article 51 of the United Nations Charter puts it, individual or collective self-defense.

Much has been made, over the past half-century and more, of the difficulty of defining aggression and of making the League or the United Nations operate properly in the absence of an agreed definition. In much of this discussion, the distinction between definition and specification, or concept and catalogue, has been ignored, and a great deal of the effort at "defining" aggression has in fact been concerned with listing the phenomena that are thought to fall within the definition. There are genuine—indeed, excruciating—difficulties in identifying all the types of behavior that ought properly to be subsumed under the heading of aggression, in determining which states are and which are not guilty of engaging in such behavior, and in securing multilateral agreement on such matters; but there has never really been much mystery about the definition of aggression that the founding fathers of the League and the United Nations intended to put at the heart of their neo-just war scheme. They had in mind *choosing* war, in contrast to having war thrust upon one; using war as an instrument for the

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achievement of some positive purpose, in contrast to resorting to war to prevent the enemy's achieving his purpose by violence. The aggressor fights *for* something; the other side fights against the effort to take something, or change something, by fighting. The aggressor decides on war; the other side feels it necessary to engage in counterwar.

The neo-just war doctrine holds that fighting can be justified only in resistance to unjustified fighting. Sharply curtailing the traditional list of injustices that should be regarded as permitting the just warrior to go into action, this new version of the doctrine identifies only one such injustice: the resort to nondefensive war; to war *for* rather than war *against*.

This doctrine is clearly the product of an age of anxiety about the consequences of having wars, as distinguished from winning or losing them. The destructiveness of military activity is the point of emphasis. The just warrior fights against resort to war; nothing else justifies fighting. When justice is reduced to peacefulness, peace has in fact been elevated over justice. Peace is too important to be disrupted by those who are tempted to fight for values other than peace. Nothing, however desirable, is worth fighting for except the principle that one might fight against those who fight for things! This was the mood engendered by World War I and intensified by World War II and the advent of the atomic age. The preservation of peace took precedence over the promotion of justice, which had to be achieved by nonviolent methods or not at all; otherwise, Armageddon! If all are dead, of what value is justice?

The Traditional Just War Doctrine Revisited

Since about 1960 the world has returned to an idea of just war more nearly in accord with the medieval view. Describing this as the era of the traditional just war doctrine revisited suggests that we have reversed the substantive curtailment of the notion of just cause that characterized the forty years or so after World War I. We have restored that which the Wilsonians trimmed from the doctrine.

What this means, in essence, is that the world no longer seriously purports to accept the view that peace is unconditionally a higher value than justice. We have returned to the medieval view that it is permissible and perhaps even desirable—and, conceivably, even mandatory—to fight to promote justice, broadly conceived. Evil ought to be overturned, and good ought to be achieved, by force if necessary.

This change does not simply add other evils to the list of things that may justly be fought against, leaving aggression at the top of the list on which it was previously the sole item. Adding the other items has the effect of taking aggression off the list. Most of the world has decided that aggression is justified if it is in support of what that same majority deems a "good cause." Those who take this view would, of course, reject the terminology: justifiable aggression is better called something else. But that is precisely what they mean. The issue of the

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justifiability of engagement in a war turns, not on whether one has chosen to fight in pursuit of some goal, but on whether the goal is a just or an unjust one. A fundamental change in attitude toward aggression has occurred: in the previous era, aggression was regarded as the only evil against which states might justly fight; now, it is regarded as a legitimate means for the achievement of approved objectives.

The formal definition of aggression that was adopted by consensus in the General Assembly of the United Nations at the end of 1974 strikingly illustrates both the fact that statesmen have changed their attitudes in favor of the traditional doctrine of just war and the fact that they are imperfectly aware of that change. In Article 5 of General Assembly Resolution 3314, it is proclaimed that "no consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression." That is vintage neo-just war doctrine; it might have been written by Woodrow Wilson himself. Article 7, however, states that nothing in the document is to be taken as prejudicing "the right to self-determination, freedom and independence . . . of peoples forcibly deprived of that right, . . . particularly people under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these people to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support. . . ." The two articles, taken together, suggest that nothing justifies aggression (according to Article 5) except colonialism and racism (according to Article 7).[9]

This is not an isolated bit of United Nations rhetoric, but a passage typical of a long list of resolutions solemnly approved by overwhelming majorities in the United Nations and numerous other international organizations, conferring international legitimacy upon wars of national liberation, wars to achieve national self-determination, wars to end racial oppression, and the like.[10] Today, the question is not whether an act of aggression occurs, but who does it, against whom, and for what. The certified good cause converts aggression into just war. There is a certain irony in the fact that the League of Nations and the United Nations invested fifty-odd years of committee work in the quest for an agreed definition of aggression and brought this effort to fruition only after the problem of defining aggression had become irrelevant, having been replaced by the problem of defining good cause.

One is tempted to attribute this recent return to something resembling the medieval version of just war doctrine to the states that constitute the so-called Third World, for the "good causes" that have been most conspicuously and insistently set forth as giving aggression the character of just war have been largely Third World causes. These states, the world's perennial underdogs, are pas-

[9] United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records*, Resolution 3314 (XXIX), 14 December 1974.

[10] See, for instance, United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records*, Resolution 2131 (XX), 21 December 1965; Resolution 2326 (XXII), 16 December 1967; Resolution 2908 (XXVII), 2 November 1972; and Resolution 3281 (XXIX), 12 December 1974.

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sionately committed to the undoing of long-standing injustices against them, and they have achieved a dominant position in most international organizations that enables them to invoke, almost at will, multilateral blessings upon the pursuit of what they regard as justice. The Third World, however, is not alone in believing that the goodness of the cause takes the curse off aggression. Perhaps all nations should try to measure the depth of their aversion to military campaigns aimed at toppling the Pol Pots and the Idi Amins of the world.

The recent refurbishment of the old just war doctrine owes a good deal to the intensification of the ideological factor in both domestic and international politics. It perhaps owes even more to the lessening of anxiety about war and to the growth of confidence that war can be controlled and prevented from assuming the proportions of global catastrophe. Just as the earlier subordination of justice to peace indicated acute anxiety about the danger of World War III, the current subordination of peace to justice reflects relaxation about that danger. A growing sense of security, warranted or not, underlies the conviction that mankind can afford to indulge in warfare for the sake of promoting justice.

We have made the United Nations the secular equivalent of the medieval church, presiding over the application of a rather similar conception of just war—not in the sense that it is expected to prevent unjust war, but in the sense that it is expected to issue official pronouncements about the justice and injustice of opposing sides in wars and to lend encouragement to and mobilize multilateral support for those it finds to be engaged in just war. For better or for worse, we are back to the position that it is legitimate for states to resort to war as an instrument of policy, if that policy is just. We should have an interesting time in the years that lie ahead, formulating a global consensus on the meaning of justice.

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The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?

BARTON J. BERNSTEIN

President John F. Kennedy has been variously praised and blamed for his handling of the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. For most, it was his great triumph: seven days of wide-ranging deliberations and careful planning; and six days of the shrewd use of cautious threats, limited force, and wise diplomacy to achieve victory.[1] For critics, however, it was an unnecessary crisis, or dangerously mishandled, or both: Kennedy should either have acceded to the Soviet missiles in Cuba, or at least tried private diplomacy before moving to the quarantine. Removal of the missiles was not worth the risk of nuclear war.[2]

Many assessments focus on Kennedy's response to the Soviet demand on Saturday, October 27, that the United States withdraw its missiles from Turkey. Publicly, he seemed to reject the Soviet proposal.[3] But did he? Some defenders

[1] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 808–35; Theodore Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965); Roger Hilsman, *To Move A Nation* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 159–229; and Robert Kennedy, *Thirteen Days* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969).

[2] Barton J. Bernstein, "Their Finest Hour?" *Correspondent* 32 (August 1964): 119–21; idem., "The Cuban Missile Crisis," in *Reflections on the Cold War*, eds. Lynn Miller and Ronald Pruessen (Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 1974), pp. 111–42; idem., "The Week We Almost Went to War," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 32 (February 1976): 13–21; I.F. Stone, "The Brink," *New York Review of Books*, 14 April 1966, pp. 12–16; Ronald Steel, "End Game," *New York Review of Books*, 13 March 1969, pp. 15–22; and James Nathan, "The Missile Crisis: His Finest Hour Now," *World Politics* 27 (January 1975): 256–81.

[3] White House statement, 27 October 1962; Kennedy letter to Khrushchev, 27 October 1962, both

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have claimed—on the basis of hints in Robert Kennedy's memoir[4]—that the president actually struck a private bargain and, hence, indirectly acceded to the Soviet terms.[5] Critics, on the other hand, have either denied that there was such an agreement or have stressed that it was dangerously loose.[6] It required that Premier Nikita Khrushchev trust Kennedy's hedged, private promise and accept public defeat in order to avoid an American invasion of Cuba and possibly all-out war. Why, the critics ask, did Kennedy refuse to accept the Turkey-Cuba trade publicly and thus leave Khrushchev a choice between possible holocaust or humiliation? Was not Kennedy guilty of brinkmanship? What would Kennedy have done if Khrushchev had not retreated and accepted public humiliation?

New evidence—recently declassified minutes, some staff reports, key diplomatic cables, and some published parts of Robert Kennedy's still-closed papers[7]—reopens these issues about the Turkey-Cuba missile trade and its background. This evidence reveals that President Kennedy was partly responsible for installing the missiles in Turkey and that the president and some advisers, from the early days of the crisis, were privately more flexible than memoirists or critics acknowledged. The new evidence establishes that Kennedy privately offered a hedged promise on 27 October 1962 to withdraw the Jupiter missiles from Turkey at a future time. Unfortunately, these documents do not resolve the problem of what Kennedy would have done had Khrushchev insisted on a public pledge. Would Kennedy have yielded and thus risked weakening his credibility? Or would he have invaded Cuba?

Who Put Jupiter Missiles in Turkey?

In 1957 the Eisenhower administration decided to arrange to send missiles to Europe, largely to strengthen NATO, both militarily and psychologically. Even before Sputnik, partly to repair the "special relationship" torn by the Suez debacle, the administration promised Britain sixty Thors—intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs).[8] And shortly after Sputnik, when administration

in *Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy*, 1962 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 813–14.

[4] Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, pp. 94–95.

[5] Though not formally a defender, see Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 228–29.

[6] For the denials of such an agreement, see Nathan, "Missile Crisis," pp. 268–70 and Steel, "End Game," pp. 15–17; those stressing that the agreement was dangerously loose include Bernstein, "Cuban Missile Crisis," pp. 120, 135, and idem. "Week We Almost Went to War," p. 19.

[7] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *Robert F. Kennedy and His Times* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), pp. 499–532, used the Robert F. Kennedy papers, now at the Kennedy Library, with permission of the family. According to the library, the sections on the missile crisis are still classified, and not organized, and access is still barred to independent scholars (William Moss to Barton Bernstein, 23 January 1979, and Martin McGann to Bernstein, 24 August 1979; and conversation with McGann, 21 November 1979). Schlesinger recently shared some of his notes with me.

[8] Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm, 1956–1959* (London: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 245–46;

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members feared a "confidence" or "deterrence" gap, the Eisenhower administration gained NATO's unanimous approval for the deployment of missiles on the continent. Most NATO allies, however, fearful of antagonizing the Soviet Union and in many cases of inflaming domestic opposition, refused the weapons. Only Italy and Turkey accepted them.[9]

The agreement with Turkey, completed in October 1959, provided for fifteen Jupiter missiles (IRBMs). The arrangements of ownership and custody were cumbersome: The missiles would be owned by Turkey; the nuclear warheads would be owned by the United States and in the custody of its forces; the weapons could be launched only on the order of the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe (an American) on the approval of both the American and Turkish governments; and the sites would be manned by soldiers of both nations. It was, in principle, a dual-veto system.[10]

The legal provisions raised serious problems about actual practices during a crisis. What would happen if only one nation decided to launch the missiles? How would the complex legal and custodial arrangements—with their checks and balances—actually operate? Could American troops stop the Turkish government, or even panicky Turkish troops, from acting unilaterally? What would happen if the Turks seized control of the weapons and warheads during a local crisis with the Soviets and launched the nuclear missiles, despite American objections? Such questions undoubtedly added to the fears of the Soviet Union; for the missiles would be close to the border. Could the Soviets trust the Turks? Should the United States?

The Jupiters were liquid-fuel IRBMs, taking hours to fire, quite inaccurate, very vulnerable, and hence only useful militarily for a first strike, and thus provocative. The skin of the Jupiter was so thin that a sniper's bullet could puncture it and render it inoperative. "In the event of hostilities, assuming that NATO will not strike the first blow," a then-secret congressional report warned, "the USSR with its ballistic missile capability logically could be expected to take out these bases on the first attack, which undoubtedly would be a surprise attack."[11] Put bluntly, the Jupiters would draw, not deter, an attack.

Why then did various Turkish governments, both before and after the coup of 1960, want these weapons? They added prestige, emphasized Turkey's key role in NATO, and exaggerated the warmth of relations with a great power, the United States. The missiles were political assets abroad and possibly at home.

Michael Armacost, *The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 190–97.

[9] Armacost, *Weapons Innovation*, pp. 175–211.

[10] William H. Brubeck, "Jupiters in Italy and Turkey," 22 October 1962, National Security Files (hereafter NSF), Countries: Cuba, Box 36, John F. Kennedy Library, Waltham, Mass. (hereafter JFKL); W.W. Rostow to Bundy, "Turkish IRBM's," 30 October 1962, NSF, Regional Security Files (hereafter RSF): NATO-Weapons, Box 226, JFKL; *New York Times*, 11 October 1959, pp. 1, 11, and 28 October 1962, p. 31.

[11] U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on the Military Posture*, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 30 January 1963, pp. 277–81.

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Turkey's military leaders believed that the Jupiters added useful military power.[12] Turkish officials probably did not understand the strategic liabilities; perhaps they believed that the missiles, because of their first-strike capacity and the ambiguity of actual control, were sufficiently frightening to deter the Soviets from pressuring Turkey.

Unlike the Eisenhower planners and the Turkish officials, President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara worried about the provocative nature of these weapons. As a result, according to some memoirists, Kennedy actually ordered the removal of the Jupiters before October 1962, and thus was shocked and dismayed to learn during the Cuban missile crisis that they were still in Turkey.[13]

Such recollections are misleading. Well before the crisis, Kennedy knew the Jupiters were in Turkey. In fact, his administration, not Eisenhower's, had actually installed these weapons in late 1961 to fulfill the 1959 agreement.[14] Key documents reveal that the actual deployment of the Jupiters did not occur until *after* Kennedy had been in the White House for at least six months, and probably not until the autumn, and they did not become operational until about July 1962.[15]

The first document, a partly declassified report by the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, makes clear that construction for the Jupiters had not even started when Kennedy entered the White House. On 11 February 1961 the committee urged that "construction . . . should not be permitted to *begin* on the . . . Jupiter sites [which are necessary for] placing 15 obsolete Jupiters in Turkey." Instead, according to the committee, the government should deploy to the area a Polaris submarine, with its sixteen missiles, operated and controlled by American personnel. That assignment, the committee emphasized, could be made before 1962, when the Jupiters would become operational, and the Polaris would be "a much better retaliatory force." It would be mobile, concealed, and thus virtually immune from a Soviet attack. As a result, unlike the Jupiters, the Polaris would add to deterrence and better protect the United States, NATO, and Turkey.[16]

The second document, a National Security Council (NSC) memorandum entitled "Deployment of IRBM's to Turkey," dated 6 April 1961, confirms that

[12] Ibid., pp. 277–85; Raymond Hare to Secretary of State, no. 587, 26 October 1962, NSF, RSF:NATO-Weapons, Box 226, JFKL; compare Sorensen, *Kennedy*, p. 3.

[13] Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, pp. 94–95, implies that JFK had been trying to remove them since 1961. Kenneth O'Donnell and David Powers, with Joe McCarthy, *"Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye"* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), p. 337, states that JFK had given the order five times. Also see Hilsman, *To Move A Nation*, pp. 202–203; Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis* (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), pp. 168–71; and Allison, *Essence of Decision*, pp. 44, 101, 142, 226.

[14] Headquarters, SAC, *The Development of the Strategic Air Command* (n.p., SAC Historian, 1976), p. 104. I am indebted to Dr. Alfred Goldberg, Historian, Department of Defense, for locating this source for me.

[15] House Armed Services Committee, *Hearings on Military Posture*, p. 283.

[16] Report quoted in ibid., pp. 279–80 (emphasis added). For evidence that Polaris missile warheads were often unreliable see *New York Times*, 3 December 1978, p. 32.

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there were no Jupiters then in Turkey and that the administration was considering whether it could back away from fulfilling Eisenhower's 1959 agreement. According to this document, at a March 29 meeting of the NSC, President Kennedy directed that a committee, drawn from the Departments of State and Defense and from the Central Intelligence Agency, "should review the question of deployment of IRBMs to Turkey and make recommendations to him." The committee was to be chaired by a representative from the State Department, which, unlike the Defense Department, was not deeply troubled by the provocative nature of the Jupiters and which was likely to serve as a partisan for Turkish interests and resist cancellation of the weapons.[17] Was this appointment of the State Department representative as chair accidental? Probably not. Kennedy, a knowledgeable leader who understood bureaucratic politics, probably cared more about not offending the Turks than about withholding the Jupiters. This message was probably clear to the chair and other representatives.

The details of the committee's activities remain classified, but another document, probably a report from the committee's chairman, establishes that the Jupiters were still not in Turkey in early summer. On June 22, George C. McGhee of the State Department reported to McGeorge Bundy, the president's special assistant for national security, "that action should not be taken to cancel *projected* deployment of IRBM's *to* Turkey." This conclusion was "based primarily," McGhee explained, "on the view that, in the aftermath of Khrushchev's hard posture at Vienna, cancellation . . . might seem a weakness." American credibility and the president's prestige required doing what the Defense Department regarded as militarily dangerous. In addition, McGhee continued, "the Turkish reaction was strongly adverse" and General Lauris Norstad, commander of NATO, "underlined the military importance of sending IRBM's to Turkey. This makes it unlikely that any attempt [would succeed] to persuade the Turkish military that they should abandon this project."[18]

Unfortunately, Norstad's arguments remain unavailable. An analyst cannot determine whether he failed to recognize the provocative nature of the Jupiters in Turkey, or whether he thought that they would make the Soviets uneasy and thus deter some small-scale adventurism, or whether he believed that the missiles were primarily valuable as symbols of (not weapons for) the alliance. What is clear is that Norstad's reasoning helped undercut the analysis of Secretary McNamara and his "whiz kids," who hoped to make deterrence more reasonable and thus chafed at the resistance of allies, the American brass, and the State Department.

Why did Kennedy accede to deploying the missiles? The documents are still classified. The most likely explanation is that McGhee's report summarized Kennedy's own thinking that summer. The president did not want to seem weak

[17] McGeorge Bundy, "Deployment of IRBM's to Turkey," National Security Action Memorandum, 6 April 1961, NSF, RSF:NATO-Weapons (Cables-Turkey), Box 226, JFKL.

[18] George McGhee to Bundy, "Turkish IRBM's," 22 June 1961, NSF, RSF:NATO-Weapons (Cables-Turkey), Box 226, JFKL (emphasis added); and McGhee to Bernstein, 19 February 1979.

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after the debacle at Vienna, where he felt Khrushchev had bullied him. Nor did he wish to weaken the NATO alliance politically and deeply offend a key American ally, Turkey, by reneging on Eisenhower's commitment. Perhaps, as McNamara later hinted, the administration might have been tempted to promise a Polaris for the future, when it would be available, instead of deploying Jupiters *then*, in mid-1961. Because there were no extra Polaris subs then, such a promise in mid-1961 would not have met Kennedy's needs or Turkish hopes. "There would have been," McNamara later explained, "a psychological loss to the West of simply cancelling the program and failing to replace them—the missiles—simultaneously with some other more modern system."[19] Presumably, after the pain of Vienna faded, when U.S. credibility was reaffirmed and more Polaris subs became available, the administration, in 1962 or so, could always try to negotiate such an arrangement with Turkish officials. But in 1961, there was no felt need for haste, since the Jupiters were deemed a minor problem in a nuclear edifice that, for the new administration, required major remodeling and expansion.

Did Kennedy Order Removal?

According to some memoirists, President Kennedy raised with the State Department in early 1962 the issue of withdrawing the Jupiters, which would become operational in about July. At the NATO meeting in May, according to Roger Hilsman, Secretary of State Dean Rusk found that the Turks still objected, primarily on political grounds.[20] There is no evidence that the administration offered a Polaris as a substitute, and Turkish officials probably would have found the submarine less attractive. They did not seem to share the Defense Department's concern about an invulnerable deterrent, and the Jupiters offered two notable advantages the Polaris lacked: The missiles, because they were visible, added more tangible prestige; and they were subject, in principle, to some Turkish control.

By the summer, Hilsman claims, Kennedy again raised the matter of removing the Jupiters, this time with Undersecretary of State George Ball, and rejected the State Department's "case for further delay."[21] And in late August, Kennedy raised this subject yet again, this time, surprisingly and dramatically, in the context of Cuba. Still, he did *not* order withdrawal, but only implied a study of its feasibility. Bundy's National Security Action Memorandum No. 181, dated 23 August 1962, expresses Kennedy's thoughts and new fears of missiles in Cuba and Soviet efforts to equate them with the Jupiters.

> The President has directed that the following actions and studies be undertaken in the light of new [Soviet] bloc activity in Cuba.

[19] House Armed Services Committee, *Hearings on Military Posture*, p. 283.

[20] Hilsman, *To Move A Nation*, pp. 202–3; Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, pp. 94–95.

[21] Hilsman, *To Move A Nation*, pp. 202–3; Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, pp. 94–95. For additional doubts that Kennedy ever ordered withdrawal, see George Ball to Bernstein, 22 February 1979.

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1. What action can be taken to get Jupiter missiles out of Turkey? (Action: Department of Defense). . . .

6. A study should be made of the advantages and disadvantages of making a statement that the U.S. would not tolerate the establishment of military forces (missile or air, or both?) which might launch a nuclear attack from Cuba against the U.S. . . .

7. A study should be made of the various military alternatives which might be adopted in executing a decision to eliminate any installations in Cuba capable of launching nuclear attack on the U.S. What would be the pros and cons, for example, of pinpoint attack, general counter-force attack, and outright invasion?
(Action: Department of Defense)[22]

By shifting responsibility for removal of the Jupiters to the Department of Defense, which, unlike the Department of State, was more concerned about nuclear strategy than about maintaining warm relations with a dependent ally, either Kennedy himself or Bundy had decided to minimize the role of the State Department. So far as the available records and recollections indicate, however, the Defense Department accomplished nothing in the next seven weeks to phase out the Jupiters.[23] Obviously, removing the missiles first required a plan and then probably diplomatic negotiations. General Norstad, as well as Turkish officials, could be an impediment. Probably the Defense Department was again flirting with the possibility of substituting deployment of a Polaris (there were nine) near Turkey for the Jupiters.

Did Kennedy believe that this directive of 23 August 1962 would soon remove the Jupiters? Given that his government had installed them, and they had just become operational in about July, he could not have been so foolishly optimistic. Nor did the memorandum *order* the Department of Defense to act. It asked "What action can be taken?" and stated that there would be a meeting with the president in about nine days "to review progress on these items." Thus it is too simple to conclude, as have some analysts, that Kennedy ordered removal of the missiles and that the bureaucracy thwarted his instructions.[24] In-

[22] Bundy, National Security Action Memorandum, no. 181, 23 August 1962, Cunliffe-NSC Box, Modern Military Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

[23] Since many files are still classified, there may have been some action. Bundy does not recall that there was any action (interview with Bundy, 31 July 1979). At the meeting of August 31 or September 1, with JFK, on the points in this memo, there was, as Henry Rowen recalls, no discussion of item 1 (interview with Rowen, 13 February 1979).

[24] See, for example, Allison, *Essence of Decision*, pp. 101, 141-42, 225-26, who uncritically accepted recollections that JFK had given a clear order and then tries to explain, in terms of bureaucratic politics, why it was not carried out. A more subtle approach would acknowledge that a chief executive may often express preferences (not orders) for policies, and that he may sincerely reinterpret them as *orders* when his own inaction leaves him woefully unprepared in a crisis. In this way, a president can place blame on a subordinate, and other aides who listen to his charges tend to believe that the president actually issued an order, and not simply stated a wish or hope. In later memoirs and journalistic accounts, the president's interpretation dominates and becomes "fact." Practitioners of the "bureaucratic politics" model develop a vested interest in uncritically accepting such dubious evidence precisely because their model so nicely "explains" it. Thus, the model *first* helps define the reliability of the evidence and *then* explains it—a dangerous, circular process. For related critiques,

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deed, according to Bundy's recent recollection, the president did not order withdrawal of the Jupiters until *after* the Cuban missile crisis.[25]

Why did Kennedy in August link the missiles in Turkey to the problem of Cuba? Did he foresee that the Soviet Union would install surface-to-surface missiles ninety miles from the United States? The memoirists tell us that neither Kennedy nor his advisers, with the exception of CIA director John McCone, deemed such Soviet action as likely.[26] Thus, their concern probably was more general: that the Soviets might justify a build-up of troops and even bombers in Cuba by pointing to the Jupiters, which had just become operational. There was already evidence that recent Soviet deliveries to Cuba probably included surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and possibly planes.

The NSC memorandum had suggested the danger of the Soviets equating "offensive" missiles in Turkey with those in Cuba. Even before a U-2 photographed the Soviet "offensive" missile sites on October 14, therefore, a NSC staff member prepared an argument to stress the political differences between U.S. Jupiters in Turkey and Soviet missiles in Cuba: The Soviet weapons were designed for aggression and deployed secretly; the American weapons were defensive and deployed openly. Put simply, the Soviet action was dangerous and dishonorable, the American action peaceful and honorable.[27] It was a strained, self-righteous document, characteristic of the administration's public pronouncements during the crisis.

The United States Considers a Trade

On Tuesday, October 16, when learning of the Soviet missiles in Cuba, some administration members feared that the Soviets would point to the Jupiters for justification. During the six days, from October 16 to October 21, when the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm) deliberated on how the administration should respond, United Nations ambassador Adlai Stevenson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and some other advisers occasionally suggested trading missiles (in Turkey for those in Cuba) to settle the crisis. Apparently the president flirted with this notion.

On Wednesday, October 17, Stevenson warned Kennedy that world opinion would equate U.S. missile bases in Turkey with the Soviet bases in Cuba. Stevenson's memorandum was fuzzy, perhaps because he feared that he was

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see Dan Caldwell, "A Research Note on the Quarantine of Cuba, October 1962," *International Studies Quarterly* 20 (December 1978):625–33; and Donald Hafner, "Bureaucratic Politics and 'Those Frigging Missiles': JFK, Cuba and U.S. Missiles in Turkey," *Orbis* 21 (Summer 1977):307–33.

[25] Interviews with McGeorge Bundy, 29 and 31 July 1979.

[26] Hilsman, *To Move A Nation*, p. 170.

[27] I.M. Tobin, "Attempts to Equate Soviet Missile Bases in Cuba with NATO Jupiter Bases in Italy and Turkey," 10 October 1962, NSF, Countries: Cuba, Box 36, JFKL. Also see Thomas Sorensen, "Information Policy Guidance on Cuba," 22 October 1962, Classified Subjects Files (hereafter CSF), Box 48, Theodore Sorensen Papers (hereafter Sorensen Papers), JFKL.

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giving unwelcome counsel, for he both warned that "we can't negotiate with a gun at our head" and suggested trading the bases in Turkey for those in Cuba. *"I feel you should [make] it clear that the existence of nuclear missile bases anywhere is negotiable before we start anything,"* he underlined.[28]

In fairness to Stevenson, on Wednesday, when he offered this counsel, the ExComm was leaning toward an attack on Cuba to eliminate the missiles; in that context, he was probably more concerned to head off disaster than to phrase an exact plan for negotiations. His memo was unclear on key matters: Should Kennedy privately demand that the Soviets withdraw their missiles and also mention future negotiations on the Jupiters? Or should he negotiate on them then? The problems of when, how, and under what conditions to offer a trade—whether explicit or informal—would bedevil thinking on this matter throughout the crisis.

Two days later, on Friday, October 19, according to the ExComm minutes quoted by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "more than once during the afternoon Secretary McNamara voiced the opinion that the US . . . would at least have to give up our missile bases in Italy and Turkey and would probably have to pay more besides . . . to get the Soviet missiles out of Cuba." On Saturday, McNamara again offered the same analysis: "We would have to be prepared to accept the withdrawal of US strategic missiles from Turkey and Italy and possibly agreement to [withdraw in the future from] Guantanamo. He added that we could obtain the removal of the missiles . . . only if we were prepared to offer something in return."[29]

On Saturday, after the ExComm had finally agreed on the quarantine, Stevenson attended the meeting and once more recommended a trade, this time to be announced along with the quarantine. His proposed settlement would have included withdrawal of Jupiters from Turkey and abandonment of the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo.[30] According to Schlesinger, who has seen the classified ExComm minutes, "everyone jumped on Stevenson." Why? Schlesinger claims that most feared that this proposed tactic, by *starting* with concessions, would "legitimize Khrushchev's action and give him an easy triumph."[31] Robert Kenne-

[28] Adlai Stevenson to President, 17 October 1962, Sorensen Papers. The irrationalities of the classification-declassification system are well illustrated by the fact that the typed copy of this item was declassified by the State Department in August 1974, but the handwritten copy (which is trivially different because of some crossing out) was kept classified until summer 1978, despite requests and appeals for declassification in the intervening years. After Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett skewered Stevenson in the press for being a "dove," Stevenson argued that he never meant to imply that the Turkey and Italy bases should be traded as part of a settlement (Stevenson to Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., [January 1963], Sorensen Papers).

[29] Leonard Meeker, memorandum, 19 October 1962, meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, Arthur Schlesinger Papers, JFKL, quoted in Schlesinger, *Robert F. Kennedy*, p. 515. On the State Department's later suppression (classification) of Meeker's memo, see Abram Chayes, *The Cuban Missile Crisis* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. vii–viii and 14–15.

[30] Notes on minutes of NSC, 20 October 1962, courtesy of Schlesinger.

[31] Schlesinger, *Robert F. Kennedy*, p. 515. Also see, [Adlai Stevenson?], "Political Program to be

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dy later added that the timing and the Guantanamo offer, not the Turkish bases, provoked the anger.[32] Probably, in addition, Stevenson himself provoked ire. Because he was an outsider, not respected by either Kennedy brother, his counsel, even when similar to that of the trusted McNamara, easily rankled the tired members of the ExComm. Whereas they viewed themselves as "tough" and decisive, they viewed Stevenson as indecisive and soft.

President Kennedy "sharply rejected the thought of surrendering [Guantanamo]," according the the ExComm minutes. "He felt that such action would convey to the world that we had been frightened into abandoning our position."[33] He "emphatically disagreed," reports Schlesinger, "that the initial presentation to the UN should include our notion of an eventual political settlement." According to the minutes, "he agreed that at an appropriate time we would have to acknowledge that we were willing to take strategic missiles out of Turkey and Italy if this issue was raised by the Russians. But he was firm in saying that we should only make such a proposal in the future." The quoted minutes in Schlesinger's account leave unclear whether the president was willing to countenance an explicit public trade of the Jupiters, or whether he was suggesting something private, hedged, even evasive.[34]

On Sunday morning, October 21, high-level State Department officials flirted with the Cuba-Turkey missile trade. At an evening meeting, convened by Robert Kennedy, a number of senior government officials agreed, in the words of Abram Chayes, the State Department's legal adviser, "that the Turkish missiles would have to be given up in the end, as the price of settlement." Why not have the United States introduce this offer at the United Nations right after the announcement of the quarantine? Offered at the beginning, such a concession would have various liabilities and seem, according to Chayes's summary of attitudes, "rather weak and defensive [and] inconsistent with the sense of resolution and determination that was judged essential to the success of the quarantine."[35]

Suggesting a trade, W. Averell Harriman, assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs, counseled President Kennedy on likely Soviet purposes: "There has undoubtedly been great pressure on Khrushchev for a considerable time to do something about our ring of bases, aggravated by our placing Jupiter missiles in Turkey." Harriman hinted that such a trade might rescue Khrushchev, who,

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Announced by the President," 20 October 1962, Sorensen Papers; [Stevenson?], "Speech Insert on Political Program," n.d. (probably October 17 or 20), Box 48, Sorensen Papers; and Stevenson, "Why the Political Program Should Be in the Speech," n.d. (probably October 21), in CSF, Box 49, Sorensen Papers. The first memo called for sending U.N. observation teams to Turkey, Italy, and Cuba to "insure [against] surprise attack," and suggested discussions on NATO bases in Italy and Turkey. The last memo suggested trading Guantanamo but did not offer the bases in Turkey and Italy.

[32] Kennedy, in interview with John B. Martin, 6 December 1966, cited by Schlesinger, *Robert F. Kennedy*, p. 515; Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, p. 50.

[33] Minutes of NSC, 20 October 1962, quoted in Schlesinger, *Robert F. Kennedy*, p. 515.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Chayes, *Cuban Missile Crisis*, pp. 81–82.

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he thought, had been pushed to take such bold action by a tough group in the Kremlin.[36]

On Monday morning, the day the president announced the quarantine, Attorney General Robert Kennedy sketched the administration's public line, at least for the next few days.[37] Fearful that Stevenson might be too soft in dealing with the Soviets at the United Nations, Kennedy pulled aside Schlesinger, then serving as Stevenson's aide, to outline the administration's thinking: "We will have to make a deal at the end, but we must stand absolutely firm now. Concessions must come at the end of negotiation, not at the beginning."[38] His implication: the quarantine, if successful, would frighten the Soviets but not compel them to yield unless the United States also offered some quid pro quo. Did the attorney general have the Jupiters in mind? The deliberations of the past week, especially the Sunday evening meeting, certainly suggested them as part of an exchange.

Why did the president not order the dismantling of the Jupiters before they might become a public bargaining card in the crisis? Probably the time was too short, and probably he was also tempted by the prospect of a future trade and therefore unwilling to discard this extra card. Stevenson, among others, warned of a potential liability: that the Jupiters would also make it harder to persuade the world that the Soviet missiles constituted a new kind of threat. But probably Kennedy was willing to take that risk in order to keep open future options, to protect himself from international embarrassment (would not the sudden dismantling suggest U.S. acknowledgement that Turkey-Cuba missile bases were equivalent?), and to avoid domestic charges of weakness and a sellout.

Plans to Trade the Jupiters

After the president's Monday evening speech announcing the quarantine, some American officials vigorously canvassed the possibility of trading the Jupiters in Turkey as part of the ultimate settlement of the crisis. There were basic questions, as they knew: Whether and, if so, how to exchange the Jupiters, ideally without appearing to do so? Would other weapons meet the military and political needs of NATO and Turkey? If so, could the United States withdraw these missiles without offending most NATO nations and Turkey in particular? "The danger in Turkey can be especially acute," one official warned. "If the Alliance or the US seems to be pulling away from [Turkey] it could lead to the fall of the present government."[39] An uneasy new coalition, shored up by the Turkish

[36] W. Averell Harriman, "Memorandum on Kremlin Reactions," 22 October 1962, JFKL.

[37] At one point, Sorensen had sketched a loose Turkey-Cuba missile trade for inclusion in Kennedy's message to Khrushchev (Sorensen, draft, 18 October 1962, CSF, Box 48, Sorensen Papers).

[38] Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 811

[39] "Scenario," 26 October 1962, NSF, Countries: Cuba, JFKL. This memorandum also dealt with removal of the thirty Jupiters from Italy.

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military and by American economic aid, the Turkish government could not afford to antagonize its powerful generals or risk a crisis.[40]

Working within these constraints, Undersecretary of State George Ball, W. Averell Harriman, Harlan Cleveland (assistant secretary of state for International Organization), Walt Whitman Rostow (director of the Policy Planning Council), and Stevenson, among others, scratched around for some solution involving the Jupiters. At times, this line seemed to capture the fancy of President Kennedy, but hard questions always lingered for him.[41]

Early in the week, President Kennedy apparently directed the State Department to consider withdrawing the missiles, which spurred Ball to consult key ambassadors. On Wednesday, October 24, he notified Ambassador Raymond Hare that a trade was being considered and requested an assessment of the political situation in Turkey so "that [we will] not harm our relations with this important ally." Would Turkey accede to withdrawal of the Jupiters, Ball asked, if there was some military replacement—possibly deployment of an American-controlled Polaris or establishment of seaborne, multilateral nuclear force (MLF) within NATO?[42] Both notions had been knocking about Washington for more than a year, and the administration, like Eisenhower's, had been flirting with the creation of a MLF, under NATO, in order to restrain the desire of some European nations, especially France, for an independent deterrent.

Removal of the Jupiters as part of an explicit trade would weaken NATO and injure American relations with Turkey, Hare replied. Turkish officials would greatly resent "that their interests were being traded off in order to appease an enemy." They were proud that, unlike the Cubans, they were not the "stooge" of a great power. Both Turkey's political prestige and military power were at stake, he claimed, and the Jupiters fulfilled both needs.[43]

Could these missiles be used to settle the Soviet-American conflict? Hare was not optimistic but dutifully discussed some programs. He reluctantly suggested a secret Soviet-American agreement (without Turkey's knowledge) and then the prompt dismantling of the missiles. That course would prove attractive in Washington.[44]

On receiving Ball's cable, NATO Ambassador Thomas Finletter also replied that Turkish officials would bitterly resent a trade. He lectured the State Department on the dangers of a "horse trade." It could set a "pattern for handling Russian incursions" elsewhere and thus frighten other members of NATO, who

[40] *New York Times*, 30 October 1962, p. 14; see also, George Harris, *Troubled Alliance* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1972), pp. 83–95.

[41] Bromley Smith, "Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting, No. 7, Oct. 27, 1962, 10:00 A.M.," NSF, NSC: ExComm Meetings, JFKL. (hereafter cited as "Summary Record, ExComm").

[42] Secretary Rusk (drafted by Ball) to Ambassadors Hare and Finletter, 24 October 1962, NSF, RSF:NATO-Weapons, Box 226, JFKL.

[43] Ambassador Hare to Secretary of State, 26 October 1962, NSF, RSF: NATO-Weapons, Box 226, JFKL.

[44] Ibid.

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"may wonder whether they will be asked to give up some military capability" the next time. Unlike Hare, Finletter did not even glance at the possibility of a secret deal with the Soviets.[45] Perhaps he did not conceive of this strategy; more likely, he did not want to risk mentioning what he deemed a disastrous course.

By Thursday, October 25, while one special NSC committee was sketching the scenario for an air strike, another was outlining a "political path"—a summit meeting while the quarantine continued—to settle the crisis. "It would probably involve discussion over Berlin or, as a minimum, our missile bases in Turkey," the committee warned.[46] A linked proposal, probably from the same committee, suggested an offer "to withdraw our missiles from Turkey in return for Soviet withdrawal of . . . missiles from Cuba." To avoid a crisis in NATO and to assuage Turkish officials, such an offer "might be expressed in generalized form, such as withdrawal of missiles from territory [near] the other [great power]."[47]

On Friday, October 26, Harriman was also urging negotiations to get the missiles out of Turkey. He endorsed the "defanging resolution" of Assistant Secretary Harlan Cleveland: Only nuclear powers should possess nuclear weapons and missiles, and thus the United States and the Soviet Union would not place these systems in the territory of nonnuclear powers. Such terms, Harriman explained, would compel the United States to pull missiles out of Turkey and Italy, but not Britain, which was a nuclear power, and Russia would have to withdraw its missiles from Cuba. By raising the terms to a level of generality, Harriman hoped to conceal what some could regard as a naked trade—missiles in Turkey and Italy for missiles in Cuba. "*Agreement should be put forward not as a trade over Cuba,*" he underlined, but "*as a first and important step towards disarmament.*"[48] And he believed sincerely that the result would be both a way out of the crisis and a course toward more effective arms control. Harriman was seizing on the crisis to address more basic problems and also offering Khrushchev a way of avoiding humiliation. At first glance, his plan seemed appealingly simple: The negotiations *might* be speedy, and the Soviets would recognize that they could take credit for forcing a trade and for promoting disarmament. But what would happen if the negotiations were not speedy? Would not obtaining the endorsement of NATO and Turkey take too much time?

[45] Ambassador Finletter to Secretary of State, Polto 506, 25 October 1962, NSF,RSF: NATO-Weapons, Box 226, JFKL.

[46] "Political Path," 25 October 1962, NSF,NSC: ExComm Meetings, Box 316, JFKL.

[47] Neither the author nor the date is given for this untitled document, but the document begins: "The following political actions might be considered" (Vice-Presidential Security File, Nations and Regions, Policy Papers and Background Studies on Cuba Affair, folder III, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, [hereafter LBJL] Austin, Texas). (This series will hereafter be cited as VP Security File: Cuba.)

[48] Harriman to Under Secretary, 26 October 1962, NSF, Countries: Cuba, Box 36, JFKL. Harriman's first choice was a resolution on denuclearization of Latin America, which excluded the problem of Europe. On October 24, he had argued for the "defanging resolution" (Schlesinger to Stevenson, 24 October 1962, Schlesinger Papers, JFKL).

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Even though all the middle-range ballistic missile (MRBM) sites *had been operational* since the first day of the quarantine, and therefore the Soviets could have launched a first salvo of about half their forty-two MRBMs, Kennedy and members of ExComm worried about the continued work on missile sites in Cuba. They seemed to fear that the Soviets would reduce the time required for launching an MRBM, and that they also were advancing quickly on twelve or eighteen launchers for IRBMs (twelve to thirty-six missiles), likely to be ready in about five weeks. The CIA was not sure whether nuclear warheads were in Cuba, but the administration assumed the worst.[49]

The ExComm minutes are scattered with demands that work on the missiles must soon stop. And Kennedy seemed to have a self-imposed deadline of roughly between Sunday, October 28, to about Tuesday, October 30.[50] As a result, plans involving a trade of the Jupiters had to meet his informal timetable. Those plans that seemed to involve lengthy negotiations would be unacceptable, unless they stipulated a way of getting the Soviets promptly to halt work on the sites.

While Harriman's plan *may* have had this liability, two others—one from a special NSC committee and the other from Rostow—certainly did. On Friday, the special committee offered a proposal, forwarded by Rusk without comment to Kennedy, for a "face-saving cover, if [the Soviets] wish, for a withdrawal of their offensive weapons from Cuba."[51] It was an elaborate, guardedly optimistic scheme suggesting a summit conference, to be preceded by the agreement of NATO and Turkey to accept a multilateral nuclear force and to remove missiles from Turkey and Italy.

Walt W. Rostow, sketching a similar plan, believed that he had devised a way out of the crisis while maintaining all of the "Free World assets" and actually strengthening the NATO alliance. His solution: secure NATO's speedy approval for MLF, presumably with an agreement to dismantle the Jupiters. The

[49] Central Intelligence Agency, "Readiness Status of Soviet Missiles in Cuba," 23 October 1962, had counted twenty-three (of the ultimate twenty-four) launchers and thirty-three (of the ultimate forty-two) MRBMs, and was unsure whether the warheads were in Cuba (NSF, Countries: Cuba, JFKL; see also, CIA, "The Crisis: USSR/Cuba," 26 October 1962, NSF,NSC:ExComm Meetings, JFKL, which is location of CIA. "The Crisis" reports). For an admission that some MRBMs were operational and probably had nuclear warheads, see McNamara's statement, *Washington Post*, 25 October 1962, p. A-10. Generally newspapers, including the *Washington Post*, disregarded this admission. For the implications on reassessing the crisis, see Bernstein, "Week We Almost Went to War," pp. 13–21. For a tendentious argument, which overlooks this essay and cites an abbreviated version, see Schlesinger, *Robert F. Kennedy*, pp. 517–18, who charges of suppression of evidence. His paperback edition struggles to maintain much of the claim while squirming away from an admission that he failed to research his subject adequately and thus simply missed Bernstein's article in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*.

[50] Harold Macmillan, *At the End of the Day, 1961–1963* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 209–11; see also, "Summary Record, ExComm, No. 5, Oct. 25, 1962, 5:00 P.M."; and "Summary Record, ExComm, No. 6, Oct. 26, 1962, 10:00 A.M."

[51] Rusk to President, "Negotiations," with attached paper, 26 October 1962, NSF, Countries: Cuba, Box 36, JFKL.

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Soviets, he acknowledged, "could read it [dismantling] as a way of helping them off the hook"; but it would "nail down the missile portion of the Alliance and [thus thwart Soviet efforts] to disrupt the confidence of the Alliance in the U.S." An additional attraction, for Rostow, was that it achieved goals he had long sought—a stronger NATO, establishment of MLF, and removal of dangerous weapons.[52] But how could these negotiations with NATO nations be completed in a few days?

Ideally, the analyst would like to know which ExComm members supported which proposals and what kind of informal dialogue ensued. But, for the most part, that kind of evidence is not available. The special NSC committee's proposal went to Kennedy, as did Rostow's, and probably all the reports reached Bundy's desk.[53] By Friday, judging from the contents of the various memorandums, there had been substantial informal dialogue. Many advisers were looking for a road to a settlement, and the Jupiters constituted a possible one.

On Friday morning, the ExComm considered whether Kennedy should seek U.N. assistance in arranging negotiations with the Soviets while they halted construction on the missile sites and, as Stevenson suggested, the United States suspended its quarantine. Could the crisis be settled this way? Stevenson, who seemed optimistic, "predicted that the Russians would ask for a new guarantee of the territorial integrity of Cuba and the dismantlement of U.S. strategic missiles in Turkey" in return for withdrawal of missiles from Cuba. Stevenson still regarded these terms as reasonable. But John McCone, the CIA director, was outraged. He resented linking the missiles in Turkey with the Soviet missiles in Cuba. He said, according to the minutes, "the Soviet weapons in Cuba were pointed at our heart and put us under great handicap to carry out our commitments to the free world."[54]

Kennedy did not bar the trade outlined by Stevenson. According to the minutes, he said, "we will get the . . . missiles out of Cuba only by invading or trading. He doubted that the quarantine alone would produce a withdrawal of the weapons." After Kennedy spoke, the dialogue quickly shifted from the Jupiters to Stevenson's proposal that the quarantine should be suspended during negotiations. Most ExComm members strongly opposed that concession. The pressure must be maintained, they concluded, to help force a settlement. Curiously, they did not return to the issue of the Jupiters at that meeting.[55]

[52] Rostow to Secretary et al., "Alliance Missiles," 26 October 1962, with copy to Bundy in NSF, Countries: Cuba, Box 36, JFKL, discussed trading the missiles in Turkey and Italy. Also see Rostow et al. to Secretary, "Cuba," 25 October 1962, NSF, RSF: NATO-Weapons, Box 226, JFKL; Rostow to Secretary et al., "Negotiations about Cuba," NSF, Countries: Cuba, JFKL; and Rostow to Bundy, [25 October 1962], with memorandum, "Summit," 25 October 1962, NSF, JFKL.

[53] This conclusion is based partly on the fact that the reports are usually available in the NSF—actually the Bundy files—at the JFKL.

[54] "Summary Record, ExComm, No. 6, Oct. 26, 1962, 10:00 A.M." Also see Stevenson to Secretary of State, 25 October 1962, VP Security File: Cuba, folder III, LBJL.

[55] "Summary Record, ExComm, No. 6, Oct. 26, 1962, 10:00 A.M."

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Later that Friday, the Soviets indicated terms for settling the crisis: withdrawal of their missiles from Cuba and on-site inspection in return for U.S. termination of the quarantine and a pledge not to invade Cuba. There was not even a hint that the United States must dismantle its Jupiters; the Soviets were asking for less than many American officials had anticipated and than some had proposed to grant.[56]

That Friday night, most ExComm members could find reason for satisfaction. The dangerous crisis would end with one American concession—the pledge not to invade Cuba.[57] Only a few advisers, including McCone and at least some of the Joint Chiefs, were deeply unhappy that Castro would be safe from a United States attack.[58] For the rest, the pledge was a small price to pay. According to Secretary Rusk, it was simply a reaffirmation of existing obligations: "we are committed not to invade Cuba [because we] signed the UN Charter and the Rio treaty."[59]

Would Western Allies Have Accepted a Trade?

On Saturday morning, October 27, the heady optimism speedily collapsed: Some Soviet ships were approaching the quarantine line; the FBI reported that the Soviet delegation was destroying intelligence documents in likely preparation for war; and a surface-to-air missile (SAM) shot down a U-2 over Cuba.[60] Worst of all, a new Soviet message arrived, raising the terms of settlement to

[56] "Significantly, and contrary to expectations, Khrushchev did not seek to link the Cuba issue with . ... the Jupiters in Turkey and Italy" ("The Immediate Consequences," n.d. [late October 26 or early October 27], CSF, Sorensen Papers). For a similar statement, also see Hilsman to Secretary, "Implications of the Soviet Initiative on Cuba," 27 October 1962, CSF, Box 48, Sorensen Papers. In searching for a settlement, the ExComm and other advisers had usually dwelled more upon the American missiles in Turkey (and less upon those in Italy), possibly because those in Turkey were closer to the Soviet Union and had provoked more Soviet ire in the past.

[57] Later, Edward Martin sent a telegram to "All ARA Diplomatic Posts," 27 October 1962, pointing out that the no-invasion pledge could be waived "if [Cuba's] breaking of accepted norms becomes flagrant, [for] US would feel . : . free to take whatever measures might be required" (CSF, Box 48, Sorensen Papers). This telegram, as well as the memorandums cited in note 56 and ExComm minutes, suggests that the no-invasion pledge raised fewer problems for the president and the ExComm than did a trade involving removal of the Jupiters from Turkey.

[58] "Summary Record, ExComm, No. 6, Oct. 26, 1962, 10:00 A.M."; John McCone to Mac [Bundy]," 22 November 1962, NSF, Countries: Cuba: General File, 11/21-11/30, JFKL; and evidence presented for attitudes of some members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Sunday, in Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, p. 119. Alexander George has argued that a no-invasion pledge was a major concession that could protect Khrushchev from humiliation (George to Bernstein, 18 May 1979).

[59] "Summary Record, ExComm, No. 6, Oct. 26, 1962, 10:00 A.M."

[60] Possibly the ExComm did not learn of the shoot-down of the U-2 until later in the day, for no reference to the event appears in the minutes by Bundy and Smith *until* the second Saturday session (4:00 P.M.). See "Summary Record, ExComm, No. 7, Oct. 27, 1962, 10:00 A.M." and "Summary Record, ExComm, No. 8, 4:00 P.M.; and Bundy, "NSC Executive Committee Record of Action, Oct. 27, 1962, 10:00 A.M. Meeting No. 7" and "NSC Executive Committee Record of Action, Oct. 27, 1962, 4:00 P.M., No. 8," NSF: ExComm Meetings, JFKL.

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require removal of the Jupiters from Turkey. "It was the blackest hour of the crisis," later recalled Roger Hilsman.[61]

How would America's NATO allies, other than Turkey, have responded if the administration had met the Soviet terms and agreed publicly to withdraw the Jupiters? Could Kennedy have negotiated a private trade before the Soviets made their public demand? Had there been more flexibility in the NATO alliance than he had chosen to act upon?

The leaders of most of the NATO allies understood the military liabilities of the Jupiters, so the issues were not primarily strategic (the loss of weapons) but psychological and political: the significance of an American concession on weaponry in Europe in order to deal with problems in the Caribbean.[62] Would Kennedy be viewed as a leader who sold out allies for U.S. interests? Or as a leader who sought peace and would pay some reasonable price to avoid plunging NATO and the United States into war?

There is considerable evidence on the attitudes of the German, French, British, Italian, and Canadian governments, and scattered evidence for Belgium the Netherlands, Greece, Denmark, and Norway. A formal trade, especially a public one, would have unnerved some governments, particularly the German and British, and probably the Dutch; it would have confirmed the analysis of President Charles de Gaulle of France, delighted Canada, and probably pleased the Italian, Belgian, Greek, Danish, and Norwegian governments.

Konrad Adenauer, the steadfast chancellor of West Germany, who always feared that American concessions anywhere might betoken abandonment of Berlin, would undoubtedly have opposed even a private trade.[63] But he had no real leverage and could not threaten to leave NATO or even acknowledge its weaknesses. Unwilling to move toward rapprochement with the Soviet Union, Adenauer and his party depended upon the United States and NATO for both military protection and political prestige. Any trade would have eroded his trust in Kennedy, but it would not have altered Adenauer's policies on the larger issues —Berlin, East Germany, the Warsaw Pact, and the Soviet Union. True, at home, he would have been compelled to defend himself and his party against charges that the United States would also sell out Berlin and thus against demands that an approach to the East was essential. But Adenauer would have succeeded, partly for his own reasons. Like Kennedy, Adenauer could have distinguished between Berlin and the Jupiters, for he could have defined the

[61] Hilsman, *To Move A Nation*, p. 220. The Soviet message of October 27 mentioned the missiles in Britain and Italy but specified only those in Turkey as a requirement for a trade. So far as the available materials indicate, no one in the ExComm speculated on why the Soviets added the Jupiters in Turkey to the deal and not *also* those in Italy. Could the Soviets have desired both to raise the ante and to keep the "price" within what seemed acceptable limits? Perhaps Walter Lippmann's suggestion of a Turkey-Cuba missile trade (*Washington Post*, 25 October 1962, p. A-25 and 23 October 1962, p. A-10) seemed to the Soviets an oblique administration offer.

[62] Sorensen, memorandum, 17 October 1962, Cuba files, President's Official Files (hereafter POF) 115, JFKL; Sorensen, *Kennedy*, pp. 680–82.

[63] *New York Times*, 28 October 1962, p. 31; CIA, "The Crisis: USSR/Cuba," 27 October 1962.

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missiles in Turkey as marginal but Berlin as essential to West Germany and the United States.

Charles de Gaulle's position was different. Already moving toward French withdrawal from NATO on the grounds that the alliance meant American domination and blocked France from an independent foreign policy, de Gaulle could use the missile crisis—whatever the outcome—to support his analysis. America had acted independently, without consultation with allies, he noted. The implication, which he would later exploit, was familiar: "annihilation without representation." In turn, had Kennedy publicly traded the missiles in Turkey, that act also would have confirmed de Gaulle's analysis: the United States would act on its own interests and abandon allies whenever convenient. Probably no likely action by Kennedy in the missile crisis—whether he traded or not—could have blocked de Gaulle's ambitions for establishing France as an independent force. That conception, so intimately related to his quest for national and personal grandeur, would not be punctured by U.S. decisions during the missile crisis.[64] While he technically supported the president in the crisis, the aged French leader hinted that immaturity had led Kennedy and the United States to overreact. President de Gaulle's chiding words, as summarized by the American ambassador, were these: "The French for centuries had lived with threats and menaces, first from the Germans and from the Russians, but he understood the US had not had a comparable experience."[65]

Britain's Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had been a strong supporter of the quarantine and worried, especially in the early days, that Khrushchev would wring concessions that would weaken the alliance. He feared that Khrushchev might have installed the missiles "to trade Cuba for Berlin." Fretting that the quarantine might be inadequate, Macmillan wrote in his diary, Kennedy may "'miss the bus'—he may *never* get rid of Cuban rockets except by trading them for Turkish, Italian, or other bases. Thus Khrushchev will have won his point." But by Friday, October 26, when the Soviets seemed to be seeking a way out of the crisis, Macmillan was conciliatory. "If we want to help the Russians save face," he asked Kennedy, "would it be worthwhile our [temporarily demobilizing the Thor missiles] in England during the . . . conference [proposed by the Soviets]?" Kennedy found the suggestion attractive, wanted to mull it over, but feared that it might provoke the Soviets to insist on dismantlings in Turkey and Italy. Though Macmillan had proposed a temporary demobilization of his Thor missiles, he later claimed that, despite the obsolescence of the Jupiters, he would not have agreed to the Soviet proposal on October 27 for their removal. Was this bravado created after the settlement? Probably not. "All America's allies would feel," wrote Macmillan in 1973, "that to avoid the Cuban threat the U.S.

[64] Cyrus Sulzberger, *The Last of the Giants* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1970), pp. 20-22, 1004-06; Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929-1969* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), pp. 504-09.

[65] Ambassador Bohlen to Secretary of State, No. 1970, 27 October 1962, VP Security File: Cuba, folder VI, LBJL.

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. . . had bargained away their protection."[66] Nonetheless, as much as Macmillan would have opposed a public trade, as the dependent ally in the "special relationship" with the United States, he and his party would have probably defended such a trade. Loyalty to the United States would have shaped the Conservative government's public statements.

During that week in late October, American analysts concluded that Norway and Denmark would welcome a trade of the Jupiters to end the crisis.[67] They were probably correct about these two Scandanavian allies, who had steadfastly resisted the emplacement of any nuclear weapons on their soil. When the Soviets made their public demand for including the Jupiters in a settlement, Norwegian government officials endorsed removal of the weapons.[68]

Italy's center-left coalition government reluctantly supported the quarantine, tried to improve relations with the Soviets during the crisis, and anxiously urged Kennedy to negotiate with Khrushchev. On October 27, when an American attack on Cuba seemed imminent, Premier Amintore Fanfani of the Christian Democrats wanted Kennedy to extend his deadline and probably favored the trade of Turkey's Jupiters. The Italian Socialist party, upon which the uneasy government coalition depended, had condemned the quarantine and probably welcomed the trade to end the crisis.[69]

In Canada, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, long unhappy about U.S. dominance, was publicly tactful but privately critical of the president's actions. So troubled was Diefenbaker by Kennedy's unilateral decisions during the crisis and so fearful that Canada might be dragged into war that he barred U.S. Strategic Air Command bombers from the use of Canadian airfields during the crisis.[70] His devout hope was that war could be avoided, and he did not seem to fear that concessions—and certainly not on the Jupiters—would seriously weaken the NATO alliance.

On Thursday, October 25, Andrew de Staercke, the Belgian ambassador to

[66] Macmillan, *End of the Day*, pp. 187, 210, 212–13. Some British officials did flirt with a Cuba-Turkey missile deal during the early days of the crisis (Bohlen to Secretary of State, No. 2082, 11 November 1962, NSF, RSF: NATO-Weapons, JFKL). For Labour and Liberal party responses, see Manchester *Guardian*, 25 October 1962, p. 2; *Times* (London), 25 October 1962, p. 8. For editorials suggesting a trade, see *Times* (London), 24, 26, and 28 October (accepting the Soviet offer) and Manchester *Guardian*, 23, 24, and 25 October 1962. On British press opinion, also see *Washington Post*, 30 October 1962, p. A-8.

[67] Roger Hilsman, "Trading US Missile Bases in Turkey for Soviet Bases in Cuba," 27 October 1962, NSF, Box 36, JFKL.

[68] *New York Times*, 28 October 1962, p. 31. The Norwegian officials approved the Soviet-proposed deal only if removal of the Jupiters would not strategically impair NATO's defenses. Probably they knew that this criterion was clearly met, for the issue was psychological and political, not strategic.

[69] William Brubeck [through Bundy] to Schlesinger, Jr., "Italy's Center-Left Government and the Cuban Crisis," 20 November 1962, with attachment of same title, 26 November 1962, NSF, Countries: Cuba, JFKL; compare Hilsman, "Trading US Missile Bases in Turkey."

[70] Robert Redford, *Canada and Three Crises* (Lindsay, Ontario: John Deyell, 1968), pp. 184–85; Peyton V. Lyon, *Canada in World Affairs* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 43, 53–55.

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NATO, privately proposed the deal that the Soviets demanded two days later. He thought, wrote Cyrus Sulzberger, "we [U.S.] should take the initiative in making such an offer." The bases were obsolete, the ambassador argued, and he did not see how the Russians would withdraw their weapons unless the United States reciprocated.[71] He apparently was not worried about the loss of prestige to the United States or the impact on NATO and seemed to believe that these matters were less important than a settlement. Unlike de Staercke, and presumably the Belgian government, Dutch officials privately opposed a trade on the grounds that it would undermine NATO's morale.[72] But Greek officials, while publicly discreet, seemed to lean toward de Staercke's analysis. When the Soviets demanded removal of the Jupiters, Greek officials privately indicated that this was an acceptable solution. "Compromise can be the only way out," one government official explained.[73]

In some important Latin American nations, despite their public statements supporting Kennedy, there was probably strong sentiment for a compromise involving the Jupiters, in either a public or private deal. The U.S. government did win unanimous support for the quarantine from the Organization of American States (OAS), but that unanimity was secured, in at least a few cases, by some deft coercion. The main item on the OAS agenda was U.S. economic aid, and Washington first moved for a vote of support for the quarantine. The American message was clear: Aid could depend upon an affirmative vote.[74] Even then, some governments—including Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, and Uruguay—feared providing full support for Kennedy's actions, as the State Department knew at the time.[75] Hostile to U.S. military intervention in Latin America, many governments there also worried about the backlash in their own countries from radical

[71] Sulzberger, *Last of the Giants*, pp. 921–92.

[72] *New York Times*, 28 October 1962, p. 31. The Dutch, because of their role as a sea power, were very troubled by the blockade (Manchester *Guardian*, 24 October 1962, p. 15).

[73] *New York Times*, 28 October 1962, p. 31. Significantly, the NATO Council never *officially* broke ranks to support the trade of the Jupiters over American objections, and the council actually endorsed JFK's *public* position (Finletter to Secretary of State, Polto 512, 28 October 1962, NSF,RSF:NATO-Weapons, JFKL).

[74] Ronald Hilton, "A Note on Latin America," *Council for Correspondence Newsletter*, no. 21, October 1962, pp. 42–44. Also see Manchester *Guardian*, 24 October 1962, p. 15, and *Times* (London), 27 October 1962, p. 8.

[75] These four nations did not support an OAS resolution to allow the use of force to remove the missiles (*Washington Post*, 24 October 1962, p. A-1). For other evidence on negative Latin American attitudes, see, Rusk to Embassy, Rio De Janeiro, 30 October 1962, VP Security File: Cuba, folder III, LBJL; CIA, "The Crisis: USSR/Cuba," 24, 27, and 28 October 1962; and *Hispanic American Report* (Stanford, Calif.) 15 (October 1962), pp. 943–44, 957, 964, 1064. Obviously, an analysis of the likely impact of an American deal might also consider the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) (which included Turkey but not the United States) and the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), but the declassified documents reveal almost no specific attention to these two alliances. CIA, "The Crisis: USSR/Cuba," 27 October 1962, noted that two CENTO members—Iran and Pakistan—"have been slow to come out with solid public support of United States action."

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groups if the United States attacked Cuba. A trade, even a public one, for the Jupiters was attractive if an invasion was the alternative.

The United States's complex alliance systems did rest partly upon faith in its credibility, but many governments also feared that efforts to affirm credibility could be rash and dangerous. They did not usually expect the United States to maintain blind allegiance, and, as the history of recent American foreign relations demonstrated, discretion, tempered force, and the willingness to compromise were also essential to operating the far-flung alliances.

The Saturday Crisis

Saturday was the most painful day of the crisis. For the ExComm and the president, there were no easy answers. Should America bomb the SAM site in Cuba, as the ExComm had previously planned, if a U-2 was shot down? Should the administration yield to the additional demand of exchanging the Jupiters to settle the crisis? The minutes for Saturday's three sessions reveal that the ExComm easily disposed of the first question and devoted agonizing attention to the second.

Some advisers wanted to arrange a way of pulling out the Jupiters without making a clear trade. A trade would injure Turkey, NATO, and the United States, according to their analysis. Was there some way of inducing Turkey to suggest withdrawal of the weapons? Or of placing their withdrawal in some broad context of disarmament? At various points, President Kennedy indicated that he did not want to yield to Soviet pressure but that he would favor some cosmetic arrangement to get rid of the Jupiters in order to settle the crisis. At a few points, he seemed desperate and prepared to countenance a trade. Work on the Soviet missile sites in Cuba must soon stop, Kennedy periodically emphasized, and his lingering implication was that an American attack on Cuba might otherwise become necessary in the next few days.

At times in the Saturday meetings, some ExComm members urged an attack—possibly first on the SAM sites and then on the MRBM and IRBM sites, to be followed by an invasion. Such counsel raised profound questions: Would the Soviet Union then respond against Berlin or elsewhere? Would not NATO and especially Turkey become Soviet targets? Could all-out war then be avoided? An anxious group of men, hardly more than a dozen, assessed actions that might lead to war or peace. And the president, listening to their counsel and trying out his own notions, ultimately had the constitutional and actual power of decision. The vigorous disputes over strategy left him *reasonably* free to choose. In the ExComm, he never faced a monolith, only shifting majorities. He could move toward peace or war. But if he chose the route of concessions, he would risk antagonizing the military chiefs, who were not his natural allies.[76]

[76] For JFK's fears of the military, see Paul Fay, *The Pleasure of His Company* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 189–190.

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At first, according to the minutes of the morning meeting, the opponents of a trade of the missiles came to the fore. Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, an ardent cold warrior dating back to the Truman years, forcefully objected to the Soviet proposal: "It would be anathema to the Turks to pull the missiles out. . . . the next Soviet step would be a demand for denuclearization of the entire NATO area." Concessions would only beget demands for more concessions. Where would the United States draw the line? Why should allies trust American promises? Both Rusk and Bundy also resisted the trade, with Bundy stressing, according to the minutes, "we cannot get into the position of appearing to sell out an ally . . . to serve our own interests, i.e., getting the Soviet missiles out of Cuba."[77]

President Kennedy regretted, as the minutes put it, that "the Russians had made the Turkish proposal in the most difficult possible way." Now, he said, because their demand is public, "we would have no chance to talk privately to the Turks about the missiles." He favored removing the weapons but did not want to appear to be yielding to a Soviet demand, lest he lose prestige and credibility, injure Turkey and NATO, and give the Soviets a public victory.[78] Could the crisis be settled without risking some American, and presidential, credibility and prestige?

The suggested trade of forty-two Soviet MRBMs (representing one-third of the entire Soviet strategic arsenal) for fifteen obsolete Jupiters was attractive on military grounds, Kennedy acknowledged. How, he worried, could he "justify risking nuclear war in Cuba and Berlin over missiles in Turkey which are of little military value?" It would even be hard to get political support for such a position, he acknowledged. Yet, he thought, there might be a way out: "We cannot propose to withdraw the missiles, . . . but the Turks could offer to do so. [They] must be informed of the great danger . . . and we have to face up to the possibility of some kind of a trade over the missiles."[79]

The minutes of the morning meeting, like those for later in the day, reveal a sense of desperation, a fear that events were hurtling beyond control, that action was restricted to unpalatable alternatives, and that an attack on the missile sites in Cuba might soon be necessary. Even though the forty-two MRBMs (and even with the addition of twelve or thirty-six IRBMs) did not alter the strategic balance or militarily imperil the United States, no ExComm member (so far as the minutes disclose) challenged the dominating assumption: the United States could not dally more than a few days.[80] But if the work on the sites ceased, Kennedy noted, "we could talk to the Russians."[81]

The two-hour morning meeting ended with agreement on a brief public reply

[77] "Summary Record, ExComm, No. 7, Oct. 27, 1962, 10:00 A.M."

[78] Ibid.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Sorensen, memorandum, 17 October 1962, POF 115, JFKL; Bernstein, "Week We Almost Went to War," pp. 16-20.

[81] "Summary Record, ExComm, No. 7, Oct. 27, 1962, 10:00 A.M."

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to Khrushchev's demand. The White House statement, widely interpreted in the press as an outright rejection, was actually more subtle and elusive.[82] It left the door open for some future agreement on the Jupiters but never specifically mentioned them. It sidestepped the Soviet demand, asserted that negotiations were impossible until work stopped on the missile sites and they were rendered inoperative, declared that the current crisis in Cuba and European security could not be linked, but mentioned the possibility of postsettlement discussions on arms limitation in Europe, and thus hinted at a willingness to consider removal of the Jupiters after the resolution of the crisis.[83]

That afternoon, a small, weary group met at the State Department to prepare the president's formal reply to Khrushchev. The strategy was to disregard the most recent Soviet message (dismantling the missiles in Turkey) and accept the Friday suggestion: withdrawal of the Soviet missiles and on-site inspection in return for termination of the quarantine and a pledge not to attack Cuba.[84]

When the ExComm reconvened at 4 P.M., the president revised the draft to stress his offer to discuss, after the resolution of the crisis, the reduction of general tensions, a halt to the arms race, and a détente between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. As the minutes indicate, this section was designed as an oblique way of offering to discuss withdrawal of the Jupiters later without specifying them and thus avoiding angering the Turks and appearing weak. According to the minutes, Kennedy "felt that we would not be in a position to offer any trade for several days. . . . if we could succeed in freezing the situation in Cuba and rendering the strategic missiles inoperable, then we would be in a position to negotiate with the Russians." When Bundy, who still opposed the trade, warned of a backlash in NATO countries, "the president responded that if we refuse to discuss such a trade and then take military action in Cuba, we would also be in a difficult position."[85]

It was a tortuous, three-hour meeting. The discussion rambled. Like broken shuttlecocks, the proposals ranged widely. Often mixing proposals, ExComm members considered attacking Cuba, or convening a special NATO meeting, or outrightly rejecting the Turkey-Cuba missile trade, and even disarming the Jupiters and then attacking Cuba. In calling for a NATO meeting on Sunday, President Kennedy wavered between supporting a bid for peace and opting for a course toward war. "If the Russians do attack the NATO countries," Kennedy explained on one occasion, "we do not want them to say that they had not been consulted about the actions we were taking." Toward the end of the session, he returned to his earlier theme: persuading the Turks "to suggest to us that we

[82] White House press release, 27 October 1962. The statement was similar to Stevenson's proposal. (MVF [Forrestal] to President, 27 October 1962, NSF, Countries: Cuba, JFKL).

[83] "Summary Record, ExComm, No. 7, Oct. 27, 1962, 10:00 A.M." and Bundy, "NSC Executive Committee Record of Action, Oct. 27, 1962, 10:00 A.M." both reveal that the statement was approved at the morning session.

[84] "Summary Record, ExComm, No. 8, Oct. 27, 1962, 4:00 P.M."

[85] Ibid.

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withdraw our missiles."[86] That would not be easy, he acknowledged, since they had just issued a statement sharply rejecting the Soviet demand for an explicit trade.

Probably in the last thirty minutes of the meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, presumably McNamara, and some others offered a zany solution: defuse the Jupiters in Turkey, inform the Soviets, and then attack Cuba.[87] That plot is outlined in part of a chilling draft message to NATO: "Wishing to minimize the possibility of . . . an attack upon Turkey, and possibly upon other NATO countries, the United States is willing, if the other members of NATO so desire, to render the Jupiter missiles . . . inoperative . . . and [thus] to notify the Soviet Government before moving against the Soviet missiles in Cuba."[88] The theory seemed to be that dismantling the Jupiters would meet part of the Soviet demand for a trade, emphasize that Kennedy was trying to restrict military activities to this hemisphere, reduce Soviet anger and fear, and probably protect Turkey and NATO from reprisals. The attack would remove the Soviet missiles and pay a bonus: elimination of Castro ("the bone in our throat"). The obvious liability was that the attack might kill 15,000–20,000 Soviets and thus compel the Soviets to retaliate—probably in Europe. As a majority in the ExComm seemed to be shifting to this plot, the president adjourned the meeting.[89]

At least a few lingered in the room to discuss the bizarre course of the meeting. According to the minutes, Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson asked, "Why were [we] not prepared to [accept the Soviet trade] if we were prepared to give up the use of U.S. missiles in Turkey?" The arguments of maintaining credibility, of keeping faith with NATO, of meeting obligations to Turkey did not seem to impress him. His chief aim was peace. Undersecretary Ball agreed, noting "that last week we thought it might be acceptable to trade the withdrawal of the missiles in Turkey if such action would save Cuba." Why not now? he asked. Accept the Soviet terms, he suggested, and replace the Jupiters with a Polaris sub.[90]

[86] Ibid.

[87] Robert McElroy interview with Donald Wilson, 18 December 1974 (copy of transcript in my possession); Wilson to Bernstein, 20 February 1979. Both Sorensen and Bundy denied any knowledge of the plan, and Sorensen implied that ExComm had never considered it (McElroy interviews with Sorensen, 18 December 1974, and Bundy, 27 February 1975; Bernstein interview with Bundy, 31 July 1979; compare Sorensen, *The Kennedy Legacy* [New York: Macmillan Co., 1969] p. 190.) Because the minutes have been "sanitized," one cannot be sure of McNamara's position ("Summary Record, ExComm, No. 8, Oct. 27, 1962, 4:00 P.M."). Because of his presidency of the World Bank, he will not discuss American policy in which he participated (McNamara to Bernstein, 6 August 1979).

[88] "Message to the North Atlantic Council and the Governments of all NATO Countries," [27 October 1962], NSF, Countries: Cuba, Box 36, JFKL.

[89] Sorensen, *The Kennedy Legacy*, p. 190; McElroy interview with Wilson, 18 December 1974. Robert Kennedy states that the president ordered the Jupiters defused "so that he personally would have to give permission before they were used" (Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, p. 98).

[90] "Summary Record, ExComm, No. 8, Oct. 27, 1962, 4:00 P.M." On Johnson, also see handwritten notes, item 143A [probably Oct. 27], VP Security File: Cuba, folder V, LBJL.

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When the ExComm met for an hour that evening at 9 P.M., the advisers talked of an invasion of Cuba, planned ways of adding pressure on the Soviets, prepared for a NATO meeting on Sunday, and again discussed the Turkey-Cuba missile trade. Kennedy decided to activate twenty-four air reserve squadrons (14,000 men) in preparation for the invasion and to frighten the Soviets. If any more surveillance planes were fired on over Cuba, Kennedy decided that "we should take out the SAM sites by [bombing them]."[91]

The group agreed not to raise with Turkish officials the question of withdrawing the Jupiters and instructed Ambassador Finletter to inform NATO that an American attack on Cuba was near but that the president still hoped that the crisis could be settled "within the framework of the Western Hemisphere." Finletter was directed to warn NATO delegates that an American attack might unleash a Soviet attack against their nations, but to encourage free expression, while reminding them that elimination of the missiles in Cuba was essential to maintaining NATO's strategic strength (not just the United States's). Finletter was instructed not to "hint of any readiness to meet [the] Soviet Jupiter proposal."[92]

Given the fears of some NATO allies, did not these instructions encourage them to push for a compromise? Had the ExComm devised tactics to lead NATO to suggest acceptance of the Turkey-Cuba missile exchange? Or was the ExComm sincerely willing to be further limited if NATO made a different recommendation and even opposed the trade? Perhaps the answer is that approval of a public trade would have enabled the administration to yield with dignity ("for the sake of allies upon their request") but opposition would not have blocked a secret deal.[93]

War seemed near. Shortly after midnight, Kennedy sent special messages to Adenauer and de Gaulle: "The situation is clearly growing more tense and if satisfactory responses are not received from the other side in forty-eight hours, the situation is likely to enter a progressively military phase."[94] The hedged implication: invasion of Cuba on Tuesday. Adenauer loyally supported Kennedy, but de Gaulle, having retreated into privacy until the French voters cast their ballots, refused to see the American ambassador. Even with war near, the French leader, ever disdainful, would not modify his ways and thus reinforced, at least for himself, his sense of olympian superiority.[95]

What neither the NATO delegates nor the United States's chief European allies could know was that Kennedy was still mulling over a trade. Toward the close of the Saturday night meeting, according to the minutes, the attorney general

[91] "Summary Record, ExComm, No. 9, Oct. 27, 1962, 9:00 P.M."

[92] Rusk (drafted by Bundy and U.A. Johnson) to Finletter (with copies to U.S. ambassadors to all NATO nations), 28 October 1962, NSF, JFKL.

[93] Finletter to Secretary of State, Polto 512, 28 October 1962, NSF, JFKL.

[94] President to Bohlen, 28 October 1962, and President to Dowling, 28 October 1962, VP Security File: Cuba, folder VI, LBJL.

[95] Bohlen to Secretary of State, Nos. 1975 and 1976, 28 October 1962, VP Security File: Cuba, folder VI, LBJL.

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summarized the strategy: "We would . . . hold off one more day a decision on accepting the Turkish/Cuban missile trade offer of the Soviets."[96] Then what? Was there any significance that the taker of minutes had not cast the matter in the negative: We will delay on *rejecting* the offer?

So far, this discussion has omitted one important set of events that evening: Robert Kennedy's secret meeting with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, at 7:45 P.M., before the evening session of the ExComm. Acting on the instructions of the president and Secretary Rusk, the attorney general invited Dobrynin to a private meeting at the Justice Department. Two points seem reasonably clear: the attorney general delivered both a virtual ultimatum and a loose private promise. According to his memoir, the ultimatum was: "if the [Soviets] did not remove those [missiles], we would remove them."[97] And in response to Dobrynin's question about America's withdrawing the Jupiters from Turkey, according to Robert Kennedy's secret memorandum and confirmed by his memoir: "there could be no quid pro quo—no deal of this kind could be made [on removal of the Jupiters]. It was up to NATO to make the decision. I said it was completely impossible for NATO to take such a step under the present threatening position. . . . If some time elapsed—and per . . . instructions—I said I was sure that these matters could be resolved satisfactorily."[98]

To frighten the Soviets, the attorney general may have dramatized the pressures on the president to invade Cuba. According to Khrushchev's first memoir in 1970, the meeting with Dobrynin, based on the ambassador's report, went, in Khrushchev's own words, "something like this: Robert Kennedy looked exhausted [and said], 'The President is in a grave situation, and he does not know how to get out of it. We are under very severe stress. In fact we are under pressure from our military to use force against Cuba. . . . an irreversible chain of events could occur against his will.'" And, still according to Khrushchev, the attorney general also warned: "If the situation continues much longer, the President is not sure that the military will not overthrow him and seize power."[99]

[96] "Summary Record, ExComm, No. 9, Oct. 27, 1962, 9:00 P.M."

[97] Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, pp. 107–08.

[98] Robert Kennedy to Dean Rusk, 30 October 1962, quoted in Schlesinger, *Robert F. Kennedy*, p. 522; and Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, 108–09; compare, O'Donnell and Powers, *"Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye,"* pp. 337–39. Robert Kennedy actually implied removal also of the thirty missiles from Italy (Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, p. 109).

[99] Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, trans. Strobe Talbott (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1970), pp. 497–98; compare, idem., *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, trans. Strobe Talbott (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1974), pp. 509–14. Also see Anatoly Gromyko, "U.S. Manipulations Leading to Cuban Missile Crisis," in *USSR International Affairs* (FBIS) (7 September 1971): G6–7. Gromyko's article, which originally appeared in *Voprosy Istorii* [Problems of history] 8 (August 1971), cites *Thirteen Days* as the source but calls Kennedy's agreement to remove the Jupiters from Turkey and Italy "a specific promise." Khrushchev makes the same claim (*The Last Testament*, p. 512), as does Anatoly Gromyko, "The Caribbean Crisis," in *Mezhdunarodnye konflikty* [International conflicts], eds. V.V. Zhurkin and Ye. M. Primakov (Moscow: Institute of World Economics and International Relations and the Institute of USA Studies, 1972), pp. 70–95. (This is available in translation from the Joint Publications Research which is published by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technical Services, Washington, D.C.)

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Probably this last theme (fear of military overthrow) was Khrushchev's or Dobrynin's embroidery, or perhaps one or the other misunderstood why Kennedy felt under pressure from the military to act.[100] This theme, published well after the end of the crisis, also had another advantage: It allowed Khrushchev to present himself as a man of peace—a leader who had rescued Kennedy from his bellicose generals and admirals—and thus to obscure his acquiescence in response to a virtual ultimatum.

What if the Soviets Had Not Yielded?

After Robert Kennedy delivered his virtual ultimatum and loose pledge, painful questions lingered for the Kennedy brothers that Saturday night and through the dawn of Sunday: Would Khrushchev and his associates accept this hedged, private offer (of future withdrawal of Jupiters) when the Soviets had demanded a firm public pledge?

For the Soviets, as the Kennedys understood, there were difficult questions: Why should the Soviets rely upon Kennedy's and NATO's future approval? Turkey had opposed withdrawal in the past. Why not again? Would the United States coerce Turkish officials if they were recalcitrant? Moreover, since the main value of the removal of the Jupiters for the Soviets was symbolic, what would be the value of this private, hedged promise? Would it give Khrushchev even a small victory in the Soviet hierarchy? Certainly, it could not help him save face internationally, since no one would know of the deal. Publicly, he was still confronting a clear American demand: back down and face public humiliation; or delay, have Cuba attacked and Soviet soldiers killed, and then back down or escalate. Ultimately, the choices were retreat or escalation.

What would Kennedy have done in Khrushchev's place? Critics of the missile crisis have stressed JFK's fears of an electoral and bureaucratic backlash and also his own lust for combat and victory.[101] In view of these needs and pressures, would he have backed down on Sunday, October 28, or at any time, if their roles had been reversed? Probably not. Did he expect Khrushchev to do so? In his memoir, Robert Kennedy states: "The President was not optimistic nor was I. [We had] a hope, not an expectation [that Khrushchev would retreat]."[102]

If Khrushchev had not retreated, what would the president have done? A few of the memoirists, Robert Kennedy included, have asserted that the United States would soon have attacked Cuba.[103] Can the memoirists be trusted on

[100] For disconcerting evidence suggesting that the president *might* have had fears, see Fay, *Pleasure of His Company*, pp. 189–90.

[101] Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis"; and Steel, "End Game."

[102] Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, p. 109.

[103] Ibid. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 830; compare, Sorensen, *Kennedy*, pp. 715–16. Alexander George, "The Cuban Missile Crisis," in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, Alexander George et al. (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 126–31, doubts that the president would have attacked Cuba without first trying other tactics. Chayes, *Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 100, leans in this direction.

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such a matter? Or were they reaffirming credibility after the fact to prove the president's (and possibly their own) toughness? After all, Robert Kennedy, after his meeting with Dobrynin, had summarized the administration's position late Saturday night: Delay a decision one more day *on accepting* the Turkish-Cuba missile deal. Does that frail evidence indicate that President Kennedy would have offered a *public* pledge in order to avoid the attack?

Such a pledge would have been painful for him. It might have denied him the appearance of victory and even confirmed that the Soviet deployment was analagous to the installation of the missiles in Turkey. Would that have made the quarantine of Cuba appear reckless? Perhaps. Certainly the hawks, especially in the Pentagon and CIA, would have been embittered.[104] They would have tried to thwart his future foreign policy. The Republican party would have condemned him for "selling out" United States and NATO interests.[105] His party might have suffered a sharp setback in the November congressional elections. That electoral defeat would have imperiled his foreign policy and further emboldened the hawks in the bureaucracy.

The United States's—and Kennedy's—international prestige and credibility would have been somewhat weakened, at least briefly, even though some NATO governments would have endorsed the settlement. Kennedy could have blunted some of the criticism at home and abroad by encouraging European allies to support the trade publicly. He might have called upon Latin American powers for similar assistance. There were also other ways of shoring up that prestige and credibility: for example, a public announcement a few days or weeks later that a Polaris submarine would replace the Jupiters. That act would not have violated the agreement with Khrushchev, but it might have punctured charges that Kennedy had made a great concession. In fact, in April 1963, when the administration quietly withdrew the Jupiters from Turkey,[106] it did send a Polaris submarine to the area.

[104] See Hilsman, letter, *New York Review of Books*, 9 May 1979, pp. 36–37.

[105] *New York Times*, 28 October 1962, p. 24; Sorensen, "G.O.P. Charges that," 28 October 1962, Box 41, Sorensen Papers. On later Soviet-American difficulties, see Bernstein, "Kennedy and Ending the Missile Crisis: Bombers, Inspection, and the No Invasion Pledge," *Foreign Service Journal* 56 (July 1979):8–12.

[106] McNamara to President, 25 April 1963, POF 115, JFKL, informed Kennedy that "the last Jupiter missile came down yesterday" and that it would be flown out at the end of the week. On the administration's earlier (October 29) commitment to removal, see Chayes, *Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 98, n. 52.

On October 29, the State Department informed Ambassadors Hare and Finletter that they could assure embassies that "no 'deal' of any kind was made involving Turkey" (Rusk to Embassy, Ankara and Paris, 29 October 1962, NSF, RSF: NATO-Weapons, JFKL). In 1963, McNamara told the House Appropriations Committee, "without any qualifications whatsoever there was absolutely no deal, as it might be called, between the Soviet Union and the United States regarding the removal of the Jupiter weapons from either Italy or Turkey" (U.S., Department of Defense, *Appropriations for 1964*, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, pt. I, 57).

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Still, the unanswerable questions linger: What would Kennedy have done? Would he have risked appearing weak? Was he strong and brave enough? Could he have escaped the "credibility trap"? Or would he have succumbed to the expectations of voters, to the needs of his party and the foreign policy he hoped to pursue, and to the demands of hawks in the bureaucracy? How free did he feel to choose the path of public concession?*

* The author expresses his gratitude to Alexander George for his criticism and counsel and to the Stanford University Arms Control and Disarmament Program for assistance.

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Book Reviews

The Price of Defense: A New Strategy for Military Spending *by The Boston Study Group. New York, Times Books, 1979. 359 pp. $15.00.*

This book aims to assess the nation's military capabilities and defense budget needs, matters of wide concern as the SALT ratification debate focuses attention on the state of our defenses. These six well- and diversely educated Bostonians apply to the issues of national security what J. William Fulbright tells us is "first-rate research and profound civilian thinking" (p. xi), and conclude that the nation should spend a great deal less, rather than a little bit more, for its defense.

One would expect so ambitious a book to face the serious issues that underlie the SALT II debate. Most of these have to do with the problem of Soviet power. What, for example, should we make of the size and structure of Soviet strategic forces? How do these forces relate to Soviet military doctrine? Are recent Soviet ventures in Africa symptomatic of growing Soviet aggressiveness, or do the Soviets simply want to establish themselves as equal, in some gross sense, to the United States? Are they trying to rewrite the rules of the international game, or do the Soviets simply want to be accepted as members of the club?

Unfortunately, the book does not so much face these issues as gloss over them. The reader learns early on that there is "little or no military significance" to the capabilities of Soviet strategic forces, since "there is no . . . foreseeable threat to the 5,000 independently targetable nuclear warheads based on U.S. strategic submarines" (p. 41). Whether or not Soviet forces yield political dividends is not discussed. On the assumption that "mutually assured destruction" remains the only viable nuclear strategy, the authors would slash U.S. strategic forces, concentrating most of what remains in missile-carrying submarines.

The authors dismiss evidence of a Soviet conventional build-up as "alarmist claims" based on "limited, simplistic, and partial numerical comparisons" (p. 39). To be sure, the Soviets are modernizing their forces, but so are we. The Soviet Union remains, they assure us, the world's "second greatest military power" (p. 35). They recommend major

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cuts in U.S. conventional forces and their withdrawal from most bases outside the United States except Europe.

The United States remains not only the world's foremost military power, but apparently its military problem child as well. The authors recommend sharp cuts in the size of U.S. conventional forces, for example, in part because the existence of such forces constitutes "a serious temptation" to intervene, as the nation did in Vietnam over a decade ago (p. 179). Similarly, they would reduce sharply investment in research and development because the products of such investment serve as "temptations to enter into spirals of unsafe technological escalation" (p. 232). On the assumption that the United States has been the driving force behind technological advance in weaponry, the authors argue that we now have "the opportunity to encourage the Soviet Union to follow a reasonable example" by cutting our forces unilaterally (p. 47).

This is not so much analysis as ideology. These were assumptions common in the late 1960s. They at least were plausible then, when the United States was unquestionably the world's foremost military power and was involved for no compelling reason in a senseless war in Vietnam. They were comforting assumptions, too, for they suggested that, were the United States only to clean its own house, the world would be peaceful and safe.

These assumptions have become increasingly difficult to maintain, however, in the face of Soviet activities in the 1970s, activities that raise troubling questions about Soviet intentions and goals. The meaning of these activities can certainly be debated. But glossing over the real issues with superficial analysis, or, worse, branding those who raise them "alarmists" whose arguments are "grossly exaggerated and often based on limited analyses and data" (p. 46) leaves the important questions standing.

Whether or not the defense budget is adequate or inflated remains an issue worth debating, of course, and concerned citizens should be engaged in that debate alongside senators and professional defense analysts. This particular group of concerned citizens, however, has missed its chance. By accepting uncritically the rhetoric of the 1960s and ignoring or at best slighting the troubling events of the 1970s, the Boston Study Group has produced a book that has litttle to say about the nation's security in the 1980s.

THOMAS L. MCNAUGHER
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Nuclear Arms in the Third World: U.S. Policy Dilemma *by Ernest W. Lefever. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1979. 154 pp. Cloth, $9.95; paper, $3.95.*

The subject of nuclear proliferation has received considerable attention in recent years as more states acquire the technical base to create their own nuclear weapons. This little monograph by a former senior fellow at the Brookings Institution adds only marginally to the material already available in this field. The bulk of the book reviews the nuclear potential of nine countries: India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Egypt, South Korea, Taiwan,

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Brazil, and Argentina and thus duplicates to a large extent material found in a book like *Nuclear Proliferation and the Near-Nuclear Countries* edited by Onkar Marwah and Ann Schulz.

Lefever organizes these chapters essentially around a brief discussion of the country's present nuclear status, including its technological base, which is followed by a political analysis, admittedly imprecise, of the incentives for the country to go nuclear. He concludes with a discussion of the most likely future policies of the country in the light of both technical and political considerations. The speculative nature of much of this discussion limits its usefulness and, as in the case of the "Shah's Iran," events in the real world can quickly make it irrelevant.

As frustrating as these chapters are, they are at least more interesting and useful than the two concluding ones that discuss possible U.S. policy options toward emerging nuclear nations. It will surprise no one to learn that "the U.S. response to nuclear development in a particular state may be supportive, punitive, or passive, or a combination" (p. 121). Although the author indicates that he realizes the United States has only a limited capacity to affect the behavior of other states (p. 122), much of his concluding discussion in chapter 7 suggests that the United States can in fact play a dominant role in this field if it so desires. The three options open to the United States are: to reduce the incentive to go nuclear by providing U.S. security guarantees, to encourage nuclear abstinence by promoting international agreements, and to deny technical information to threshold states (p. 122). Of the three the first is the one that has been least seriously examined because of the post-Vietnam malaise in this country, and yet it is, in the opinion of the author, "the simplest and most effective way to deter a nuclear attack and to enhance the security of a state" (p. 124). For the author the effectiveness of this American nuclear umbrella is demonstrated by the fact that "the Soviet Union has never launched a direct attack of any kind against any state having a U.S. mutual defense treaty or agreement" (p. 124). While such a statement is true, it might also be noted that since World War II the Soviets have not launched a direct attack against any state beyond the confines of the iron curtain.

After devoting a whole chapter to urging the United States to play a much more active role in international affairs to help impede the spread of nuclear weapons, the author opens the final chapter with this observation: "Even in those cases where a militarily significant force is developed, the net effect of nuclear acquisition could be stabilizing, tending more to deter conflict than to provoke it" (p. 136). If "an increase in number [of nuclear states] does not necessarily increase the probability of nuclear war" (p. 136), why have we been urged to increase substantially security commitments, military pacts, military aid, and even the number of troops stationed abroad (p. 134)? Unfortunately, the author does not clarify this point but spends the rest of the chapter offering fatuous advice. For instance, "American policies . . . must be adapted to meet the particular requirements of each situation" (p. 137). "The range and intensity of U.S. measures designed to deal with unwanted new forces should be geared to circumstances" (p. 138). "Once a force exists . . . the United States should undertake efforts to encourage the adoption of responsible command and control measures over the force" (p. 144).

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A policymaker looking for guidance will have to look elsewhere, and an analyst looking for provocative new ideas will not not find them here. For a Brookings study this book is a disappointment.

PHILIP W. DYER
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Crisis Resolution: Presidential Decision Making in the Mayaguez and Korean Confrontations *by Richard G. Head, Frisco W. Short, and Robert C. McFarlane. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1979. 323 pp. $20.00.*

This is much like two books under one cover. The first is a survey of the enormous postwar literature on the management of international crises. The authors guide the reader through different academic approaches to the study of foreign-policy crises—such as the rational-analytic, decision-making, and social-psychological models—and include in-depth descriptions of the crisis decision-making process within the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Departments of State and Defense. Their examination of the American military's crisis command, control, and communications system is especially useful.

The rest of the book consists of case studies of two international incidents during the Ford administration: the seizure of the S.S. *Mayaguez* by Cambodian troops on 12 May 1975; and the killing of two U.S. army officers by North Korean soldiers in the DMZ on 18 August 1976. The authors are correct to stress the subjective nature of an international crisis; if the statesman believes that an event is a crisis, then it is a crisis. And yet the fact that the murder of the American officers in the DMZ does not even merit a single sentence in President Gerald Ford's autobiography suggests that the Korean DMZ "crisis" was of less than compelling significance.

These two case studies do, however, point to an interesting insight: For the statesman, crises are not simply dangers that one seeks to avoid, but are also opportunities that one can exploit. In the past, American policymakers have sought to resolve crises in a manner that both ended the current dangers of military conflict and aided future deterrence by demonstrating American military credibility. In the *Mayaguez* and Korean DMZ crises, however, the dangers of inaction were less than the opportunities for action, the potential losses less than the perceived future gains. In this sense, both incidents should be seen largely as a low-risk way of demonstrating American resolve and perhaps not as genuine crises at all.

The authors are clearly enamored with the "crisis as opportunity" approach: "The view that crises are undesirable neglects their positive aspects" (p. 2). The authors argue that those who believe that the American bombing of the Cambodian mainland was unnecessary "tend to deny either the existence or the validity of the US objective of demonstrating resolve to international allies and adversaries" (p. 256). This is not true. One can both accept that the successful resolution of a crisis can enhance the American reputation as a military power and question whether this was actually a result in the two events studied.

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Who was really impressed by American military actions in these two crises? The authors uncritically state that the retaking of the S.S. *Mayaguez* "demonstrated a strategic resolve worthy of a great power" (p. 148) and that the local military alert after the DMZ killings proved "US will, resolve and capability" and "served a long-term foreign policy interest" (p. 214). And yet, they offer no evidence that our allies were impressed by these displays of power. A far more revealing point can be found in Gerald Ford's ironic description of his meeting with Dutch Prime Minister Johannes den Uyl on the night the American forces recaptured the *Mayaguez*.

> During the dinner with den Uyl, I was totally preoccupied and on several occasions I had to leave the table and step out to the usher's office to talk to Brent (Scowcroft) by phone and find out what was being done. Den Uyl seemed irritated that I wasn't giving him my full attention. . . . Decisive action would reassure our allies and bluntly warn our adversaries that the US was not a helpless giant. This effort, if successful, would benefit not only the United States but the Netherlands as well. Den Uyl's inability to understand that annoyed the hell out of me (from Gerald R. Ford, *A Time to Heal* [New York: Harper & Row, 1979], p. 282).

If not all American allies were impressed, were American adversaries? Here, the answer must be that we simply do not know. It is certainly possible that the use of American military force deterred potential enemies from instigating similar crises, but once again the authors make rather extreme assumptions that they fail to prove.

Who was impressed by these displays of American military muscle? First, the president was clearly impressed by the attack on the Cambodians. As he told the authors: "Although we were successful in the evacuation of Phnom Penh and Saigon, it was sort of a subdued feeling that we had accomplished something in those two instances, but to have an affirmative action go right, gave me a great sense of confidence" (p. 253). Perhaps this should not be surprising, if one desires confidence one can find it easily. Second, the authors were impressed to the point of contradicting themselves. On the one hand, they state that, unknown to Washington, the Cambodian authorities released the *Mayaguez* crew at approximately 6:20 A.M. on May 15, although the empty ship was not boarded by American troops until 7:25 A.M. and the bombing of the mainland was not underway until 7:45 A.M. On the other hand, they argue that "the substantive international outcome was the forced submission—or compellence—of the Cambodians to release the crew" (p. 256).

Lastly, it appears that the American public may have been impressed with these two demonstrations of American military power. After most modern international crises—the Cuban missile crisis, the U-2 incident, and even the Bay of Pigs disaster—presidential performance ratings improved in the polls. President Ford's popularity rose after the *Mayaguez* and Korean DMZ incidents, although as always it is impossible to attribute the increase directly to the crisis. This leaves one with a paradoxical final impression. It may be reassuring to remember that the American people will stand behind the president in times of international crisis. But it may be equally disheartening to note that, to paraphrase H.L. Mencken, no one ever lost votes by underestimating the aggressiveness of the American public.

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The Politics of National Security *by Marcus G. Raskin. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1979. 204 pp. $5.95.*

Marcus G. Raskin's purpose in this slender volume is not to examine defense and security politics in the orthodox sense (that is, the making of defense policy). Rather, Raskin seeks to analyze the "national security state," which he defines as "a conglomerate of great corporations, police and military agencies, and technical and labor elites" connected to defense production and war preparation (p. 34). His basic thesis is that the basic aim of this amorphous system is controlling the American political system and hence the American citizenry and promoting the American "empire," by which he means American corporate economic interests overseas.

Raskin's tone and message are reminiscent of the somewhat Marxist, somewhat populist New Left literature of the late 1960s. Raskin sees the national security state as a kind of conspiracy that seeks to oppress the legitimate democratic process and that only the demise of this Byzantine system can allow individual expression and rights to flower. As he puts it, "A peaceful democracy for American society is only possible by ending the American empire and discarding the concept of national security which buttresses that empire" (p. 143). While he has no specific blueprint for bringing about that transformation, he sees the rise of movements as diverse as the civil and women's rights groups and the antinuclear lobby as hopeful signs of Americans rejecting the values of the national security state.

To make and argue his case, Raskin adopts an analytic and writing style that is more polemic than scholarly. He selects evidence that is congenial to his thesis and interprets events within the framework of that thesis, citing sources sympathetic to his viewpoint and ignoring sources offering different perspectives. The real foundation of the national security state is nuclear weaponry, he argues, because these weapons "defined the need for secrecy and the potentiality of world hegemony and influence" (p. 108). These weapons were developed "without concern for the decaying moral effects such weaponry had on the society" (p. 50), he asserts, and the United States stockpiled "over 40,000 nuclear weapons" at one point (p. 153). These controversial assertions are made without reference to any other authority than the author himself.

In addition, the author is given to sweeping statements and hyperbole. Of official reaction to the civil rights movement he says, "There was no recognition by the police agencies that the struggles . . . were for natural and human rights," because the authorities realized "that their own activities would have to come under strict scrutiny and finally be dismantled in favor of local neighborhood and community police" (p. 97). The political value system underlying the national security state is described as a "Procrustean bed of antileftist conformist ideology" (p. 83).

As the above examples are intended to illustrate, Raskin has a tendency to overstate his case. The national security state is blamed for a vast number of ills, but beyond the definition quoted above, the reader is never told exactly who composes the conspiracy or in any detailed way how it has operated in specific instances. Occasionally, Raskin gives the reader a glimpse of principals or entities who help make up this complex by anecdotally mentioning a David Rockefeller or an IBM, but no detailed, systematic profile emerges.

All of the proceeding is intended to say that this book is not traditional scholarship,

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and the reader looking for careful, measured and well-documented arguments will be disappointed by it. Rather, it comes across as a polemic intended to reinforce those who already believe in its basic premise. If one did not believe in that thesis in advance, reading this work is unlikely to result in conversion.

DONALD M. SNOW
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The Future of United States Naval Power *by James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1979. 248 pp. $15.00.*

About eighteen months ago, *Time* magazine emblazoned its cover with a picture of a large aircraft carrier, across which ran the words "Attack on the Navy." The *Time* story (8 May 1978) dealt with the major budgetary cuts that the administration planned for an embattled U.S. Navy, whose problems also included coping with growing Soviet naval capabilities as its own force level declined. The debate over the navy's future structure has not abated since then. While the navy's force levels currently are rising, projections for the mid-1980s are extremely pessimistic, given recent budgetary allotments to shipbuilding and other naval procurement. At the same time, the Soviet Union, seemingly unfettered by budgetary constraints, continues to launch modern units off its building ways, including, for the first time, a class of small aircraft carriers.

It is in the context of this ongoing debate that James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver have produced a thought-provoking volume entitled, appropriately, *The Future of United States Naval Power*. The authors argue that considerations about missions must be placed in a context that is wider than that implied by the systems analyst's preoccupation with costs and effectiveness. In their view, a key, perhaps *the* key, navy mission is a political one, namely, projecting the image, and at times the firepower, of U.S. military power overseas through permanent or periodic deployments of carrier and marine amphibious forces. Nathan and Oliver, therefore, examine the evolving domestic and international order in which all U.S. foreign policy must function. They argue that domestic factors, including both congressional and public uncertainty about desired levels of U.S. military activity overseas and appropriations to support such activity, may limit the effectiveness of naval forces in future crises. Additional constraints stem from the growth of a multipolar world in which even small states have access to inexpensive precision-guided munitions. The authors' point is a telling one: Navy posture statements pay lip service to the international environment and overall U.S. strategy and commitments, but rarely reflect changes in either strategy or commitments.

Nevertheless, the navy rightly argues that *wartime* missions should determine the size and composition of the fleet. Unfortunately, the authors devoted relatively few pages to these missions. Navy proponents of maintaining the status quo might, therefore, assert that Nathan and Oliver's analysis is beside the point, since peacetime requirements—or constraints—ultimately do not determine the shape of a force geared primarily to fighting a worldwide war with the Soviet Union.

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Several recent studies have indeed questioned the validity of the navy's wartime missions, and the authors might well have tried their hand at elaborating a critique of their own. Elements of that critique appear in disparate parts of the book: the development of precision-guided munitions (pp. 114–119); the vulnerability of the large carrier (pp. 50–51); the growth of Soviet maritime capabilities (pp. 93–101); the true meaning of "sea control" (pp. 47–48, 82); and the critical role of "the long war" to navy thinking at a time when planners increasingly believe that any war would be of short duration (pp. 35, 87–88). Nevertheless, Nathan and Oliver's observations provide a useful supplement to the critiques already in print; they make it difficult for proponents of "more of the same" to call forth new peacetime demands to offset what may be obsolescent rationales concerning wartime.

There are numerous minor errors throughout the volume. These include reference to the CVV (new class of smaller, conventionally powered aircraft carriers) as a V/STOL (vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft) ship which might carry the F-18 (p. 61) (it actually is a small conventional flattop vessel capable of launching the navy's largest shipborne aircraft); the statement that nuclear power has been adapted to "propulsion sensor technology" (p. 9) (there is no such technology); and reference to Title VIII for an all-nuclear navy as part of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1975, when in fact it was part of the Authorization Bill of 1975 (p. 6).

More generally, the authors did not successfully consolidate their discussion of recent navy policies and missions in their chapter entitled "The Official View" (pp. 40–63). Their rather brief discussion of Admiral Zumwalt's "hi-lo" mix concept appears much later in the book (pp. 141–143, 150); nor is there much reference to Admiral Rickover's highly influential nuclear navy concept, which likewise is only summarily assessed elsewhere (pp. 5–6, 157, 192). Similarly, their discussion of navy strategy does not note the growing criticism of navy missions that involve attacks on the Soviet homeland.

Finally, like all studies that address events that are as yet unfolding, *The Future of United States Naval Power* includes assertions based on 1977 materials that have already been disproved. For example, the statement that Congress is opposed to procurement of "lo-mix" ships (pp. 154–155) collapses in the face of congressionally approved procurement of over thirty "lo-mix" frigates, as part of the fiscal years 1977 to 1980 budgets.

These and similar errors detract somewhat from the book's overall authoritativeness. Nevertheless, this study will be of value to students of public policy and international affairs who may be unfamiliar with the navy's important place in U.S. foreign policy and overseas posture. Equally as important, the book will be worthwhile reading for defense analysts who, in their search for optimum cost-effectiveness solutions, tend to overlook the political context in which naval forces must operate.

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The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA *by Thomas Powers. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1979. 393 pp. $12.95.*

Thomas Powers has written an ambitious, thoughtful, but uneven historical survey of the CIA and of Richard Helms's CIA career. Based on extensive research into accessible primary and secondary sources supplemented by interviews with CIA officials, this is the best published book on the subject. For the nonspecialist, it is a useful, comprehensive survey. For the specialist, however, it is decidedly deficient, owing to its limited use of primary sources and its interpretive biases.

Powers's major thesis is that cold war imperatives and executive directives led to the expansion of the CIA's role and the agency's involvement in questionable activities. The CIA, Powers argues, was an executive agency, responsive to presidential demands, and not, in Senator Frank Church's phrasing, a "rogue elephant" making major policy decisions independent of presidential knowledge or authorization. Powers, however, does not convincingly substantiate this implicit refutation of the Church committee's findings. Powers's own research, moreover, supports a "rogue elephant" interpretation. For example, responding to a Drew Pearson column, in March 1967 President Johnson demanded a report on the CIA's role in assassination attempts against Castro and in the assassinations of Trujillo and Diem. In his report, Helms did not advise the president of the CIA's efforts to assassinate Lumumba—after all, Johnson had not specifically requested this information—and that CIA assassination efforts against Castro continued until 1965 (including during Johnson's presidency). Helms's report on Castro stopped at 1963. Furthermore, after delivering his oral report to Johnson, Helms ordered the destruction of all written and interview records used by CIA staff to prepare his report.

Powers's thesis is not vulnerable because of this singular example—which nonetheless raises questions about CIA accountability. More important, this study either fails to discuss, or discusses sketchily, a host of CIA programs: the agency's efforts to assassinate Lumumba; its mail cover-intercept programs, drug programs, domestic surveillance programs; and its role in the abortive effort to secure President Nixon's authorization for the so-called Huston Plan. Excepting the planning of the Lumumba assassination, these programs suggest CIA insubordination and independence. The nature of the recordkeeping on the Lumumba assassination, moreover, underscores why the Church committee concluded that President Eisenhower had authorized this action but that President Kennedy might not have authorized the Castro assassination efforts.

The Lumumba episode, moreover, highlights one of problems confronting the researcher of CIA activities—the intentional incompleteness of the written record. The CIA's drug program highlights another aspect—the intentional destruction of written records, such as those that were destroyed in January 1973 when Helms directed his secretary to destroy the tapes of all his office and telephone conversations (after having received a Senate request to preserve all CIA records pertaining to the Watergate Affair). Does this necessarily mean, then, that the written record is incomplete and thus that CIA activities can only be reconstructed through interviews with CIA officials, which served as Powers's method? Interviews are notoriously self-serving, particularly when involving formerly secretive and sensitive activities. The option that Powers did not pursue and that limits the value of his otherwise thoroughly researched study was to exploit the Free-

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dom of Information Act or the mandatory review provisions of executive orders to secure relevant National Security Council and CIA documents. Thus, whereas in 1975 in a congressional testimony former CIA Director Colby characterized as limited the CIA drug programs, noting that a fuller reconstruction could not be provided because relevant documents had been destroyed, additional documents were in fact uncovered in 1977 as the result of a legal suit invoking the Freedom of Information Act—and these confirmed that the CIA drug program was more extensive and abusive than Colby's 1975 description.

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Theory of International Politics *by Kenneth N. Waltz. Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1979. 251 pp. $7.95.*

Professor Waltz has given us a tightly written, tightly reasoned book, elaborating a systems-theory approach to international politics. Two chapters (2 and 3) on "reductionist" and systemic theories appeared earlier in the author's 1975 essay, "Theory of International Relations" (*Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 8, *International Politics*). Waltz has expanded these somewhat. The essential arguments of two other chapters (1 and 6) also appeared in the 1975 essay. The reader must presume that the justification for publishing this book must then be either the more convenient format of a separate paperback or the additional arguments offered in the expanded first six chapters and in the new chapters at the book's end. However, the arguments of these last chapters—that interdependence is low in the current state system and that a bipolar system is more stable than a multipolar system—do not need the preceding chapters. Waltz leads his reader through brilliant demolitions of reductionist theories (Hobson's, Lenin's, and Galtung's theories of imperialism) and through the overly severe criticisms of the not so systemic (according to Waltz) systems theories of Kaplan, Hoffmann, and Rosecrance. He also gives his own conceptions of a systems theory (distilled on pp. 88–101). These are important: it will help us look at the world, and a systems theory, somewhat differently—and more fruitfully. However, while the preliminaries are important in their own right, and the author uses the ideas to defend his balance of power approach to world politics, they are neither used nor necessary for Waltz's last three chapters (although he asserts otherwise). Moreover, the last chapters are disappointing, because the repeated claims Professor Waltz makes for systems theory are not substantiated. We cannot say that, given the author's theory, *it follows* that a system of two great powers is more stable (and the states more secure and less economically interdependent) than in a system of many great powers. It is plausible perhaps—but still debatable—that such is indeed the case. Systems theory simply does not help the theses all that much, except analogically; and economic theories of the firm and markets are more important analogically than systems theory in Waltz's arguments.

For Waltz, "structure" is the basis of a correct and useful systemic approach to international politics; and structure is to be defined by an ordering principle, by the specification

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of the functions of differentiated units, and by the distribution of capabilities across units (pp. 100–101). Waltz argues that only two types of structure (anarchic and hierarchical) are needed to describe all types of societies, including the international political state system (pp. 114–116). The important subject of state-system transformation becomes a study (it seems) of changes from only anarchic to hierarchical orders, and vice versa. (The author seems to use the words "structure" and "system" interchangeably: "To move from an anarchic to a hierarchic realm is to move from one system to another" [p. 100].) Thus, a change of structure is a change of system. Yet, he also suggests otherwise: "Changes in this distribution [of capabilities across units] are changes of system whether the system be an anarchic or a hierarchic one" (p. 101). And thus, system change for one particular structure seems to be contemplated. Further, the author seems to take the position that the state system has only one structure: anarchic (as he defines it). Are other structures excluded? Is the only other possible structure "hierarchical"? The answer seems to be in the affirmative to both questions. Yet, how interesting is it to say that the state system is anarchic and has always been (since 1800? 1500?). Is there no allowance for the study of changes in the state system over the centuries? Can there be a systems theory that addresses itself to the important matter of state-system transformation, a theory that accepts the existence of more than one (or two) state-system structures? If a theory of international politics is possible at all, it must account for the impact of social, economic, and political changes on the relations of states.

Thus, while clarifying the "systems approach," Professor Waltz fails to make a case for the explanatory and predictive usefulness of his theory, beyond the bases it provides for a balance of power theory. In an effort to avoid "reductionism" in his sense—where "the whole is understood by knowing the attributes and the interactions of its parts" (p. 18)—the author becomes ostensibly a reductionist within the more common meaning of the word: reducing the complex phenomena of world politics to overly simple terms.

ROBERT F. RANDLE
Columbia University

In Defense of Decadent Europe *by Raymond Aron. South Bend, Ind., Regnery/Gateway, Inc., 1979. 297 pp. $14.95.*

The surprising title needs immediate explanation. Raymond Aron tells us in the forward that he almost chose *In Defense of Liberal Europe*. Decadent, thus, should be read in quotes for it refers with irony to the Marxist view of democratic societies. Much of this book raises fundamental questions about the nature of Communist and Western societies, and therein lie both its strengths and weaknesses.

Raymond Aron needs little introduction. A man of many disciplines—sociology, history, politics, economics, and strategy—he will leave a remarkable intellectual heritage from his writings as a scholar and journalist. As Stanley Hoffmann, one of his greatest admirers, has written, Aron is a descendant of the Philosophes of the Enlighten-

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ment, and his intellectual godfathers are Montesquieu and Tocqueville. This book continues in that tradition, sweeping in its scope, erudite without being pedantic, and relentless in its search for the explanation of the broad forces in contemporary society.

Yet, curiously, this is also a somewhat dated book. Written in 1976 (and published in France in 1977) it is imbued with a need to demonstrate the superiority of Western ideology and reality over that of the East. Aron surely was influenced by the critical upcoming legislative elections of March 1978 in which the Communists and socialists, united in their "Programme Commun," were seen as having a good chance of coming to power. As such this work is also a sophisticated political tract, far superior, it might be added, to any counterparts in the Anglo-Saxon countries. But it is also much more.

The opening part of the book consists of a learned discussion of the appeal of Marxism and a refutation of the "ideocracy" through which it has been applied in the Soviet system. Marxism's appeal has been stronger in France than elsewhere in the West, but even in that country the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the more recent testimony of Solzhenitsyn have left their marks. The "nouveaux philosophes" such as Andre Glucksmann and Bernard-Henri Levy, who caught the public imagination shortly after this book was originally published, appear to owe much to Aron's penetrating analysis. Their essentially conservative views indicate the extent to which the French intelligentsia has moved beyond the "leftist" ideology of the first postwar quarter century. Outside of France, moreover, the Western publics have still longer been disillusioned with Marxist ideology, so that Aron's dissection of it, though brilliant, will appear to some as unnecessary.

Turning to a "liberal" Europe in part two, Aron sees its strength in the productive efficiency of the modern industrial society. The personal freedom to be found in the West is also praised as essential to progress. The problems of the Third World, and particularly the gap between rich and poor, can only be ameliorated by the West. Some will dispute Aron's almost complete espousal of "pure" capitalism; it may not be as efficient in dealing with the economic and social ills to be found within the West as he believes it to be; and beyond, in the Third World, it may lack the ideological appeal needed to rally the allegiance of the impoverished masses. But events have proven Aron correct in predicting the limited attractiveness of the West European Communist parties; he neither believed that the formal links between the French Communists or socialists could survive or that the Italian and French Communist parties had much in common on which to build a Eurocommunist alliance.

The most lasting analysis is to be found in the final third of the volume where Aron deals with the "crisis" of Europe in its economic, political, and cultural dimensions. Although he fully understands the new international situation created by the rise in energy costs and OPEC's power, Aron is optimistic about the ability to deal with it. Placing the "crisis" in a historical perspective, he is much less apocalyptic than has been the fashion in France in recent years. Similarly he sees the university, the military, and the church in France under challenge, but he has confidence in their ability to adapt to change. Yet Aron is too knowledgeable and shrewd an observer not to recognize the self-

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doubt that has seized Western societies in the past decade. That doubt, Aron tells us in this rich and evocative tour d'horizon, eventually will be either creative or prove to be fatal.

ANDREW J. PIERRE
Council on Foreign Relations

Hitler vs. Roosevelt: The Undeclared Naval War *by Thomas A. Bailey and Paul B. Ryan. New York, Free Press, 1979. 303 pp. $12.95.*

For anyone such as myself coming of age shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the years 1938–1941 were both terrifying and bewildering. Nothing was more mystifying than U.S. foreign policy, as tension and danger loomed across two oceans. The president struggled with the Congress, and the public grudgingly emerged from its post-1918 resubmergence in deep isolationism. Since the war started in the Pacific, most attention has focused on the diplomatic showdown between Washington and Tokyo. But America's primary concern was Europe and the Atlantic, which had enjoyed strategic priority since 1919. The most baffling aspect of the whole affair was the very limited undeclared naval war between America and Germany that developed in 1941 and yet did not seem to be going anywhere.

The authors argue that this was no accident, that the two protagonists—for very different reasons—wished to avoid an all-out war and were quite successful in their efforts until Japan's blundering attack destroyed this fine balance. Roosevelt's purpose was to make sure that the sinews of war got to Britain and other anti-German forces, whereas Hitler sought to check this flow. As a result, relations were bound to be tense and shooting was inevitable. Yet it remained limited, since Hitler was preoccupied with the Russian front and did not want to repeat the disaster that followed from America's entry into the previous war. Grasping Hitler's forebearance, Roosevelt persisted in pushing his undeclared economic and naval war—with the destroyer deal; lend lease (described as a noncombat declaration of war); the occupations of Greenland, Iceland, and Surinam; various types of military cooperation with the British (in science, intelligence, repairs, and training); revision of the neutrality laws; and above all, naval escorts and convoys to the mid-Atlantic by September 1941.

Until the *Greer* incident that month, U.S. vessels were allowed only to trail and report on German submarines. When FDR manipulated that uncertain affair to justify shooting at submarines, he still kept it limited to defensive action in convoy formation. Nor did he seek to depart from this course when the *Reuben James* went down on October 31 with a loss of 115 of the 160-man crew, since he was by then preoccupied with the Japanese problem. He was still seeking to reduce the effect of submarine warfare without drawing Germany into a full-scale war. Hitler displayed his circumspect attitude in 1941 by ordering U-boats to avoid attacking destroyers—their main antagonists—since these could be American as well as British vessels, following the American transfer of the fifty overage

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ships to Britain in 1940. And the total sum of U.S. vessels hit in the undeclared war were two merchantmen, two destroyers, and one armed tanker. Under international law, the Germans were within their rights to shoot at U.S. vessels endeavoring to protect convoys through combat.

The authors recognize, even highlight, FDR's distortions of history, misinterpretations of law, and dissimulations, but, they argue, all this was for the specific purpose of shoring up Hitler's enemies and, it was hoped, avoiding U.S. involvement in war—in either ocean. They are convinced that FDR not only genuinely sought to avoid a major involvement but also was certain that Congress would not support a declaration of war. They justify his deviousness on the grounds that truly vital interests were at stake; since his purposes were limited, the authors conclude that FDR was acting constitutionally within his authority as commander in chief.

Questions for our time leap to mind—controlled escalation, constitutional questions, the public's desire for security with limited risk, and above all the unwillingness of a divided Congress to move decisively even on a controlled path until driven by events. By probing deeply into this facet of the events of 1941, through interviews as well as examination of the documents, the authors demonstrated how complex certain crises can be and how national leaders continually strive to limit their risks and keep their options open.

FRED GREENE
Williams College

International Trade Policy by F.V. Meyer. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1978. 234 pp. $19.95.

This dull title hides a provocative but muddled essay on structural change in world trade. Two closely related themes stand out. First, Professor Meyer stresses America's crucial role in reorganizing trade after World War II and in sustaining its liberality through the 1950s and 1960s. Although this conclusion is strictly conventional, Meyer's argument is not. He is less interested in the United States's economic size and military prowess than in the character of its industrial production. "An assessment of international trade policies," he observes, "must take account of the structure of the trading countries' industries" (p. 13). Consequently, he is more concerned with the intensity of U.S. research and development than with the hegemonial basis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system. The result might be termed "supply-side political economy."

Meyer's focus on research and development expenditures is connected to his second theme: the changing character of import and export markets. Here he draws on the growing literature in economics dealing with intra-industry trade, a literature that concentrates on the increasing similarity between manufactured imports and exports in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) economies. One of his basic arguments, first developed by Gary Hufbauer and John Chilas, is that intra-industry trade is favored by the GATT's across-the-boards (linear) tariff reductions. The

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GATT's contracting parties are more likely to cut tariffs, according to this argument, when they believe their import-competing industries can develop specialized exports to offset production lost to foreign competition.

Regrettably, Meyer's discussion of these topics is deeply flawed. Neither rigorous nor systematic, it gives sketchy treatment to basic theoretical problems and glosses over serious evidential questions. In addition, far too little effort is made to test the propositions or develop alternative hypotheses.

Still, the argument is intriguing. Meyer presents some evidence to show that research intensity is correlated with intra-industry trade, and he further suggests that intra-industry trade is central to postwar liberal trade. Indeed, he links American trade leadership to the high U.S. rate of research and development expenditures (with their potential for intra-industry trade) in the postwar economy. And he convincingly shows the vital role of the United States in the GATT system. Similarly, he develops challenging ideas relating the world trading system to several key features of modern industrial production: qualitative (nonprice) competition in oligopolistic markets, production with increasing returns to scale (due to longer production runs rather than to larger plant size), and in some industries the rapid obsolescence of both products and production processes. In each case, Meyer tries to show how these facets of industrial organization undergird liberal trade.

Yet the results are far from satisfactory, theoretically and empirically, and the writing is unfortunately turgid and opaque. In spite of these defects, *International Trade Policy* contains several thought-provoking ideas about the complex relationship between national industrial structure and international commerce.

CHARLES LIPSON
University of Chicago

Domestic Affairs: American Programs and Priorities *by James H. Duffy. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1978. 309 pp. $10.95.*

It used to be fashionable to say, "If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the problem," or words to that effect. That slogan, simpleminded though it may have been, is nevertheless applicable to James H. Duffy's study of domestic affairs. The book begins by promising to offer solutions to the problems currently facing American liberalism; the book ends, in my view, by failing to offer such solutions, thereby demonstrating just how serious those problems are.

The first pillar on which liberalism has rested since the era of Franklin Roosevelt has been a belief in strong presidential leadership. One might have supposed that in the late 1970s a reformulation of the liberal agenda would have taken into account the critique of the "imperial presidency." But Duffy simply asserts that one of the "unhappier legacies" of Vietnam and Watergate "has been the ever-increasing popularity of the notion that Presidential power is inherently bad" (p. 201). Predictably, Duffy is critical of Dwight Eisenhower, whose "innate small-town conservatism always seemed to hold him back

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from exercising Presidential leadership in advancing social programs" (p. 174), and of Gerald Ford, who brought a "sense of negativism to the White House" (p. 178). Just as predictably, Duffy commends Harry Truman and John F. Kennedy; their approaches "had lasting value, for their stated positions served to educate the public and to stimulate discussion and a focusing of the various economic and social issues addressed" (p. 189). Lyndon Johnson's "achievements will provide the basis for a truly 'great society' at the hands of a President bold enough, wise enough, and progressive enough to utilize the Great Society lessons and experience in fashioning a new social program" (p. 195). Americans, Duffy concludes, have "no alternative but to look to the President and the Executive Branch as the prime instruments for progress and social change in this country" (p. 202).

And what form should progress and social change take? A second pillar of liberalism has been a conviction that underprivileged groups could be aided through high levels of federal spending in such fields as health care, education, and welfare. Again, one might have thought that developments in the late 1970s—especially runaway inflation, a taxpayers' revolt against expensive government programs, and the recognition that such programs often create new problems as quickly as they solve old ones—would have led to a reconsideration of liberal premises. Duffy at one point acknowledges this difficulty: "Our economy is not going to grow at a rate adequate to produce a dividend big enough to finance the cost of an extensive range of social programs" (p. 14). Yet when it comes to rearranging liberal priorities the author simply offers a laundry list of desirable objectives: full employment, lower rates of inflation, improved health care, energy conservation, welfare reform, environmental protection, and racial justice.

The question, of course, is how to accomplish all of this. Rejecting the view "that our economic and social problems are intractable and insoluble" (p. 23), Duffy is under some obligation to explain why his objectives are compatible and how a political consensus can be forged from a welter of competing interest groups. On a general level, though, he offers only platitudes—exhortations to use power "openly" and "intelligently" (as if anyone had proposed using it secretly and stupidly), or to make a "genuine, honest and sustained commitment to planning and efficiency" (p. 225) (as if anyone had proposed making a fraudulent commitment to inefficiency). When it comes to specific prescriptions, Duffy favors full employment but also wants to restrain inflation. How? "As a matter of first principles, the President should be unafraid of announcing that he will have no hesitation in imposing wage and price controls. . . . No one can be sure that such an announcement would work, but knowing that the President does not have ideological or tactical hangups about imposing controls may just contribute sufficient incentive for adherence to voluntary guidelines" (p. 248). Of such stuff may dreams be made, but not a liberal agenda for the next decade.

RICHARD POLENBERG
Cornell University

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Nutrition and National Policy *edited by Beverly Winikoff. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1978. 580 pp. $27.50*

The problem of hunger is usually not a problem of insufficient amounts of food. Rather, chronic undernutrition and malnutrition arise from a variety of social, economic, and health conditions. This point is expressed repeatedly in this volume edited by Beverly Winikoff. The book contains the papers and edited discussion of a Rockefeller Foundation conference on this topic at Bellagio, Italy, in 1975. Ms. Winikoff, who helped organize the conference and then edited its results, contributes a clear introduction and two concluding chapters which distill most of the observations and conclusions contained in the eleven country case studies and the six thematic papers prepared by economists, political scientists, and nutritionists.

Solutions to nutrition problems will require not only greater efforts, but also more multifaceted and contextually appropriate ones. Aside from the relatively useless insight that nutrition efforts fail because of a lack of "political will" (that is, insufficient priority), the volume offers a number of points of interest to social scientists and health experts. First, the nature of the nutrition "problem" of a country depends upon whether the major constraints to adequate nutrition lie in inappropriate production; failures of market or other distribution systems (most often because the malnourished are too poor to purchase needed food); or in problems of health, education, or sanitation that drain resources and vitiate the potential value of food. Second, relevant policy interventions range from broad indirect ones to narrow direct ones. Broad indirect policy interventions may affect the basic economic structures and principles of distribution of wealth. Cuba and China were cited as societies that effectively lowered malnutrition through broad egalitarian economic measures. Policies based on direct intervention may target specific problems such as children and lactating mothers in poor regions. The Philippines, Panama, and Ghana have attempted such policies. Targeting specific groups is a cheaper, more effective approach theoretically and more likely to be politically acceptable to any elites with stakes in the status quo or who favor incremental change. This approach, however, often fails because implementation is left to those without skills or motivation to carry out crucial steps—such as agricultural extension officers, primary-school teachers, or village leaders. Short of famine conditions nutrition competes unsuccessfully for the time and attention of general purpose government administrators or those with other principal concerns. Moreover, the expense of even small-scale, direct programs grows (as do bureaucratic interests in preserving them) with little economic return unless employment and other macroeconomic policies are geared to take advantage of gains in health and productive capacity that such specific interventions may yield. John Montgomery and John Mellor add particularly helpful analyses to the specific dilemmas and failures that nutrition advocates recite.

This book will interest those who want a better understanding of specific government policies and national programs. National authorities from eleven states review their country's programs—Chile, Colombia, Ghana, Nigeria, Indonesia, Jamaica, Panama, Philippines, Tanzania, the United States, and Zambia. It will also be of interest to those concerned with world food problems, since the focus is not exclusively on the consumption phase of food systems. Unfortunately, many of the country descriptions are prosaic,

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information is not always complete, and several important cases, for example, India and China, are omitted—a vacuum the editor explicitly laments. Readers will be impressed with the humility of nutrition experts, the innovativeness of many nutrition efforts, and the mixture of frustration and dedication that marks the papers and discussion.

Two major theoretical considerations are largely ignored in the volume. First, what the problem of nutrition is—whether it is a distinctive problem (for example, distinct from poverty), a governmental problem, or one best addressed by targeted efforts—is not of serious concern to nutrition experts. In general nutrition advocates want to get on with better, more effective programs; their question—one to which they look to social scientists for answers—is how to improve their resources and the commitment to improved nutrition as a national goal. They *know* it is a serious, distinctive national problem, and one requiring specific government action (though not all action need be labeled "nutrition policy" or controlled by a national nutrition board). The effort envisioned, therefore, is of greater coordination, greater resources, greater success. Unlike Alan Berg's *The Nutrition Factor* this book makes little effort to justify such presumptions. Second, the idea that malnutrition might be an international problem is overlooked. Passing reference is given to the utility of foreign assistance, but no one argues that nutrition problems arise from or their solutions are the responsibility of the international system. Yet most Marxist and dependency analysts and many liberals—those who see the world in transition under the impact of interdependence—would suggest precisely this point. The diagnosis of the causes of malnutrition by such theorists would require significant international action and policies—indeed for the more radical either an end to global domination by industrialized states and their elites or autarkic socialist policies as in Cuba or China. Perhaps if spokesmen from these countries or viewpoints had been at the conference, these broader theoretical concerns would have received more attention. Yet those who work in the conventional nutrition community would probably also have found such concerns fruitless, tedious, and distracting; the main point of this volume is how best to get on with the task of advocacy, effective implementation, and increased understanding of the broad links between nutrition and agriculture, health, sanitation, education, and community organization.

RAYMOND F. HOPKINS
Swarthmore College

On the Making of Americans: Essays in Honor of David Riesman *edited by Herbert J. Gans, Nathan Glazer, Joseph Gusfield, and Christopher Jencks. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979. 350 pp. $25.00.*

Volumes of "essays in honor of" distinguished figures most often present problems, both for the editors and contributors and for the reader. Editors who attempt such works must reconcile the requirements of a fitting tribute to some eminent figure with the need to create a work that has more than purely sentimental significance. This means enlisting the efforts of contributors who share both an esteem for the one being honored and the abili-

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ty to produce something worth reading in its own right. And it means persuading the contributors to choose their subject matter with enough coordination to make the final result something more than a smorgasbord of unrelated offerings. To top it off, the contributions are usually supposed to bear some discernable relation to the lifework of the person being honored. The result can often be an embarrassing fall among several stools which leaves everyone dissatisfied.

Happily, no one need be embarrassed here, for this volume does remarkably well in reconciling these conflicting demands. No doubt the extraordinary qualities of David Riesman himself have given the book a special chance at success. He has, over the years, been such a magnetic colleague and inspiring teacher to so many as to foster many potential contributors, now notable intellectual presences in their own right. The result is a collection that largely does just what such works are supposed to do—that is, to demonstrate the inspiring effect of a senior figure's influence on a diverse and gifted group of admirers.

Like most of Riesman's own work, these essays fall at varying points in the range of specialization between that of academic journals and that of the most thoughtful journalism. Inevitably, some are more satisfying than others. One of the best is Joseph Gusfield's essay, "The Sociological Reality of America," an inquiry into the role of sociology in shaping, as well as analyzing, social "normality." This is speculative writing in the best sense. Another outstanding piece is Herbert Gans's "Symbolic Ethnicity," an argument against the thesis of "third-generation return" to ethnic identification. Less persuasive is Nathan Glazer's "Individualism and Equality in the United States." Ostensibly an excursus on themes from Tocqueville, this piece is both weak in its connections to the Frenchman's work and dubious in its commentary on present-day affairs in America. Note, for example, Glazer's remark, "Today, it is sadly taken for granted by most white males, regardless of training and talent, that their chances of getting jobs in universities, against the competition of governmentally favored minority group members and women, are slim" (p. 138). University appointments are scarce for everybody these days, but if the majority of the few available spots is going to women and minorities, I certainly have not noticed it.

Withal, however, this volume will be satisfying reading for anyone who has enjoyed the work of the man being honored by it. Some of the chapters are polished scholarly statements; others are more vignettes of work in progress. But all are urbane and thoughtful. They leave one feeling as though one had just finished a wide-ranging chat with a particularly learned and civilized colleague—someone like David Riesman.

One sour note: The price of this volume, which the publishers have slyly banished from any appearance on the book itself or the dustjacket, is $25.00. This is simply too much for a book of some 350 pages.

JAMES B. RULE
State University of New York at Stony Brook

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Justice and Reverse Discrimination *by Alan H. Goldman. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1979. 251 pp. Cloth, $16.50; paper, $3.95.*

Fair Game? Inequality and Affirmative Action *by John C. Livingston. San Francisco, Calif., W.H. Freeman and Company, 1979. 281 pp. $12.95.*

The opportunity to review these two books together is something of a happy accident. The two authors, Goldman and Livingston, take very different positions on the issue of affirmative action—not the proverbial "diametrically opposite" positions, but sufficiently different for their books to constitute a kind of debate. Their disciplinary bases are not the same—Goldman is a philosopher and Livingston a political scientist—but they meet head-on, on territory that might be called political philosophy or social philosophy. In their "debate" about affirmative action, Goldman takes a qualified position of support, while Livingston is unequivocally positive. Indeed, it may be that it is only in the context of Livingston's eloquent endorsement of affirmative action that Goldman appears quite negative, and there is some risk, in casting this review as a debate, of putting Goldman's argument in an unfairly negative light.

Two issues have salience in Goldman's argument: fairness to individuals and maximal utility for the society. Fairness to individuals is conceived in rather familiar terms; namely, the selection (whether in admission to institutions of higher education or in hiring) of the individuals who are best qualified according to objective standards. Goldman develops elaborate "rules" according to which the awarding of positions by competence is a just reward for individual effort; it is also most consonant with utility for the society that the best qualified individuals be selected. Although he is aware of the questions that have been raised about the objectivity of criteria of selection, he assures us that "in a truly competitive situation market pressures will militate against the use of irrelevant criteria or credentials" (p. 53). Another quotation reveals Goldman's position more sharply yet: "We want criteria that serve the public interest and toward which an individual can aim his efforts; and these must be applied consistently and with an attempt to guarantee equality of opportunity, so as to give maximum weight to choice and effort. Out of moral considerations, then, and pragmatic ones regarding women and minority-group members as well, we should not consider race or sex as direct qualifications for positions" (p. 56).

Inevitably, Goldman has to deal with the massive fact that injustice has been done to blacks and women through discrimination in the past. Compensation for such discrimination should, therefore, now be made, but only insofar as particular individuals have been unjustly treated should they now be given preference. In this way, such individuals will wind up where they should have been in the first place, and there will be no loss to society in utility or efficiency. (It may be worth noting that Goldman is really concerned only about positions "that call for open-ended degrees of excellence," that is, professional or managerial positions; for other positions, "more random methods of choosing are fairest" [p. 64], and, presumably, even affirmative action or reverse discrimination can do little damage.)

The crucial issue here is whether compensation is owed only to the particular individuals who have been harmed or to the entire groups to which these individuals belong, and Goldman comes down firmly on the side of individuals. Indeed, he worries

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that any effort to compensate entire groups (blacks or women) for the disadvantages to which they have been subjected may lead to unfair treatment of the most able members of those groups, whose achievements will be rendered ambiguous. Basically, however, his concern is for the white male, and to protect the white male from reverse discrimination, he has constructed what he calls the "reversal test": "To identify reverse discrimination, we ask whether a white male with similar qualifications would have been given the position granted to a minority-group member. . . . As a method for rooting out biases in intuitive reactions toward instances of reverse discrimination, it calls upon us to judge whether a white male in similar circumstances [having been discriminated against in the past] would deserve preferential treatment in the context in question" (p. 17).

The sense of a debate between Goldman and Livingston is enhanced by the appearance in both of their books of the notion of a crucial test; not surprisingly, the results the tests produce are strikingly different. Goldman's test is designed, essentially, to prevent reverse discrimination, while Livingston's is designed to insure that affirmative action occurs. (The very emphasis by Goldman on reverse discrimination and by Livingston on affirmative action is revealing: "reverse discrimination" carries with it the negative connotations of direct discrimination, while "affirmative action" explicitly suggests remedies or constructive change.) Here is Livingston's test: "The test of the moral genuineness and the persuasiveness of white arguments against affirmative action is simple: If I were not white, and were in full sympathetic understanding of what it means in this society to be colored, would I find the argument compelling" (p. 33)? Livingston makes the same point when he applies a *cui bono* ("to whose advantage") approach: any policy that does not require whites to give up something is ipso facto not a valid approach to social justice for blacks. Of those who offer such powerful arguments against affirmative action as did Justice Douglas in the *DeFunis* case or, subsequently, the protagonists of Alan Bakke, Livingston says: "But something must be inherently wrong with a proequality argument that reaches a conclusion endorsed by racists. There must be a flaw somewhere in a case that opposes special treatment on the basis of race, but ends up protecting the special advantages of being white in America" (p. 31).

Livingston has two principal targets: one is racial injustice and the other is meritocracy. Insofar as it is possible for a white man to understand what it has meant to be both black and poor in this country, he captures extraordinarily well the situation of blacks in a society where the basic premises of the legal system are implicitly racist and where success implies the repudiation of one's cultural identity. (Livingston does not appreciate the extent to which socially mobile whites also have had to disavow their backgrounds, though there surely is a qualitative difference between the adoption by whites of middle- and upper-class ways of life and the "passing" of blacks.) The chapter on "Color-Blindness and the Constitution" is especially telling. Livingston argues that until the 1930s, the Supreme Court took the position that the Constitution is, in effect, class- and wealth-blind, therewith shoring up the advantages of the rich, and that the Court continues to define the Constitution as color-blind, therewith maintaining the advantages of whites. And he argues, drawing support from Chief Justice Marshall, that the Court became aware that "no Constitution can bind two races unless they 'meet upon terms of social equality'. . . . unless the Fourteenth Amendment permits laws that redress those forms of

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discrimination that mark blacks as inferior members of the social order, whites can have no right to expect blacks to live among them as fellow citizens, bound by civil association through the terms of a constitution" (p. 113).

The kinds of laws that are needed, according to Livingston, involve some sacrifice of the principle of equal opportunity, as Alan Goldman understands and defends it, as well, if need be, of the principle of efficiency. Appropriately, color-conscious laws would accept the need for quotas (without evasive tactics with regard to the differences between quotas and goals) as a remedy for racial imbalance, rather than as compensation for specific past injuries. Livingston quotes effectively from McGeorge Bundy on this issue: "The need for more blacks in the professions relates to what our whole society requires, not just what more blacks deserve." Its purpose, he adds, is "to improve our future, not just to overcome our past" (p. 120).

A large part of Livingston's book goes far beyond the argument for affirmative action and challenges fundamentally the validity of the concept of equal opportunity in a democratic society. Indeed, he is willing to give only the proverbial two cheers for affirmative action because affirmative action presupposes a meritocracy, "a technocratic and bureaucratic social order in which individuals occupy places in a hierarchy of income, status, and power that they have earned exclusively on the basis of their demonstrated individual abilities" (p. 18). The rule of narrowly conceived merit would not be undermined by affirmative action; "purified of its hidden racial bias," the meritocracy would simply incorporate blacks and women. (Livingston is really interested only in blacks.) The society that Livingston would accord three cheers would be based on the value of the natural equality of men, as proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence. He urges, eloquently, that we "choose equality, because the meritocratic world toward which we drift corrupts the democratic moral perspective. It does this by translating differences in particular natural talents into a hierarchy of human worth" (p. 223).

Livingston's vision is a generous one, but in its more extreme form it seems incompatible with the practical demands of contemporary social organization. Goldman's rules for discriminating between intuitive reactions about justice and injustice are useful, in principle, but his conception of justice appears grudging and legalistic—it is not much tempered with self-abnegation, let alone mercy. If they were really debating the best way to achieve social justice, this reviewer would award the victory to Livingston. His profound sense of the conditions of exploitation and dehumanization provides a stronger framework for social remedy than do tests and rules and laws that are, inescapably, vulnerable to suspicion of white male self-interest.

ELINOR G. BARBER
Ford Foundation

The Creation of a Democratic Majority 1928–1936 *by Kristi Andersen. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1979. 160 pp. $13.00.*

Political scientists have developed two models of electoral change, one stemming from the American experience and the other from the European experience. The American model is that of party realignment. This model is essentially temporal in nature. A two-

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party system such as that in the United States is organized around a major axis of conflict that dominates its political life for a generation or so. Eventually new conflicts emerge and displace the old party alignment. The parties either redefine themselves in terms of the new conflict, or new parties emerge to replace the old ones.

The European experience suggests a different model of electoral change. The typical European pattern has been for conflicts to mobilize previously unenfranchised or uncommitted groups behind new political parties or movements. The central principle here is spatial rather than temporal. European political history is depicted as a sequence of mobilizing conflicts (over territorial authority, church-state power, protectionism), each of which expanded the scope of political participation and "filled in" vacancies in the conflict structure. In their well-known essay elaborating the European model of party alignment, Lipset and Rokkan describe the "freezing" of party alternatives once all the major social forces have been mobilized. They argue that most European party systems have been fully mobilized since the 1920s.

Very little has been done to reconcile these two models with a single theory of political behavior. That gap is now filled to a great extent by Andersen's study.

Andersen argues for a mobilization model of political realignment *in the United States*. When a new conflict emerges, as in the 1928–1936 period that constitutes the focus of her monograph, one or the other party (or, conceivably, a new party) finds new sources of support among segments of the population that are "nonimmunized"—that is, relatively indifferent to or uninvolved in the previous system of conflict. Her analysis demonstrates that the supply of "nonimmunized citizens" in the U.S. electorate of the 1930s was adequate for the consolidation of a new Democratic majority: recently enfranchised women; immigrants and the children of immigrants; habitual nonvoters; and a younger generation for whom the conflicts of the 1890s and the party loyalties stemming from them had lost salience (chap. 3).

Andersen presents her theory of mobilization as an alternative to the "conventional" hypothesis of conversion. Previous realignment theorists had depended almost exclusively on aggregate data. Those data showed that groups previously loyal to one party "switched sides" during the realignment period and subsequently gave preponderant support to the other party. The *implication* of such a shift is that many individual members of these realigning groups switched allegiance from one party to the other—that is, converted. In fact, the conversion hypothesis has been more nearly an assumption than a strongly argued theory, and Andersen is somewhat hard pressed to find a good antagonist.

Andersen finds that very few urban workers, for example, switched from Republican to Democrat in the 1930s. Instead, the Democrats mobilized large numbers of urban workers who had weak or nonexistent party loyalties and who had never before participated in politics. The net result was to change the loyalty of the urban working class as a group from Republican to Democratic, but not by converting individual Republicans to Democrats. The aggregate voting statistics tend to obscure this underlying pattern of change, especially since most analyses have been based on the partisan division of the vote rather than on the partisan preferences of the total available electorate (including nonvoters).

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The author remedies this fault in the literature in two ways. First, she undertakes a reanalysis of the aggregate data using figures for nonparticipants (nonregistered citizens, nonvoters) as well as for voters. That analysis convincingly demonstrates that most of the Democratic gains in heavily working-class and immigrant areas came about through a sharp attenuation in the number of nonparticipants. Republican support stayed fairly constant during the realignment period.

Second, Andersen carries out an ingenious reconstruction of party identification during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s by using data amalgamated from surveys conducted in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. The device she depends on for this exercise is the respondents' memories of their own previous partisanship and voting behavior and their recollections of the party loyalties of their parents. She is well aware of the methodological problems involved in using such data; she raises the pertinent objections and deals with them quite sensibly (see especially pp. 57–60 and pp. 75–78). In the end, she is able to show that less than one-quarter of the total Democratic gain from the pre-New Deal to the New Deal generation came about through conversion (Republican parents to Democratic children). More than three-quarters of the gain was due to "mobilization," from uncommitted or apolitical parents to predominantly Democratic children (pp. 78–82).

Andersen's quantitative analysis is innovative and skillful. The historical sections are unfortunately a bit cursory (chapters 3 and 6), and one could not read this book without some prior knowledge of the literature on realignment. This work is valuable, first, for its impressive methodological dexterity. It should be required reading in all introductory quantitative methods courses in order to convince skeptical students that real knowledge can be gained through careful quantitative work. The book also makes an important theoretical contribution in identifying mobilization as the common behavioral mechanism underlying both American and European models of electoral change. Andersen discusses the broader applicability of the mobilization concept in her (too brief) conclusion. I find her specific definition of realignment (p. 122) a bit too constraining. But there is no doubt that her findings will have a substantial impact on all future theory building in this area.

WILLIAM SCHNEIDER
Hoover Institution

The Senate Nobody Knows *by Bernard Asbell. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1978. 466 pp. $10.00.*

Senator *by Elizabeth Drew. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1979. 191 pp. $8.95.*

These two books are remarkably similar in method, intent, and in some of their conclusions. Both are eminently readable; either could contribute greatly to the general public's understanding of the United States Senate. But there the similarities end. Drew's book is an enjoyable evening's reading that offers the knowledgeable reader some useful, but

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limited, insights into the Senate. Asbell's less publicized volume is an outstanding effort that deserves to be read carefully by every person who would like to understand how Congress looks from the inside.

Asbell's and Drew's common method appears on the surface to be simplicity itself. Each chose to follow a respected senator for a limited period of time. Both convey their impressions in the form of a diary written in the present tense. In each case, the subject was manager of a controversial piece of environmental legislation at the time of the study. In both, therefore, the diaries may be seen as something between conventional case studies of individual bills and "slice of life" portraits of individual legislators on randomly chosen days. What both of them give us is a look at how two people manage the conflicting chores of guiding a bill through the Senate while simultaneously pressing for floor amendments on other bills, voting on still others, meeting with lobbyists and staff on all of these, and traveling back and forth between Washington and the home constituency.

The subjects of both books are liberal Democrats: John Culver of Iowa for Drew and Edmund Muskie of Maine for Asbell. Muskie's relative seniority put him in charge of one important committee (Budget) and two subcommittees (the Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution, and the Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations). Culver, still in his first term, chaired no full committees but headed one subcommittee each on the Environment and Public Works, Judiciary, and Armed Services Committees. His position as a junior member sitting on top of these three bodies illustrates an important truth about the modern Senate: any member of the majority party and most members of the minority party have ample forums to put their own stamp on public policy if they choose to do so, and if they marshall their resources wisely.

The similarities between Muskie and Culver revealed by Drew and Asbell go well beyond institutional labels. The two senators have similar views about what it takes to be an effective leader in the Senate—detailed knowledge, respect of one's colleagues, and careful selection of the issues. They implement their views successfully on controversial amendments to the Clean Air Act (Muskie) and the Endangered Species Act (Culver). Both statutes were caught in crossfires between "public interest" and industry lobbyists, and both senators came out in favor of a modest "weakening" of the existing laws to preserve their essential purposes in the face of real dangers that they might be gutted. In both cases the senators resisted the almost entirely negative lobbying campaigns on both sides of the issue and constructed, after much effort and with great skill, precarious bipartisan majorities behind their politically exposed positions in the middle. In the course of both of these "case studies," Drew and Asbell give us a great deal of material about the way lobbyists function and the way members resist the lobbyists to construct coalitions behind positions they feel comfortable supporting on the merits. Asbell's book is by far the stronger on the role of subcommittee and committee deliberation; Drew's account of Culver's floor tactics is an unrivaled masterpiece of its genre.

As they move away from the piece of legislation central to each of their accounts, Drew and Asbell again leave us with many similar impressions. Both show us by example, without pontificating, how the workload of the Senate pulls their respective subjects

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in more directions than any one person can follow. Both show us the importance of staff, although Drew does so even in spite of herself: she states that Culver is in command of what he is doing, while showing that he is not up to speed on the bill he is managing until the day before floor debate, when all of the key details have already been compromised by his staff and the senator is looking for arguments to support decisions already ratified.

So much for the similarities. The key differences between the two books are reflected by their titles. Drew tells us that by watching Culver, "one could get a picture . . . of what one Senator actually does, and also the workings of the Senate" (p. 12). Despite this, her book is essentially a portrait of one person; Asbell does a far superior job of portraying the institution. The bulk of Drew's book seems to be composed of her own interviews of and travels with the senator. Virtually everything presented is as seen through Culver's eyes. That leads to a highly sensitive and useful portrait of Culver in Iowa, but it creates problems in Washington.

Drew's accounts of the positions taken by senators who disagreed with Culver are given entirely from his not very charitable or understanding perspective, while the roles of lobbyists and staff are presented solely from their direct conversations with Culver. Asbell, in contrast, devotes much of his book to reproducing interviews with Muskie's staff, with lobbyists, and with the key senators active on all sides of the Clean Air Act debate. Drew, in other words, takes us to Culver's office and to the Senate galleries; Asbell also takes us to the basement cafeterias and the office building annexes. Drew shows us lobbyists meeting the senator formally; Asbell shows the staff stimulating a corporation interested in the catalytic converter to give money to the Sierra Club and thus help Muskie create counterpressure to the auto industry. Drew, in other words, gives us a vivid portrait of one person painted against a barely sketched background. Asbell fills in the background and thus gives his portrait the sweep of a landscape.

MICHAEL J. MALBIN
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

Congress and the Bureaucracy: A Theory of Influence *by R. Douglas Arnold. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1979. 235 pp. $17.50.*

Executive-legislative relations in the United States have been studied extensively. One dimension of that relationship, congressional influence on bureaucratic decision making, has received more modest attention. Research on congressional oversight of the bureaucracy typically skirts attempts at direct measurement.

In this book, R. Douglas Arnold writes on one dimension of the problem of congressional influence on bureaucratic decision making: the measurement of congressional impact on bureaucratic allocations of federal funds to geographic areas.

In part one, Arnold presents a theory of influence. This effort comprises nearly half of the book. As he proceeds he describes three previously developed theories and finds them wanting. Arnold comments on seven studies that have attempted to test aspects of these theories. He dissects them and finds them seriously flawed. Their characteristic deficiency is in selecting the constituency as the unit of analysis. This procedure, according to Ar-

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nold, does not permit the determination of cause and effect. Arnold prefers a direct focus on bureaucratic decisions.

Bureaucrats will act, Arnold asserts, primarily to protect their budgets and at times to augment them. Serving the public interest is a third but subsidiary goal. All else flows from this starting point.

Bureaucrats who are determined to preserve their level of expenditure devise strategies to that end. The appropriate strategy varies with the dimensions of the situation. Arnold illustrates the utility of his theoretical approach in three case studies: military employment, water and sewer grants, and model cities grants. When defining the situation by issue is inadequate, Arnold subdivides. For example, in his study of military employment, Arnold finds that standing committees in Congress seem influential on decisions to open and close military bases but relatively unimportant in decision making on employment levels.

In his study of water and sewer grants, Arnold adds another amendment to the notion of policy analysis by issue, pointing out that bureaucratic allocation strategies on the same issue changed over time as the strategic situation in Congress altered.

A third useful refinement is to distinguish congressional influence on bureaucratic decision making by the stage of the process. In some policy areas congressional influence is substantial in determining the geographical scope of the program. In making specific allocations of money under these same programs, congressional influence may be less substantial.

Arnold has done a fine job in his efforts at theory building, in his effectively developed case studies, and in his useful critiques of previous research. Moreover, his candor in dealing with the limits of his efforts should be applauded. He seems sensitive to his problems in using ideal types. While he is a forceful advocate of his general approach, he can still see difficulties in a particular section of his analysis: "I am not entirely happy with the following analysis nor do I have complete confidence in the results" (p. 119).

This is an impressive book in design and execution. It yields substantial substantive and methodological benefits. It clarifies considerably, but it also heightens the anxieties of political analysts by confronting them with new dimensions of complexity. One wonders whether to applaud or to cry out in pain. Perhaps a bit of each is the best response.

MORRIS S. OGUL
University of Pittsburgh

The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower *by Elmo Richardson. Lawrence, The Regents Press of Kansas, 1979. 218 pp. $12.00.*

In this volume, the seventh to appear in the American Presidency Series, Elmo Richardson provides an economical summary and analysis of the Eisenhower administration. He has based his reconstruction of the Eisenhower presidency on the more important materials at the Eisenhower Library (notably the Ann Whitman File), the oral histories,

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and the published record. To his credit, the author has given us a careful, nuanced reading of the data.

On the debit side, the scope of the research that underlies this account is narrow—virtually no archives besides the Eisenhower Library were tapped. There results an Oval Office bias. One misses the perspectives accessible in the papers of, for example, Senators Robert Taft and Everett Dirksen. The Democrats, similarly slighted, remain a somewhat shadowy presence in the book.

The author has served up a meat-and-potatoes history of the Eisenhower administration; the soufflé of social history is seldom allowed to distract from this staple fare. On its own terms, *The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower* is a successful survey. Rarely dramatic, it is invariably sober. One might quibble that coverage is skimpy in some areas, notably the 1956 and 1960 elections; on the other hand, the Suez crisis is just one example of a complicated topic which the author has handled well in brief scope. Richardson does not stint on coverage of the second term and thus avoids a shortcoming of some earlier books on Eisenhower.

Richardson's study can be termed revisionist only in the limited sense that it brushes aside the liberals' flippant criticisms of the Eisenhower administration. Instead the author, while he acknowledges their shortcomings, takes Eisenhower's political precepts seriously. Like Gary Reichard, he understands Eisenhower as a conservative; he is not especially swayed by representations of the general as a "modern Republican" or "progressive conservative." By the same token, Richardson is skeptical of those like Murray Kempton who have reassessed Eisenhower as a Machiavellian political genius. His Eisenhower is more obvious than devious.

Though impatient with the tenor of the liberals' breezy belittlement of Eisenhower, Richardson underscores their perspective on some issues, notably civil rights. On the other hand, he shows that Eisenhower's mistrust of the "military-industrial complex" was consistent, long-term, and not merely a speech writer's artifice. In foreign policy, Eisenhower emerges from these pages as a craftsman who took care to shape available means to generally attainable ends. As to whether the ends, as in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, or Lebanon in 1958, were always appropriate, Richardson expresses some doubts. And if Eisenhower managed to avoid excessive short-run risks in his Indochina policy, his perception of long-run consequences was extremely foggy; in retirement he spoke as an uncompromising hawk.

Richardson approvingly terms Eisenhower a "modernist" in his methods of running the executive branch; however, his "traditionalist" approach to congressional relations produced mixed results (p. 41). The tone of the book is temperate throughout, so that the closing criticism comes lightly: for Eisenhower the presidency was "not beyond his reach. By the end of his tenure, however, he had demonstrated that its great storehouse of powers was surely beyond his grasp" (p. 195).

In keeping with the format of the American Presidency Series, documentation is only sparingly provided, an editorial decision that circumscribes the book's usefulness for scholars. The book is also marred by occasional errata: some names are wrong (Frol Kozlov becomes "Fred Koslov"); the second *Brown* decision, Nelson Rockefeller's second

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gubernatorial campaign, and some other events are misdated. Nonetheless, the book offers a valuable introduction to the Eisenhower era.

RICHARD M. FRIED
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

Bureaucratic Politics: Executive Reorganization during the Truman Administration *by William E. Pemberton. Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 1979. 262 pp. $21.00.*

This somewhat expansively titled book is essentially a descriptive chronology of President Truman's efforts to gain congressional approval for his reorganization plans. Within its own terms, the book is comprehensive. It encompasses the two acts granting reorganization authority to the president (in 1945 and 1949), as well as all the specific reorganization proposals submitted to Congress between 1945 and 1952.

All of this is useful information for serious students of the Truman administration, although it does give an artificial feel to events by abstracting reorganization efforts from other developments occurring at the same time. Other political scientists more broadly interested in the presidency may find worthwhile background information on particular issues. For example, in discussions of the present-day legislative veto one needs to recall that it began as a device for enhancing presidential discretion and only during Truman's term began being transformed into a legislature-enhancing process (allowing veto of reorganization plans by one rather than two houses of Congress).

As far as reorganization is concerned, there are lessons here that seem to be forgotten with each new president. Few persons now recall that Harry Truman began his presidency determined to make reorganization and administrative rationalization a centerpiece, indeed the centerpiece, of his first years in office. As Professor Pemberton ably points out, part of this determination derived from his own intellectual convictions. The record of his prepresidential years shows that Harry Truman really did believe the classic doctrines of public administration and progressive good government (for example, group similar functions, place final responsibility in a single executive). But he also believed that reorganization, by transcending partisan divisions and relieving some of the insecurity about his own stature as president, would carry with it major political advantages. Alas, as this chronicle shows, it did not take very long for the president to conclude that the practical costs of such a course usually outweighed any benefits. Truman's greatest personal success came in persuading Congress to pass the 1945 reorganization authority act; yet this success was based in part on misleading key congressmen into thinking major cuts in "big government" would follow. Given congressional memories, it was a heavy price to pay for reorganizations that yielded few tangible results for the president. The author does not quite say so, but after that first year, Truman discovered that he had to be a president, not a manager or reorganizer (no prizes for contemporary analogues).

Unfortunately, as an aid to understanding the presidency the book is generally a disap-

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pointment. Despite its title, there is very little information about what was happening within the executive bureaucracy—the departments, the Bureau of the Budget, and the White House staff. In fact we learn very little about the reorganizers, the backroom boys in the bureau and public-administration community who worked out Truman's proposals (the one reorganization about which the president did seem to have personal concerns was the Employment Service and Labor Department). Nor do we learn anything about what happened in government when a reorganization plan came into effect, an area begging for serious research.

It is possible to study a given problem of the presidency across several administrations and say something interesting about particular trends and constants. Likewise it is often rewarding to study the interaction of a particular problem and other forces within a given administration. Hardest of all is to make sense of one fairly narrow issue within the confines of one administration, clouded as such things are by personalities and unique events. In this book there is little that would put Truman's reorganization experiences into a broader perspective, either of that administration or of reorganization as a continuing presidential problem. The concluding chapter of two-and-one-half pages suggests that there never really was a clear idea of any larger reasons for studying the chronology of Truman's reorganization plans.

What then should a person make of this history? President Truman did a great deal for reorganization. In terms of plans approved by Congress, Truman ranks as the champion reorganizer among modern presidents. But what did reorganization do for the president? As a success story, reorganization during this period can be read as another step toward centralizing excessive discretion in an overpowerful presidency. As a tale of continued frustration for Truman's ambitious goals, his reorganization efforts clearly showed the inertial power of congressional-bureau alliances and, some will say, it is this that eventually led presidents into the aggrandizement of White House staffs. Can one have it both ways? Or perhaps postwar reorganization was not so much a success or failure as it was an act of supreme irrelevance to what was actually going on in government. Thinking about how the current reorganizations may be interpreted thirty years from now, a person might be excused for adopting the latter, somewhat cynical view of the entire enterprise.

HUGH HECLO
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The GAO: The Quest for Accountability in American Government *by Frederick C. Mosher. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1979. 387 pp. Cloth, $24.00; paper, $12.00.*

Cases in Accountability: The Work of the GAO *edited by Erasmus H. Kloman. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1979. 254 pp. Cloth, $15.00; paper, $7.50.*

With Frederick C. Mosher's book the comptroller general of the United States and the General Accounting Office (GAO), which he heads, receive the first comprehensive, scholarly study in forty years. The time gap is astonishing. The GAO is the congressional

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agency that monitors the legality, efficiency, economy, and effectiveness with which executive agencies implement public policies and programs. The comptroller general's reports to Congress—over 800 a year—are a rich, but neglected, resource for scholars and others interested in program evaluation, program implementation, and "why government doesn't work." The neglect is not due to inaccessibility: a subscription to the *Monthly List of GAO Reports* is free for the asking, as are the individual reports.

Mosher's study was commissioned by the National Academy of Public Administration at the request of the current comptroller general. The terms of reference called for an expository, not evaluative, study, and that is what is provided. Mosher has written the definitive history of the GAO, identified the critical issues about the GAO's roles and its capabilities, and furnished the information that readers need to arrive at judgments on these issues. The result is a fine book, informed by Mosher's rich understanding of administrative organizations and the governmental system. Its defect is that it is the book that was planned, one that deprives readers of the author's own assessments of the GAO.

Two-thirds of the text is a history of the GAO from 1921, when it began, to 1978. These chapters provide a fascinating study of organizational development. Of primary significance have been *formal prescriptions* (the comptroller general has a fifteen-year term and is removable only by joint resolution of Congress or by impeachment), *autonomy* (two-thirds of GAO's workload is on studies initiated within the GAO, only one-third on studies requested by Congress, its committees, and individual members), *skills and values dominant in the professional staff* (which has changed from all lawyers to virtually all accountants to the present mix of accountants and members of other disciplines), and *variable responsiveness to the external environment.*

Four comptrollers general account for fifty-three of the fifty-eight years of the office's existence. The transformations over time are striking. J. R. McCarl (1921–1936) established a pattern that persisted to 1945. The emphases were on agencies' precise legal compliance, a professional staff of lawyers, and audit of every executive expenditure voucher by clerks, inverted Micawbers eagerly waiting for something to turn down. In what Mosher terms the second GAO (1945–1965), Lindsay Warren (1940–1954) effected "one of the most dramatic changes in American administrative history" (p. 125). He largely abandoned the audit of individual vouchers, shifting emphasis to GAO appraisal and guidance of agencies' financial-accounting and general-management systems; Joseph Campbell (1954–1965), on the other hand, abandoned Warren's accounting-system thrust and transferred resources to the critical study of defense contracts. Of greatest import for the future, Warren heavily recruited accountants. The result is that, though the GAO's studies (still called "audits") now focus substantially on appraising programs' effectiveness in achieving policy objectives, the current "chiefs and deputy chiefs of most of the offices and divisions started with credentials in accountancy, . . . the majority of whom were initially appointed to the GAO in the years from 1945 to 1955" (p. 124).

Elmer B. Staats, whose term runs from 1966 to 1981, has effected the second revolution. The new priority became the evaluation of program results. This absorbs nearly half of the GAO's audit resources, while audits of legal compliance and financial operations, the earlier priorities, take only 10 percent. A new recruitment policy has yielded a professional staff 40 percent of whose members are from disciplines other than accountancy.

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Staats has brought the GAO to its highest point of prestige (though, of course, Mosher could not say so), preserving its reputation for nonpartisanship, objectivity, and thoroughness, while expanding services to Congress, absorbing new legislatively assigned responsibilities, and broadening public awareness of its findings about executive performance and program effectiveness.

The last third of the book thoughtfully examines the issues confronting the GAO, especially in its relations with Congress and the executive branch. The GAO's elaborate internal and external reviews of draft reports delay issuance of final reports, often beyond the time of Congress's need. Staff characteristics—the dominance of accountants and the limited subject-matter specialization—affect not only what the GAO inquiries look for and highlight but also whether the studies demonstrate to the agencies a deep or superficial understanding of the program areas reported on. This part of the book contains some gems of analysis. Among these are a clarification of the comptroller general's independent powers of an executive and judicial character; a persuasive contrast of the GAO and "public" auditing firms; an original analysis of changes in the pattern of federal operations and expenditures—"only about 15 percent of federal spending is directed to activities that the federal government performs itself" (p. 297); and, closely related, a masterful exploration of the puzzle of how, and how far, to enforce accountability by outside users of federal funds (state and local governments, contractors, universities, and international organizations).

The companion volume, edited by Erasmus H. Kloman, is a set of twenty-eight brief case studies that illustrate well the variety of GAO projects. The accounts, mostly prepared by GAO staff members, are descriptive, not evaluative. The attention accorded both internal GAO procedures and the problems of access to information in the executive branch narrows the audience for the book. Most cases, however, are followed by a series of questions that alert readers to issues of GAO's role and performance. And the key questions for GAO—What should the GAO be doing? and what should it not be doing?—are clearly posed by cases on GAO inquiries into the seizure of the S.S. *Mayaguez*, the president's National Energy Plan, the Clinch River Fast Breeder Reactor, and New York City's fiscal crisis.

JAMES W. FESLER
Yale University

Can Organizations Change? Environmental Protection, Citizen Participation, and the Corps of Engineers *by Daniel A. Mazmanian and Jeanne Nienaber. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1979. 220 pp. Cloth, $11.95; paper, $4.95*

For years the Army Corps of Engineers was well-known for its ability to build dams, dredge harbors, and extract funds from Congress. In the late 1960s the corps and other federal agencies came under attack for their lack of concern with environmental issues and the minimal citizen access to their decision-making processes. Mazmanian and

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Nienaber have written an interesting study of the corps's subsequent efforts to change in response to these outside pressures.

The authors convincingly document a significant amount of organizational change in the corps. During the early 1970s the leadership of the agency sought to increase the amount of resources and attention devoted to environmental aspects of its construction projects. New staff trained in nonengineering specialties were hired in many corps district offices. Environmental units were established, as well, to give institutional status to this new concern. Perhaps even more impressive than these adaptations, however, is the degree to which the corps experimented with "open planning" to involve interested citizens in the agency's activities. A variety of innovative techniques were used to incorporate environmentalists, businessmen, farmers, and others in the process by which the unit's projects were selected, designed, and evaluated.

The data used by Mazmanian and Nienaber came from close observation of the organization (one of the authors served as a resident scholar there), interviews with a large number of agency officials around the country, and detailed examinations of five corps efforts to induce citizen participation. (The authors even collected survey responses from hundreds of citizen participants in these projects.) Their description of organizational change is particularly interesting given the extensive amount of literature extant on the difficulties and costs of inducing bureaucracies to alter their ways.

The authors' judgment about the events in the corps is ambivalent. They conclude that the extent of organizational change has been significant, but they also find evidence that the agency is showing signs of retrenchment. They attribute this latter possibility to disillusionment. The corps's leadership had worked for change because of a mistaken belief in a simple version of the participation hypothesis: by allowing involvement on the part of those who express an interest in the corps's projects, the organization would win support even from its former opponents.

The book's strengths are significant. The authors' use of widely varying types of material increases the plausibility of the findings. In addition to its material on organizational change the volume provides excellent examples of such varied issues as intergovernmental relations (p. 145), the assumptions and politics of benefit-cost analysis (pp. 76, 141), goal succession (p. 113), and the value of alternative citizen involvement techniques (pp. 123, 147). Furthermore, the survey data allow Mazmanian and Nienaber to explore an issue of great concern in recent years: the impact of participation on public support for an agency and its programs.

Not all features of this study are satisfying. For instance, the volume is almost totally devoted to a documentation of the changes that occurred in the corps. But the reader is left with very little understanding of how decisions were made to induce the changes or why changes occurred in the corps while so many other agencies remained relatively static under similar outside pressures. The authors present evidence that the extent of change in the unit varied considerably by division but do not really explain the variation. Some of the conclusions which they draw from their use of the survey material may go beyond their evidence. And the general concluding section, in which Mazmanian and Nienaber attempt to generalize "about the potential for change in large public bureaucracies as a whole and the process by which this change occurs" (p. 191), is only

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loosely joined to the information educed in the main body of the text. Nevertheless, the significant contributions of this book justify the attention of those interested in public bureaucracies and their responsiveness.

LAURENCE J. O'TOOLE, JR.
Auburn University

The Office of Management and Budget and the Presidency, 1921–1979 *by Larry Berman. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1979. 180 pp. Cloth, $15.00; paper, $4.95.*

Although the dust jacket promotes this book as "the first comprehensive study of the Office of Management and Budget," the author correctly sets a more modest goal, which we would expect from a book containing 130 pages of text. Berman does not promise an exhaustive history of Office of Management and Budget (OMB—before 1970, the Bureau of the Budget) (p. xi). Instead, he focuses principally on the relationships between presidents and the various budget directors. He discusses organizational changes, internal (self-help) studies, and outside critiques. In what he does cover, Berman is far more thorough and analytical than *The Bureau of the Budget*, authored by Percival Flack Brundage in 1970. Berman skillfully weaves together material from presidential libraries, Budget Bureau files, interviews, and oral histories. The result is an impressive and valuable study of OMB's effort to serve the presidency without becoming politicized by the White House office.

Berman argues that OMB is at its strongest when it supplies objective, nonpartisan advice to the president and operates as a professional institution instead of a personal staff service (p. 130). These distinctions are easier to make on paper than in actual operation. The record seems clear that if a budget director does not share the political goals and values of the president, he will soon be dismissed or bypassed. The history of FDR and his first budget director, Lewis Douglas, illustrates this point well enough, as Berman shows (pp. 8-9).

Even though the Budget Bureau operated as an objective agency under Eisenhower, it did not escape criticism. Berman finds fault with the bureau during this period for being negative, rigid, and committed to a "green eyeshade" mentality. He appears to want an agency that is "flexible," "dynamic," and "positive"—qualities he cites from a 1959 study. Still, Nixon's OMB had these qualities, vague as they are, at the same time that objectivity and professionalism suffered a disastrous decline within the agency. Moreover, the Budget Bureau under Kennedy and Johnson ran into trouble for being too much the activist agency. The agency has a hard time pleasing one party without offending another. At times it is blamed for serving an abstraction called "the presidency" rather than an individual president (p. 93), while at other times it is claimed that the bureau was created "to provide an institutional career staff to the Presidency" (p. 96). Faced with these contradictory and inconsistent challenges, no wonder OMB becomes schizoid.

The book offers very little information on how well OMB has fulfilled its middle initial. Berman discusses a 1971 conference which reviewed its management function (pp.

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114–15), but this occurred only one year after the creation of OMB. Brief reference is made to a symposium by the National Academy of Public Administration in 1976, concerning the managerial role of OMB, and to some management studies initiated by the Carter administration (pp. 115, 128). However, thus far we have a very sketchy understanding of OMB's effectiveness in serving the managerial needs of the president.

With the focus on presidents and budget directors, the book often overlooks other important actors and agencies in the budget process. Berman covers the competition between the Budget Bureau and the Office of War Mobilization (pp. 29–30) and between the Budget Bureau and the Domestic Affairs staff during the Johnson administration (pp. 74–79). Much less is said about the strains that existed with the Treasury Department, the Council of Economic Advisers, and other major departments. Little attention is given to the influence of Congress, especially the Appropriations Committees and party leaders. It would have been valuable to explore the performance of the Estimates Division. Did it defer to some departments more than to others? Did the Defense Department have unique access to the president, circumventing OMB examiners in the review process? These are some of the questions that deserve investigation in future studies.

LOUIS FISHER
Washington, D.C.

Personnel Management and Productivity in City Government *by Selma J. Mushkin and Frank H. Sandifer. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1979. 185 pp. $18.95.*

This is a report of a study of the effect of personnel management on productivity. Eight cities were selected for study; the eight represented a wide variety of city types—by location, size (100,000 to 500,000 population), growth rate, and general revenue per capita.

The research task was not an easy one. The researchers decided to use whatever productivity programs were under way in each of the eight cities, and they ascertained by interview the effect of each of nine components of personnel management on the implementation of the productivity programs: recruitment and selection; classification; compensation; performance appraisal; employee development; promotions, transfers, and terminations; employee-employer relations; collective bargaining; and equal employment opportunity—affirmative action.

After quantifying that which is inherently difficult to quantify, the authors concluded that the personnel practices impeded the productivity programs in 11 percent of the cases, had no effect in 54 percent, and helped in 35 percent; that is, in only one-third of the cases did personnel practices help the city improve productivity. A finer, more detailed analysis leads the authors to the conclusion that one-third of the factors in personnel management were harmful to the productivity programs, the worst ones being such things as the attitude of unions toward productivity, the number of bargaining units, the procedures for changing pay levels, and the procedures for classifying positions properly. The most helpful factors were performance appraisals, employee development, and employee-employer relations.

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Chapter 5 presents conclusions and recommendations. While not dramatic or novel—breakthroughs in Western thought are not likely in this field—the conclusions follow from the survey study, accord with common sense, and cannot be repeated too often. They reinforce familiar maxims such as the need for workers to understand the relation between their performance and their compensation, that workers and managers must understand the performance criteria, that rewards must be tied closely to performance, and that rewards should go only to those who meet the agreed-upon standards.

Purists may comment with disdain that the study was not a scientifically rigorous one, what with nonrandom selection of cities, making do with whatever so-called productivity programs happened to be under way in those cities, and relying on the "perceptional assessment" of city officials involved in the productivity programs. Nevertheless, I consider this study a brick usable for building on an otherwise pretty vacant lot. Aside from a widely referenced article by Savas and Ginsburg ("The Civil Service: A Meritless System?" *The Public Interest*, [Summer 1973]) and some other reports, not enough empirical research has been attempted that looks closely at the actual effect of personnel management practices on government performance. This is a welcome addition to a regrettably barren landscape.

E. S. SAVAS
Columbia Universtiy

Implementation in a Bureaucracy *by Andrew Dunsire. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1979. 260 pp. $22.50.*

Control in a Bureaucracy *by Andrew Dunsire. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1979. 263 pp. $25.00.*

These two studies are far removed from peas-in-a-pod, so this review begins with some broadly orienting comments. Perhaps most helpfully, readers might well begin with pages 219–227 of *Implementation* and pages 220–235 of *Control*. They involve the most positive gain-to-pain ratio. Undoubtedly, also, seasoned readers will find a challenge in *Implementation*. General and introductory readers should find *Control* more accessible, even though (or, perhaps, because) that book's nine summary propositions—for example, "Every office-holder in a bureaucracy has both a superior and subordinate" (p. 221)—seem too facile and unqualified.

Dunsire's analytical approach is exhausting as he strives to be exhaustive. Was all that necessary, or even useful, the reader may ask, to get where the analysis went? Consider chapter 2 of *Implementation*. After fifty-nine tightly packed pages, Dunsire asks: "What can we say we have learnt from this survey of the literature of implementation" (p. 76)? Nothing that justifies the preceding 20,000-plus words, I conclude. Four learnings are proposed (p. 76), and only one (even by generous construction) seems to require, or even much profit from, the fullness of the preceding survey. Three of these learnings could have been stipulated, in fact, with only slight supplements: "much confusion can be avoided by recognizing what is mere semantic entailment and what is not" (p. 76); it

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"might be" that "it is not always wise to try to proceed from simple models to more complex . . . ones" (p. 77); and "policy/action transformation" reflects "two different appreciations of the nature of organisational relationships": one stresses hierarchy and gets portrayed in pyramidal images; and the second implies a "system" whose metaphors relate to "networks" (pp. 78–79). Moreover, the fourth lesson does not satisfy me—that the "implementation literature" includes two distinct subspecies: accounts of the implementation of various laws or decisions, as in case studies; and the "abstract account or ideal type" of what implementation should be (pp. 17, 76). This neglects most empirical inquiry relevant to implementation and control: those bodies of work often called "organization behavior" and "organization development" that diversely relate to implementation through alternative structural arrangements, group properties, organization, and supervisory styles.

Both *Implementation* and *Control* are too much in a stylistic sense. For example, the books contain approximately 2950 inches of copy, excluding front and back materials, and about 280 inches of that total constitute direct quotations which often echo one another or the author's summaries. To a similar overall effect, twenty-eight pages of high-resolution detail in *Implementation* (pp. 90–117) are devoted to a case study, whose bulk gets but few references in subsequent analysis.

The overreliance on distal analogies troubles me as well, not only as to meaning and relevance but also as to relative emphasis. Among other efforts, for example, Dunsire devotes pages 203–19 of *Implementation* to a summary of the popular literature on vertebrate physiology; and pages 209–15 of *Control* deal with bodily homeostasis. Similarly, both books are sprinkled with various schemas or renderings which often obfuscate or even seem to have no clear connection to the text or to man-machine systems, as in the case of the full page devoted to the structure of a diamond crystal (p. 81).

I find seriously deficient what Dunsire sees in *Implementation* as "feasible": "to discuss the analytical structure of administrative processes while 'leaving the people out'—that is, while ignoring the 'human factor'—motivation, interpersonal conflict, group dynamics, and so on" (p. ix). Even Dunsire cannot long live with his exclusion. That is, he soon allows that "I have endeavoured to include in the analysis behavior ascribable to the *official role* . . . and have concentrated on cognitive factors in explanation of behaviour while setting aside the affect component" (p. x). This not only compromises Dunsire's initial exclusion, it muddies what had been clear, even if objectionable.

Both books are rooted in individualistic description and analysis—individualistic in the sense of relying on the idealized person rather than in terms of individual differences between people. Consider only *Implementation* where Dunsire proposes that the "model of human-individual implementation" reflects "the same principles implicit in the bureaucratic implementation model" (p. 213), relying at one point on the analogy of "lifting a hand" to illustrate and understand organizational "willing and acting" (pp. 203–7).

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University of Georgia

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The Business of Organized Crime: A Cosa Nostra Family *by Annelise Graebner Anderson. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1979. 179 pp. $10.95.*

Annelise Graebner Anderson's book adds new fuel to the critique of the conventional view of organized crime in America. An economist by training and an insider at the Justice Department's Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), she has had unusual access to the records of federal agencies, and her book is based on an analysis of records pertaining to one pseudonymous Italian-American crime family in an unidentified large American city (not New York).

Numerous details in Anderson's portrait of the Benguerra family, as she names it, seem to undermine the conventional view, which sees organized crime in terms of a virulent alien ethos that has infected American life: organized crime is equated with the Mafia and depicted as a menacing and elaborately hierarchical national criminal conspiracy. In contrast to this view, the Benguerra family appears to tolerate and even cooperate with non-Italian criminal groups in its city. Moreover, the family appears in danger of dying out. It lacks a younger generation—the median age of its members was sixty in 1969—and Anderson believes that it has declined in size since its birth during Prohibition. Nor are its members doing very well. Only one-third appear to be at least modestly affluent, with annual incomes estimated above $20,000 a year in the late 1960s; 15 percent appear impoverished, with estimated incomes under $5,000 a year; and 40 percent lack any visible income from illegal sources. While the sparse publicly available data about individual Italian-American crime families make it difficult to judge whether the Benguerra family is unusual in these respects, it is clearly not unique. The transcribed conversations of Samuel de Cavalcante make it apparent that in the mid-1960s his New Jersey crime family was very much like the Benguerra family (and details reported in Anderson's book indicate that the two families were not one and the same).

Anderson's analysis of this one crime family weakens the case for the unique potency of Italian-American organized crime and thereby seems to place Cosa Nostra within a broad spectrum of ethnically organized illicit enterprise. Further, her analysis suggests that an ethnic group's involvement in illicit enterprise characterizes a particular stage of its assimilation into American life. Anderson interprets the virtual absence of a younger generation in the Benguerra family as a reflection of the acculturation of third- and fourth-generation Italian-Americans to American values and the opting for legitimate careers by the children of crime family members. As she notes, Daniel Bell's description of crime as a "queer ladder of social mobility" is thereby vindicated.

This book is not without its faults. Especially in its introduction, it displays an occasional partisan loyalty for the conventional view, which is peculiarly at odds with the overall tenor of the book. Anderson derides some of the important critics of the theory of Mafia-ridden organized crime, charging them with seizing upon the "extreme and unqualified statements" of politicians and law enforcement officials and thereby of attacking straw men (p. 12). But some of the same extreme statements have gained academic recognition in the famous book, *Theft of the Nation*, by the criminologist Donald Cressey. To settle the issue, she makes use of an unfortunate device, inviting the reader to

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interpret a few bits of de Cavalcante's conversations. However, the reader's interpretation must depend on which bits are selected, and all uncertainties have been eliminated from these, turning their exchanges into misleadingly unproblematic descriptions of the formal structure of Cosa Nostra.

In fairness to Anderson, the critics have frequently been too hasty in denying specific organizational features of Italian-American crime families. As the published transcripts make clear, for example, these are groups with "made" members (those who have been accepted into the organization); and there is a Commission (although its role is unclear). Nonetheless, Anderson's book is compatible with the spirit of the critical view: namely, that organized crime is an American institution which at any one moment takes on the colorations of those ethnic groups that are passing through on their way to other destinations.

RICHARD D. ALBA
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Before Watergate: Problems of Corruption in American Society *edited by Abraham Eisenstadt, Ari Hoogenboom, and Hans Trefousse. Brooklyn, N.Y., Brooklyn College Press, 1979. 231 pp., $15.00.*

The relationship between these twelve essays, presented originally at the Third Annual Brooklyn College Conference on Society in Change, and Watergate is largely limited to the literal sense of the volume's title: they concern persons or events antedating the national trauma of 1972 through 1974. Indeed, the most modern case study describes the avoidance of corruption by the U.S. Fuel Administration of World War I. The reader wonders whether Tea Pot Dome, munitions profiteering, Internal Revenue Service irregularities in the Truman administration, or Billie Sol Estes are not pertinent to Watergate, by reason of proximity if nothing else.

Arthur Schlesinger's provocative introduction samples theories "of social functions that corruption might serve—a factor in economic equilibrium [Karl Marx], a response to consumer demand [Walter Lippmann], a disapproved path toward an approved goal [Robert K. Merton], an escalator for minorities [Daniel Bell], a facilitator of economic growth, a response to frustrations due to growth [Samuel Huntington]" (p. 3). Linda Levy Peck disputes the powerful argument that corruption served modernization in seventeenth-century England by promoting national integration and governmental centralization. The old aristocratic elites, suggests the author, remained firmly in control of the system of corruption. This further polarized the nation and, moreover, undermined the legitimacy of the ruling class. Several other essays emphasize the losses in governmental legitimacy and the unacceptable concentrations of power and privilege that follow corruption. *Before Watergate* does not systematically reexamine the systemic or individual consequences of corruption; but such an endeavor is needed before we become sanguine about the "social functions" corruption performs.

The study of corruption is hampered by wide differences about definition. Arnold

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Heidenheimer insists that comparative scholarship can proceed only under a narrow definition that emphasizes behavior deviating from formal public duties because of "private-regarding . . . pecuniary or status gains" or violating "rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence" (p. 22). But Edward Pessen applies the label corruption also to "the abuse of power" involving the "subversion of law by powerful men in high office to increase their power" (pp. 80–81). This is closer to the corruption of Watergate; but Pessen argues that it applies to Andrew Jackson as well. Edwin Burrows reminds that Albert Gallatin's attacks on Federalist corruption, which echoed the broader Jeffersonian view, focused on "the method by which one element of a balanced government, usually the . . . executive power, tried to overawe the others and seize complete sovereignty for itself" (p. 60). Corruption, so understood, went well beyond "bribery, graft, pluralism, and the selling of offices" to "standing armies, national debts and patronage" (p. 60). This Jeffersonian definition of corruption denounces the imperial presidency of the modern period. Finally, Morton Keller confounds us further by suggesting that "strong ideological commitments" among the "new class" breed a special modern form of corruption by justifying breaches of public office to provide information or succor to the enemies of the regime or of policy (pp. 14, 15).

Reform does not fare well in *Before Watergate*. Hans Trefousse denounces Carl Schurz's commitment to civil service reform as souring his support for corrupt Reconstruction governments and ultimately diverting him from the vastly more important cause of the freedmen. The end of home rule in the District of Columbia, inspired largely by fear of black political power, was justified as a move to end corruption, which was ironically perpetrated by the district's lily-white public works board appointed by President Grant. Ari Hoogenboom points out that Gilded Age reformers marched back and forth across the political landscape adopting first one reform (for example, municipal home rule) and then its exact opposite (for example, state regulation of municipal affairs). Even general incorporation laws and civil service were only limited bulwarks against corruption. In the end, he argues, nongovernmental forces, "particularly a responsible political opposition and press, remain the essential components of the on-going, never ending process of reform" (p. 140).

It may well be that, despite the paucity of theory and data about corruption, the focus of study should indeed be broadened from the institutional rules against wrongdoing to the political conditions or arrangements that deter it.

DAVID ADAMANY
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Residential Crowding in Urban America *by Mark Baldassare. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979. 250 pp. $12.95.*

This study of residential density and its impact on social patterns and personal attitudes raises many questions that cannot be answered yet, if ever. By formulating the questions in a systematic manner, exposing the theoretical and empirical limitations of current research, and proposing an operational framework for further investigation, however,

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Baldassare has written a highly useful study. His critical review of the literature on residential density and the major themes raised by different approaches is both comprehensive and convincing. His own preference for sociological and psychological explanations of human behavior leads him to adopt an "exchange theory" approach "which posits that people rationally attempt to maximize rewards and minimize costs in their social lives" (p. 29). His primary purpose is to "develop empirically testable hypotheses about the social and psychological impacts of neighborhood density" (p. 203), and he is highly critical of studies that "have placed undue emphasis on biological and environmental determinism" (p. 202).

Summarizing the findings of his own empirical research, Baldassare concludes that there is "little sound evidence for the hypothesized link between residential crowding per se and pathology." The author also stresses "that most people can develop strategies to overcome the effect of residential crowding, and that these effects are basically problems of social overload and lack of needed space" (p. 193). The author also recognizes the explanatory limits of density as an independent variable and wisely states at the outset, "I have the notion that social position and economic status are more significant determinants of well-being than household or neighborhood crowding" (p. 35).

Most of the book is devoted to a detailed presentation of the author's own empirical study of residential density. He feels that contextual analysis is the best available "direct way to study the impact of density on individuals' attitudes and social behaviors in residential settings" (p. 63). He selects two large-scale national surveys as his data base—the 1971 Quality of Life study conducted by the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research, and the Continuous National Survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center between April 1973 and May 1974—and supplements them with 1970 census tract data for each respondent. Throughout, Baldassare makes the crucial distinction between two types of residential crowding: crowding in the primary environment, the home; and crowding in the secondary environment, the neighborhood. Thus, his two independent variables are persons per room (household density) and persons per residential acre (neighborhood density). The dependent variables fall into three broad categories: perceptions and reported levels of satisfaction with the residential environment; quantitative and qualitative aspects of individuals' social relations; and measures of reported well-being. The study also uses selected control variables "to account for extraneous factors through multivariate statistics" (p. 58). These include median tract and individual income, percentage of black population, and renter versus homeowner status. The author also gives a lengthy verbal explanation of the complex statistical procedures he uses, procedures which rely primarily on various regression techniques. The book itself has surprisingly few tables, however, and some readers might prefer an appendix with some of the preliminary data analysis. In addition to providing a thorough explanation of his research design, Baldassare painstakingly details the limitations of the data. Since he is relying on secondary surveys he is forced to make the data fit his variables, and the differences in the questions posed in the two surveys do raise problems of comparability and fit.

The findings of the study are not surprising. Since he is stripping the study of density down to a core hypothesis that can be empirically validated, his findings often confirm what intuitive thinking would lead one to expect. For example, household crowding is

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most common during years of rapid family growth; high person-per-room ratios are associated with more complaints about dissatisfaction with housing (chap. 3) and less positive marital experiences (chap. 4). However, the data did not offer strong support for the effects of crowding on marital satisfaction or parent-child relationships (chap. 4). People who live in larger cities are more likely to live in higher density neighborhoods, and high-density neighborhoods receive more negative evaluations from their residents than less dense neighborhoods (chap. 5). Baldassare also claims that high densities in homes or neighborhoods do not appear to disturb the most important social activities of their residents, and such residents seem to adopt the strategy of "specialized withdrawal" to minimize less-valuable social contacts (chap. 6). He sees this as evidence of "the abilities of human beings to adapt through problem solving and social structure" (p. 188).

One of the most interesting parts of the study is the preliminary exploration of the relationship between high-density neighborhoods and the well-being of subgroups who vary in economic resources, stages of the life cycle, and psychological attributes. His data suggest that certain of these subgroups may be more adversely affected by high-density situations, and he urges further research in this area (chap. 7).

Overall, I think Baldassare comes fairly close to fulfilling his intentions as stated in the preface: "I hope that this book serves the purpose of placing crowding studies in their proper perspective: eliminating myths and misunderstandings, establishing some basic facts, and providing (theoretical and substantive) justifications for future (and redirected) research" (p. xii).

FLORA SELLERS DAVIDSON
Barnard College, Columbia University

The Story of Housing *edited by Gertrude S. Fish. New York, Macmillan Publishing Co., 1979. 550 pp. $15.95.*

People who teach courses in planning, urban affairs, public administration, and local government have been waiting a long time for the appearance of a first-rate text in housing. This is not the volume we have been hoping for. This study is a series of fifteen separately commissioned chapters, including two by the editor. The basic organization is chronological, although there are some odd chapters that do not fit the serial format. One on "Race and Housing," decently done by Jack E. Woods, treats a subject that justifies separate attention. A chapter entirely devoted to "The Secondary Mortgage Market" makes less sense. There is no obvious basis for singling out this narrow topic when there is no separate treatment of the more general subject of housing finance. Presumably its presence is explained by the fact that the book was "sponsored" by the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), which also owns the copyright (a curious fact to which we will return).

A second odd chapter consists of a long memorandum by Miles L. Colean written in 1952 and submitted to the Eisenhower administration. While it has some historical interest, reflecting that period in its policy recommendations, it is hard to see what rationale would justify including the memo in its entirety in a textbook.

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It is not clear that a largely historical approach is the most satisfactory way to organize a general text on housing. I suspect students will find the level of detail and the inherent complexity of the subject baffling, even though most of the contributors have tried to be simple and methodical in their individual presentations. What is missing is an analytic framework and a set of themes which might help make sense of a great quantity of information. The volume is neither a reader nor an integrated text. The latter would have required a firmer hand on the part of the editor and probably fewer contributors. The former might have gained in liveliness what it lost in thoroughness of coverage.

Among the most successful chapters are those by Mary K. Nenno on the 1940s and Donald G. Sullivan on the 1970s. Albert M. Cole, administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency during the Eisenhower years, provides an interesting chapter on that period. But it has to be regarded essentially as a memoir rather than an objective appraisal of the record. The rosy discussion of relocation under the urban renewal program, for example, is self-serving and at variance with most of the serious research on this subject.

The weakest chapter is the one covering 1890–1929 by Steven E. Andrachek. It deals with housing in the Progressive Era without once citing a standard source, Roy Lubove's *The Progressives and the Slums*. It is written in what might be termed the "naive Utopian" style and is desperately in need of editing: "The failure of the United States to pursue social welfare benefits for the general population as opposed to the working population was an error that has yet to be solved" (p. 124). Moreover, Andrachek continues, "As Americans 'reexamined' the social order they had built in the light of 'progressive' and 'liberal' ideals, the traces of Puritanism that had early been ingrained in the social system became evident and were not incompatible with the rise of Social Darwinism and other repressive philosophical systems which justified the suppression of the great mass of people now moving toward the urban-industrial centers" (p. 126).

Despite its obvious shortcomings, Andrachek's chapter is one of the few that at least tries to explore the political economy of housing. A general text ought to pay some attention to the sources of public policy in housing, to try to understand where all the twists and turns described in these 550 pages have come from. Most of the authors subscribe to what Peter Marcuse has called "the Myth of the Benevolent State," which assumes that housing programs actually come from well-intentioned efforts to address housing problems, particularly those of low-income households and neighborhoods. If they have failed, it must be because of lack of knowledge, poor design, or honest error. Widespread adherence to this notion among housing analysts is a continuing sign of our political naivete.

There is something more than vaguely disquieting about a textbook that apparently has been commissioned and financially underwritten by a private corporation, in this case FNMA. How are we to know to what extent the editor and publisher may have deferred in exercising editorial judgment to accommodate the interests of the "sponsor"? Even were the contents better, the volume's ambiguous origins would be reason enough to caution potential purchasers and users.

Robert Kolodny
Columbia University

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The Politics of Faction: Christian Democratic Rule in Italy *by Alan A. Zuckerman. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1979. 251 pp. $18.50.*

Alan Zuckerman has tackled an extremely important though often neglected topic in comparative politics: the role of factions in dominant parties. The case under study is the Christian Democratic party which has ruled Italy since 1945. Zuckerman is interested in how the Demochristians have managed their monopoly of governmental power rather than why they have ruled for such a long time. The contention is that the Christian Democratic party's lack of ideology and commitment to a clear program of public policies has permitted the fruition of a clientelist brand of factional, intraparty politics. "Most DC leaders are political patrons using the control of government positions to further personalist ends" (p. 161). What gives the argument importance is the notion that Christian Democratic clientelism is not an outgrowth of economic underdevelopment but a product of the "abundance of government resources with few limits on their use"(p. 33). Clientelism is defined by Zuckerman as a tie "based on personal loyalty, obligation, and the exchange of unequal goods and services" (p. 16). The party patrons control privileged access to public goods and services while their clients provide the votes necessary to get candidates elected to public office. It follows that one would expect to find clientelism throughout the country and at different points in Italy's postwar political history.

The impressive job that Zuckerman does in laying out his theoretical argument is not supported by an equally convincing use of empirical data. The analysis is highly anecdotal, and significant gaps appear in the author's grasp of national and local events. Evidence for the point that patron-client ties exist throughout the country is drawn from two types of sources. The first source is the anecdotes presented by Luigi Barzini in his book *The Italians* and the findings of four case studies on village communities. Considering that there are 8,100 statistically defined cities (*comuni*) in Italy, a sample of four cannot be considered as representative of Italian local communities. The second source of information used to establish the Italian penchant for personal ties to influence politics is the 1959 Almond and Verba civic culture data. Despite some problems in interpretation, Zuckerman does not seem to be bothered by the fact that the data are twenty-years old. It is doubtful whether in 1959 the issues of divorce, abortion, decentralization, or workers' rights would have rallied a majority of public opinion. More important, there are significant changes in both public and elite opinions when one compares data over a much shorter period of time. Even worse is the author's failure to discuss the origin of factionalism in the Christian Democratic party—that is, the programmatic debates of the 1940s and 1950s that pitted the secretary of the party, Alcide DeGasperi, against the progressively minded Giuseppe Dossetti, the spiritual mentor of almost all of Christian Democracy's "second generation" of leaders. It was this group along with the leftist factions that opened the way to the center-left government in 1963.

An unsystematic use of interviews with party leaders provides the base for the argument that Christian Democratic party factions are clienteles rather than policy-oriented groupings. The reader is told that the leftist *Base* and *Forze Nuove* factions organize their members around national issues but that the others do not. No empirical evidence is presented to support this conclusion. It would have been useful if the author had used answers to systematic policy-oriented questions to judge whether there is indeed a lack of

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coherence in the positions taken by nonleftist factions. Such work has been done by others, but Zuckerman fails to cite the results. The final flaw in the book is the lack of any information about what has been going on in terms of factional politics in the three provinces that the author visited in 1969, 1972, and 1974, and which he uses to illustrate his points about the clientelist nature of factions.

The Milan factions are split not only on national issues but also on local issues that affect the city administration and regional government. Provincial politics as such do not raise enthusiasm among party leaders, not because they agree on all issues, but because the province has very little power. Differences among the factions, however, do emerge at the city and regional levels where the power of local government is substantial. The province of Potenza is no longer a Colombo fiefdom. Angelo Sanza has been successful in organizing the local section of his own *Base* faction. In 1975 there was a full spectrum of seven factions (of the Left, center, and Right) in Potenza, and Colombo was on the defensive in both the province of Potenza as well as in the Basilicata region. Finally, there is less than adequate treatment of the section on the policy implications of factionalism. Zuckerman argues that the instability of Italy's cabinet can be explained exclusively as a by-product of intraparty conflicts without ever doing an analysis of Italy's governmental crises to determine exactly how many were produced by factional strife and how many by interparty conflicts. The result is a book whose theoretical background is highly intriguing but whose analysis of primary and secondary sources of data is very disappointing.

ROBERT LEONARDI
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The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese-American Relations, 1969–1971 *by I. M. Destler, Haruhiro Fukui, and Hideo Sato. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1979. 394 pp. $19.50.*

This is a detailed study of a bitter dispute and negotiation between the United States and Japan involving control over manmade fiber and woolen textile exports from Japan, a dispute that threatened the very essence of the relationship. The book is particularly invaluable in providing insights into the dominant role domestic politics played in handling this dispute in both the United States and Japan. It is also unique as a collaborative effort on the part of the American and Japanese authors who interviewed countless participants to dig out the inside story. Rarely has a negotiation of such major importance been so well documented and so objectively presented. The inadequacies and failures of both the Americans and Japanese are factually related, particularly the failures of the political leadership in both countries to understand the political context of the other side, and the ineptitude of many of the negotiators and their inability to understand the interrelationship of economic and political factors in negotiating textile export controls.

The Textile Wrangle traces the negotiation of import quotas from the early campaign promises of President Nixon to the U.S. textile industry to limit imports, through the Nixon-Sato summit settlement that likewise failed to bring agreement, to the final forced settlement by special negotiator, Ambassador David M. Kennedy. The irreconcilability

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of the extreme positions taken by both sides, under pressure from their respective industries, overriding summit agreements on broad principles is particularly well documented. A variety of compromise efforts collapsed because neither side was willing to confront its industry upon which it was politically dependent. In the end, brute force in the form of a U.S. ultimatum forced an agreement that could satisfy neither side. As the authors note, the ultimate irony was that textile imports from Japan expanded from the 774 million equivalent square yards in 1970 to approximately 1.3 billion in 1971, only to decline after the agreement as Japanese textiles were increasingly priced out of the U.S. market.

The Textile Wrangle is valuable not only as a record of failure on the part of all those most intimately involved, but for the lessons it provides for future U.S.-Japanese economic relations. Unfortunately, the textile dispute is not unique. The same mistakes and lack of understanding recur in U.S.-Japanese economic negotiations. The authors note that their book has "lessons for scholars . . . but it also had direct lessons for Japanese and American officials" (pp. 333-34).

This book should become required reading for any American official, high or low, who is involved in negotiating on economic or other issues with Japan. Perhaps at least some of the mistakes of the past will then be avoided, although the inherent conflicts in the U.S.-Japanese economic relations will remain.

RICHARD L. SNEIDER
Columbia University

The American Movement to Aid Soviet Jews *by William W. Orbach. Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1979. 245 pp. $15.00.*

Although we tend to think of world conflicts in international terms—literally, as disputes between nations—many twentieth-century struggles have had transnational or subnational groups (for example, Armenians, Jews, Palestinians, Kurds) among their principal actors. Thus in the movement to improve the lot of Soviet Jews, the combined effort of American and Soviet Jewry have worked to produce some changes in the Soviet Union's repressive policies. This book, recounting that effort, aims to shed light on how one transnational group, espousing nonviolent tactics, can achieve its goals.

The author presents, in very specific detail, the history of the American Jewish movement on behalf of Soviet Jewry in the last two decades. Despite the breadth of historical material, however, Orbach leaves the impression that he has leaned heavily on a few informants, notably those "activists" in the Soviet Jewry movement who are critical of the slowness of the Jewish organizational "establishment" in addressing the plight of the Soviet Jews. The result is a clear bias and tendency to use worn-out generalizations about the establishment and old stereotypes about individual organizations.

More seriously, the author's useful hypotheses about the operations of such movements, the Soviet Jewry movement in particular, are nearly obscured by the web of detail about organizational meetings, internal squabbles, and personality conflicts. Do the trivia amount to anything? It is hard to know, especially since several minor errors in identifying actors in the drama reduce confidence in the particulars. Moreover, a problem characteristic of case studies plagues this work: repeated shifts between historical chro-

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nology and political analysis are confusing and suggest a failure of discipline, in both senses of the word.

Even when we come to the end of the story, we are left uncertain about what it all means. The seven-page chapter on the effects of the movement does start out with some potentially useful observations: "Nothing has altered the Soviet desire to assimilate Russian Jewry"; and "It seems reasonable to conclude that American Jewish support has helped protect Soviet Jews" (p. 155). But on balance, was the movement a success or failure? By what standards should it be measured? Emigration figures? The numbers allowed to leave each year are indeed included, but are they large or small, good or bad? Did they go up and then down because of the Jackson amendment (linking American trade benefits to Soviet emigration policy) or despite it? Would a more activist approach have helped?

While the failure to suggest answers to these big questions is disappointing, a fascinating final chapter offers some other intellectual reward. Leaving the particular case of Soviet Jewry, Orbach examines some parallel movements earlier in the century, enabling him to submit, at last, some theoretical judgments. The movements to prevent the decimation of the Armenians and to avert the Nazi Holocaust failed; the efforts to gain Irish independence and to establish the state of Israel succeeded. What were the factors that determined these outcomes?

Among the conclusions: "A movement's success or failure does not depend on how unified its American wing is; internal conflict racked all four movements, particularly the Irish and Zionist, yet these two succeeded. . . . Perhaps [internal] competition stirs the interest groups to greater activism. . . . The character of the target state does affect success. A democratic Britain is more responsive to public pressure than a dictatorial Turkey or a Nazi Germany. . . . The size and intensity of interest groups apparently influence success. Twenty million Irish and six million aroused Jews wield political clout; 100,000 Armenians and timid Jews do not" (p. 199). Perhaps more crucial, says Orbach, is the congruence of the movement with American interests: "The concurrence of an interest group's demands with the American national mood . . . enhances a movement's chances while divergence may doom it" (p. 200).

These are all plausible hypotheses, borne out by the experiences of the five movements considered by Orbach. So also is his final point: "Perhaps as important is the target regime's evaluation of the protested policy's importance." The less threatening the issue to the target state, the more it will accede to the protesting movement's demands. But then he complicates rather than clarifies the subject. "Soviet Jewish emigration," he writes, "does not mortally threaten the Soviet regime" (pp. 200–201). This is a fact that evidently contributed to that movement's gains but also, according to Orbach, "accounts for the near hysterical condemnation by Israel and the American Jewish establishment" of activists' efforts to aid non-Jewish Soviet dissidents like Andrei Sakharov, on the grounds that to do so would make the issue seem more threatening to the Soviet authorities (p. 201). The author is apparently critical of the establishment's decision, while acknowledging that its posture contributed to the movement's success. He cannot have it both ways.

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Political Participation in the USSR *by Theodore H. Friedgut. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1979. 353 pp. $18.50.*

Professor Friedgut's book, based on careful analysis of Soviet publications, study and experiences in the USSR, and effective use of refugee interviews, is, I think, by far the best study of political participation in the USSR, as well as an important contribution to scholarship on participation generally. Unlike most specialists of comparative politics, Friedgut refuses to dismiss "output" participation of the Soviet variety—subordinate, as he perceives it, to systemic goals of socialization, legitimation, community building, and the fleshing out of inadequate local administrative resources—as insignificant simply because it does not enable citizens to influence the selection of leaders or national policy. Of course, the question springs to mind: is Soviet-directed participation, even of "elections" to soviets at the local level, with their more than 2 million deputies, and the other activities analyzed here "really" participation? It would be quibbling, however, to attach much importance to problems of definition in evaluating this major study. Professor Friedgut is acutely aware of the danger of imprecise comparison. While he gives proper credit to Jerry Hough, for example, for his energetic effort to instruct us on the role of citizen participation in Soviet politics, he has, in my judgment, a much better understanding than Hough of the limitations of, and differences between, the functions of administered, "supportive" participation and what is known as political participation in polyarchies.

Somewhat "revisionist" in his evaluation of the significance of Soviet-style participation, Friedgut is perhaps conservative—and, I think sound—in his emphasis upon the auxiliary functions such participation performs. However, this is an innovative, thoroughly empirical, densely written—but highly readable—study. Anyone interested in the development of Soviet political institutions, in the compelling socioeconomic reasons for the post-Stalin revitalization of elections and the functions performed by them and by their deputies, and in a wide range of other important topics will find here a wealth of fresh information and thoughtful analysis. Friedgut displays balance and sensitivity in informing us of the impressive scope, flexibility, and adaptability of the Soviet political system—for example, in coping with the task of closing "the gap between the regime and its citizens" (p. 157); and in providing citizens "with a variety of points of access to the administration and [in providing] the administration with a variety of sources of information on the aspirations of the citizens and the effects of policy output at the grass-roots level" (p. 188). Extraordinarily fascinating is his discussion of "functional dissent" (voting against the carefully selected official, sole candidate; or avoiding voting; or rarest, openly refusing to vote) as a source of information to the central authorities on conditions requiring their attention (pp. 71–137, 315)

While mindful of the Soviet system's staying powers, Friedgut also is aware of its weaknesses, including his analysis of careerism as a major factor in joining the ruling party (pp. 54–99). The author notes other shortcomings, citing as evidence interviews with emigrants who expressed widespread skepticism, even contempt, regarding choice-free "elections" and participatory activity in general (p. 313). Friedgut, rebutting Soviet official claims that a "mature," responsive polity exists in the USSR, strongly doubts the emergence of anything approaching "citizen competence." He is indeed pessimistic even

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about chances for development of "subject competence," which would provide subordinate participants with a measure of autonomy in performing tasks assigned from on high. If this cannot be effected, however, he foresees "stagnation" and a host of difficulties (p. 320). Friedgut concludes that the USSR "is caught between a transformation of society in which citizens are mobilized to protect the dominance of authority and a consolidation . . . in which the party rules through bureaucratic fiat" (p. 325).

FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN
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The Sphinx and the Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East *by Mohamed Heikal. New York, Harper & Row, 1979. 304 pp. $12.95.*

Mohamed Heikal, a long-time confidant of Egyptian President Gamal Nasser and an adviser to Anwar Sadat until he was fired in 1974, presents an Egyptian view of Soviet policy in the Middle East from 1955 to 1975. Heikal seeks to make two central points in his narrative: that the USSR has been unable to understand the phenomena of Islam and Arab nationalism, and that Egypt was successful in maintaining a position of independence vis-à-vis the USSR despite all the military and economic aid that Egypt received from Moscow. While Heikal's book is marred by a number of factual errors, in general it is an informative and, in some places, even an entertaining account of both the attempts by the Soviet Union to extend its influence in the Middle East and the difficulties that the Soviet leaders faced in their dealings with Arab leaders.

One of the central problems that has faced the USSR in its quest for influence in the Middle East has been the activities of the Arab Communist parties, which are seen by Arab leaders as potential or actual competitors for power. In Arab eyes, the USSR is identified with the actions of the Arab Communists whether or not Moscow has been behind them. Heikal discusses this Soviet dilemma at length, and emphasizes the alien nature of the Arab Communists in Arab society, on several occasions pointing up the Jewish origin of Arab Communist parties. Ironically, he also shows that one means of Nasser's demonstrating to the West and to conservative Arab states that he was independent of Moscow was to jail Egyptian Communists and give maximum publicity to their trials (p. 63).

A second difficulty encountered by the USSR in its dealings with the Arab world has been, in Heikal's view, the Soviet inability to relate culturally and personally to the Arabs. Thus Soviet films and books are usually unpopular with Egyptians because of their high propaganda content, while deficiencies in the area of interpersonal relations are shown by the fact that of 200,000 Arabs who studied in Moscow only 100 married Russian women, as compared to almost 7,000 of the 15,000 Arabs studying in the United States who married American women.

Nasser clearly emerges as a hero in this book, and Heikal emphasizes his ability to manipulate the Russians. Thus, according to Heikal, Moscow was "fascinated" by Nasser (p. 66) and decided to make Egypt the coordinating center for all their dealings with the

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Arabs (p. 97). Nonetheless, Nasser was careful to remain independent of the Russians, refusing to send them secret Baghdad Pact documents that had come into Egypt's possession as a result of the Iraqi Revolution of 1958 (lest the United States see Egypt as a Soviet puppet [p. 101]), and allowing an Arabic translation of *Life* magazine's book on the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Revolution to be printed in Cairo. Indeed, based on his experiences with the Russians over a period of years, Nasser expressed to Heikal his ideas for an "instructional manual" for Third World leaders who have dealings with Moscow (pp. 23–32).

If Nasser emerges as the hero of the book, Khrushchev is also treated very sympathetically. The anecdotes that Heikal relates about Khrushchev are in many ways reminiscent of Djilas's descriptions of Stalin (in *Conversations with Stalin*), and the buoyant peasantlike spontaneity of Khrushchev is clearly revealed. Indeed, the book is well worth reading if only for the glimpses of Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders which it provides. Interestingly enough, however, even in his more humorous anecdotes about Soviet-Egyptian interactions, Heikal is careful to maintain both Egyptian pride and independence, as is clearly shown in his story of an Egyptian admiral knocking out a Soviet admiral in a fistfight after the Soviet naval officer had told his Egyptian counterpart that he had an American spy on his staff (p. 85).

While there is much that is both informative and entertaining in Heikal's account, it is also open to criticism in several areas. In the first place it is doubtful that Nasser was as successful in manipulating the USSR as Heikal indicates; nor can one agree that the Soviet Union had been "sucked into the Middle East by events" (p. 65), as if the decision to send arms to Nasser had not been a deliberate Soviet move. Secondly, there are a number of rather serious factual errors that detract from the book. Thus the Libyan coup that brought Qadhafi to power occurred in September 1969, not January 1970 (p. 209); the Seventh Comintern Congress was held in 1935, not 1918 (p. 158); and the Soviet protests against the bad press they were receiving in Egypt in the aftermath of the June 1967 war came in June 1967, not May 1967 (p. 184). Finally, Heikal makes several rather outrageous statements such as the one in which Kissinger reportedly orchestrated the Kurdish revolt against Iraq in March 1974 in order to ease Iraqi pressure on Syria, thereby allowing Syria to sign a disengagement agreement with Israel in May 1974 (p. 268). In actuality, the Kurds had been in revolt since 1973, and by February 1974 the Iraqis were preparing (with Soviet help) a major military campaign to try to end the Kurdish rebellion once and for all.

In sum, however, despite its errors, *The Sphinx and the Commissar* is a useful book for those who wish to have an Arab perspective on Soviet policy in the Middle East.

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Venezuela: Oil and Politics *by Romulo Betancourt. Boston, Mass., Houghton Mifflin Company, 1979. 418 pp. $14.95.*

For two decades, students of Venezuelan political and economic development have begun their research with a thorough reading of Romulo Betancourt's *Venezuela: Política y Petróleo*. At long last, this important book is available in English. The book will be of interest to Latin Americanists, to specialists in international relations and the politics of the world petroleum market, and to those concerned with the establishment of democratic government; it fully merits the attention of this wider audience.

Betancourt's book is a political history of his country from the 1880s to 1956, a period of dictatorial military rule broken only by a three-year interlude of democratic government (1945–48). Two overriding concerns shape the narrative of the book, as indeed they have dominated Betancourt's life: the struggle to forge viable democratic political institutions, and the effort to control the operations of foreign petroleum companies in Venezuela. Early on, Betancourt perceived that these two concerns were inseparable: Venezuela could never create a stable democratic polity—one based on balanced and more equitable economic growth—unless it captured control of its petroleum resources. And no Venezuelan has done more to accomplish these objectives. Betancourt is the founder of one of Venezuela's major political parties, *Acción Democrática* (AD); he was the key figure (along with Juan Pablo Perez Alfonso) in the 1945–48 government that planned and initiated a strategy for fundamentally altering the relationship between the foreign-owned petroleum companies and the Venezuelan state; he was the leader of the democratic Left in exile during the Perez Jimenez dictatorship (1948–58); and he was the president of the country from 1959 to 1963, an immensely difficult transition period that witnessed an economic recession and repeated attempts by both the Left and the Right to overthrow his government. The fact that Venezuela is today a functioning democracy largely in control of its petroleum industry (nationalized on 1 January 1976) is in considerable measure attributable to Romulo Betancourt.

This book is not a dispassionate or scholarly account of Venezuela's political history. To the contrary, as Franklin Tugwell points out in an excellent introduction to the volume, "it is a very personal and partial account of events, one intended to serve both as explanation and justification of Betancourt's, and his party's, actions and policies" (p. xi). This is perhaps best illustrated by Betancourt's controversial account of the events surrounding the 1945 military coup that overthrew the liberalizing regime of Medina Angarita, including his defense of the AD party's decision to participate with the military in governing the country "to lead and channel the revolution" (p. 106). Indeed, his discussion of the policies of the AD government during the 1945–48 period is especially incomplete and self-serving.

This book is not only of historical significance. Specialists and laymen interested in understanding contemporary Venezuela would be well advised to read the book for what it reveals about the character, values, and political style of Romulo Betancourt. In his seventies, Betancourt is still a major force in Venezuelan politics; currently he is embroiled in a struggle with his former protege, ex-President Carlos Andres Perez, for control of the AD party. Betancourt's moralism, his condemnation of corruption, his insistence that the country's petroleum wealth not be squandered, his faith in the common

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sense of the average Venezuelan, his emphasis on party organization, and his respect for party loyalty—all these attributes contribute to an explanation of his break with Carlos Andres Perez and to his vision of AD's future.

ROBERT D. BOND
Council on Foreign Relations

Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth-Century Mexico *by Peter H. Smith. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1979. 384 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $9.75.*

Peter Smith seeks an elusive and mysterious quarry: a systematic portrayal of political recruitment in Mexico's one-party system. The resulting volume combines rigorous methodology and computer analysis of elite career paths with judicious, informative inferences about the Mexican system. Combined with a survey of related literature, the Smith book offers generalists and specialists alike a thorough view of the possibilities and problems of elite analysis in Mexico.

Professor Smith divides his analysis into three parts, beginning with a methodological introduction, followed by chapters treating social background, political career paths, and turnover among political elites. In his chapters on continuity and turnover and the role of the dominant party in government, Smith displays considerable agility in orchestrating the contrasting inferences drawn from his own research with political clichés traditionally substituted for hard and careful analysis. The result is often a convincing refutation of many of the classic assumptions regarding the nature of elite politics in Mexico.

Smith finds that there is a great deal of elite turnover from one sexennium to another, refuting the "musical chairs" hypothesis of ministerial politics and affirming the brevity of political careers in the system (chap. 6). Further, by analyzing three longitudinal cohorts of officeholders, the author points out periods of highest turnover as those which mark the greatest political transformations in the system; the Aleman, Echeverria, and Lopez-Portillo presidencies. Smith carefully and insightfully relates such phenomena to "pendulumlike patterns of national policy" (p. 166) universally cited by Mexican scholars.

Among his most convincing findings is that the dominant party, Institutional Revolutionary party (PRI), considered by many the backbone of authoritarian rule in Mexico, is a subsidiary machine, "a tool of the state, an instrument of those who truly command the governmental apparatus" (p. 231). The PRI is found to underrepresent labor and peasant sectors, to have little access to uppermost levels of political office, and to favor the amorphous "popular sector" in offices and patronage. As Smith notes, Frank Brandenburg's classic notion that the PRI cannot hold much influence in decision making (because, if it did, the laborers and *campesinos* would benefit disproportionately) is simply mistaken. The PRI, it is true, does not hold much sway over official policy, but not because it represents the masses.

The final chapters of the book show Smith's acute sense of elite politics. From his data and his knowledge of the system, Smith develops "rules of the game" for political success in Mexico (chap. 9). Respectful of the subtlety of Mexican politics, but betraying a sharp

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sense of irony, this chapter blends with well-chosen political cartoons to offer a spicy narrative of earlier inferences. The chapter on the transition in 1976 from President Echeverria to Lopez-Portillo captures some of the political savvy that has marked Lopez-Portillo as one the ablest of modern Mexican *politicos*.

With all this, the book has some irritating shortcomings. Aside from a very weak data base, which haunts the analysis from the outset, Smith employs a fuzzy concept of social class, flitting from standard socioeconomic determinations of class to status-based categories. Nowhere in the book is attention paid to the theoretical problems of social class, which is more disturbing given the careful nature of the rest of the text. Admitting the vagueness of his conception of "middle class," Smith still asserts that they are privileged (pp. 43–44). On this point even the casual visitor to Mexico can agree, but in formal terms who are they? What distinguishes them from the "upper class" and "lower class," or from capital and labor? Smith characterizes his set of socioeconomic classes as "wholly impressionistic" (p. 78) but does not shy from taking advantage of "some judgmental data" which are unsatisfying empirically.

More important, the Smith volume betrays a limited conception of the political realm in Mexico. Drawing only on officeholders for his data base, Smith confines his analysis (and is, in turn, confined by his data) to the formal political process, a process that is often more form than substance in the closed or semipublic structure of agenda setting and public discourse which traditionally had dominated Mexico. Though this limitation is to some degree overcome in later chapters by recourse to political informants and anecdotes, Smith pays no attention to "unofficial mass politics." Informal political leaders are a strong tradition in Mexico, and in certain epochs peasant leaders have affected the political process as much as any formal leader. Cardenas in the 1930s often depended on local organizations outside the party structure to effect the policies of redistribution which mark his administration as the most radical since the revolution. Likewise, Echeverria was impelled by mass political power to take certain of his populist postures. Such leadership and its relation to the state does not appear in Smith's analysis. Though it is unfair in one sense to demand that such analysis appear in a book devoted to formal recruitment, a book entitled *Labyrinths of Power* should give attention to such powerful channels of political expression and protest. Smith's book is a valuable one, both in its exposition and conclusions, but the still-awaited seminal work on political power in postrevolutionary Mexico requires a fundamental rethinking of the nature of politics in a system that hides its face from public view and denies its rewards to the constituency it professes to represent.

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Soviet Foreign Policy towards Egypt *by Karen Dawisha. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1979. 271 pp. $25.00.*

In the period from 1955 until 1978, the Soviet relationship with Egypt fluctuated widely from such high points as the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal of 1955 and the Soviet commitment of troops to aid in Egypt's defense in 1970 to such low points as the Nasser-

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Khrushchev clash in 1959 over communism in the Arab world and Sadat's repudiation of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty in 1976. Karen Dawisha traces these ups and downs in the Soviet-Egyptian relationship in a two-part book which both summarizes the flow of relations between Egypt and the USSR in the 1955–1978 period and analyzes the making of Soviet policy toward Egypt.

Dawisha's overview of twenty-three years of Egyptian-Soviet relations in the first seventy-nine pages of her book is necessarily a bit superficial, and her failure to at least mention the Soviet role in the violation of the cease-fire organized by the United States in August 1970 is somewhat surprising. Nonetheless, on balance it is a useful summary, particularly since Dawisha discusses Soviet policy toward Egypt against the background of Soviet policy toward the rest of the world. Still, one might raise a few questions with some of her assertions. Thus, she states that the USSR used Czechoslovakia as an intermediary in the arms deal with Egypt in order "to disassociate itself from the deal in order to safeguard the temporary relaxation in cold war tensions" (p. 11). Given the fact Czechoslovakia in 1955 was clearly a Soviet satellite that followed Moscow's directives in foreign policy, it is doubtful whether it made any difference if Czechosolovakia or the USSR itself was the arms supplier. Similarly, she cites the Arab conference at Khartoum in the aftermath of the 1967 war as a victory of the Arab moderates (p. 50), although resolutions of that conference specifically stated that there was to be no peace or negotiations with Israel. Dawisha's most debatable assertion, however, comes in the context of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, which she asserts was a case where détente took priority over Soviet relations with Egypt (p. 123). Given Soviet actions during the war—a massive airlift to Syria and Egypt (which prompted a similar U.S. airlift to Israel), opposition to the U.S. call for a cease-fire, and the general obstruction of peace efforts until Egypt was in deep trouble at the end of the war—one could argue that the USSR chose to maintain its relations with Egypt at the expense of its détente relationship with the United States during the conflict. Indeed, one can trace the beginnings of the erosion of American support for détente to Soviet behavior during the 1973 war.

In the second, and larger, section of her book, Dawisha sets out to examine the different elements that have influenced Soviet policymaking toward Egypt. Unhappy with the traditional models put forth by such Soviet specialists as Kennan, Ulam, Bauer, Friedrich, and Brzezinski, she chooses instead to adopt the model of Michael Brecher (p. 89). Brecher's model is based on the proposition that foreign-policy decisions are the product of the interaction between objective factors in the operational environment (military capability, economic capability, demographic influences) and subjective and idiosyncratic factors in the psychological environment of the decision makers. The problem with this approach is that without access to interviews with key decision makers, it is very difficult to determine exactly what the psychological factors affecting foreign-policy decisions are. Indeed, Brecher has successfully applied his model to a study of Israeli foreign policy because key government officials were willing to be interviewed. Since the USSR remains a closed society, such research techniques are not possible in the Soviet Union and Dawisha has had to depend on the Soviet press, reports of foreign observers such as Mohamed Heikal who have been privy to meetings with Soviet leaders, and inter-

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views with low-level functionaries in the Soviet establishment. As a result, the effectiveness of her analysis of Soviet policymaking is limited, although she makes some useful observations such as on the method by which Soviet academics get input into the policymaking process—"it's who you know where" (p. 145). In general, however, specialists in Soviet foreign policy will not learn too much from the book. On the other hand, undergraduate students and those interested in a general overview of the Soviet role in the Middle East will find the book useful.

ROBERT OWEN FREEDMAN
Baltimore Hebrew College

REFERENCE BOOKS AND SOURCE MATERIALS RECEIVED

American Labor Sourcebook *by Bernard Rifkin and Susan Rifkin. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1979. 928 pp. $39.95.*

Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 5: 1979 *edited by Alex Inkeles, James Coleman, and Ralph H. Turner. Palo Alto, Calif., Annual Reviews Inc., 1979. 415 pp. $17.00.*

Archives and Manuscripts in the Rockefeller Archive Center *compiled by the Rockefeller Archive Center. North Tarrytown, N.Y., Rockefeller Archive Center, 1979. 28 pp. no charge.*

County Government Employment in 1978 *prepared by the Governments Division, Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979. 17 pp. $.70.*

Directory of European Political Scientists, 3d. ed. rev. *edited by Jean Blondel and Carol Walker. New York, Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979. 461 pp. $75.00.*

Employee-Retirement Systems of State and Local Governments *prepared by the Finance Branch, Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979. 55 pp. $2.30.*

Employment of Major Local Governments *prepared by the Employment Branch, Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979. 235 pp. $5.50.*

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Finances of Special Districts *prepared by the Finance Branch, Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979. 85 pp. $3.50.*

The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1978 *by George H. Gallup. Wilmington, Del., Scholarly Resources Inc., 1979. 300 pp. $49.00.*

Metropolitan Reform: An Annotated Bibliography *compiled by Paula C. Baker, Elinor Ostrom, and Robert Goehlert. Bloomington, Ind., Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, 1979. 346 pp. $15.00.*

National Planning in the United States: An Annotated Bibliograhy *by David E. Wilson. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1979. 279 pp. $20.00.*

New York City Management Studies Collection, Selected Annotations, vol. 2 *prepared by the Institute of Public Administration. New York, Institute of Public Administration, 1979. 123 pp. no price.*

The Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. XII: 1833–1835 *edited by Clyde N. Wilson. Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1979. 618 pp. $27.50.*

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 31: 1914 *edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1979. 592 pp. $27.50.*

State Payments to Local Governments *prepared by the Finance Branch, Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979. 128 pp. $3.00.*

The Statesman's Year-Book 1979–1980 *edited by John Paxton. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1979. 1700 pp. $27.50.*

Who's Who in American Politics 1979–1980, 7th ed. *edited by Jacques Cattell Press. New York, R. R. Bowker Company, 1979. 1315 pp. $52.30.*

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